EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the physical delivery, receipt, and inspection of ballot packages before election day. It does not mention downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, result signatures, or any digital verifiability artifacts. The section is entirely about ballot chain-of-custody procedures, not public verification mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates that all elections use paper ballots, which directly establishes a paper trail requirement. While the statute does not explicitly use the term 'voter-verifiable,' paper ballots are by their nature voter-verifiable records—voters mark them directly and can observe their vote recorded on the physical ballot.

“all elections shall be conducted using paper ballots in accordance with this title”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section restricts recount applications to specific candidates: those for whom votes were cast at a primary and those receiving at least 9 percent of votes in a presidential primary. It does not authorize any citizen to apply for or conduct a re-tally based on published precinct data. The recount right is conditioned on candidate status and official payment of fees to the secretary of state, not on general citizen access.

The section mandates tamper-evident seals on electronic ballot counting devices and requires detailed logging of seal breaks through activity logs maintained by clerks, with witness requirements and moderator certification. This satisfies the tamper-evident requirement with comprehensive logging, placing it at level 4 on the ordinal scale, though it does not appear to mandate automatic quarantine upon tamper detection.

“Each electronic ballot counting device shall have a removable memory device which can be secured in the device with a tamper evident seal that will disclose unauthorized access to the hardware and software inside the device.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses political advertising requirements, including disclosure of sponsorship and identification in various media formats. It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or any technical specifications for voting systems. The section is entirely about campaign disclosure and advertisement labeling requirements, not election infrastructure or voting machine security.

The statute requires that election returns be kept by the town or city clerk and be open to public inspection, which provides some transparency. However, the section does not explicitly require 'full chain-of-custody documentation'—it addresses retention and public access to returns, not comprehensive documentation of the complete chain of custody for voting hardware or ballots.

“The other shall be kept by the town or city clerk in accordance with RSA 33-A:3-a and shall be open to public inspection at reasonable times.”

The statute explicitly criminalizes unauthorized device access, tampering, and possession of keys to electronic ballot counting devices, imposing class B felony penalties for natural persons. This directly addresses criminal penalties for unauthorized access to election equipment.

“Whoever shall take away, tamper with, injure, attempt to injure, destroy, or attempt to destroy any electronic ballot counting device for the counting of ballots to be used or being used in an election or whoever shall prevent or attempt to prevent the correct operation of such device or whoever shall tamper with software used in the counting of ballots or design such software so as to cause incorrect tabulation of the ballots or any unauthorized person who shall make or have in his or her possession a key to an electronic ballot counting device to be used or being used in an election shall be guilty of a class B felony if a natural person or guilty of a felony if any other person.”

The statute mandates that the secretary of state 'shall' conduct audits of ballot counting devices in every election, establishing a post-election audit requirement. The mandatory language ('shall') and the absence of any exception or discretionary language indicates this audit must occur for every election.

“The secretary of state shall randomly select not less than 8 ballot counting devices used by towns or city wards to be audited.”

The statute mandates a comparison audit method where paper ballots are processed by audit equipment and compared against the results of the device being audited. This is a comparison audit (score 3) rather than a risk-limiting audit or RLA with reconciliation, as it does not employ statistical risk-limiting methodologies to determine sample sizes based on risk limits.

“The paper ballots for each device audited shall be processed by the audit equipment, and the results shall be compared with the results from the specific device being audited.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly provides that audits are open to the public, which affords parties, media, and citizens observer access. The restriction on touching ballots or equipment relates to handling procedures, not visibility or observation rights.

“The audit shall be open to the public, but no one except audit team members shall be allowed to touch any ballot or any of the audit equipment.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute describes an audit procedure that requires comparison of results and reporting of findings, but contains no language establishing that audit results are legally binding on the final certified result. The provision allows the secretary of state to expand sampling or order a full hand recount in cases of 'significant differences,' but does not specify that audit findings modify or override the certified election result.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses deepfake media and AI-generated content in election communications within 90 days of elections. It does not pertain to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The statute regulates the distribution of deceptive synthetic media rather than addressing software verification or source code disclosure for voting systems.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires vendors to provide electronic records of device programming to the secretary of state before each election, which addresses data transparency. However, the statute does not explicitly require that ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules be signed and published in a way accessible to the public before polls open. It mandates internal documentation but does not clearly satisfy the criterion's requirement for public pre-election publication of these election definition materials.

“Before each election, the vendor for any electronic ballot counting device shall provide the secretary of state with an exact electronic record of the data written to each external storage device to be used in the election.”

No matching sections in corpus.

This section explicitly mandates that appointed challengers (party observers) be positioned to see and hear ballot counting and maintain line of sight on electronic devices, ensuring full procedural access to the vote tabulation process.

“a challenger appointed pursuant to RSA 666:5 shall be assigned by the moderator or other election official presiding at the polling place to such position or positions within the polling place as will enable such challenger to see and hear the hand-counting of ballots for the tabulation of votes, and to maintain a line of sight on any electronic ballot counting device”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 666:5-a addresses positioning of challengers (domestic partisan observers) at polling places to observe ballot counting and electronic devices. It does not mention international observers, OSCE, EU, or IFES observers, nor does it establish any provision for their admission by default or otherwise.

The statute requires forwarding election returns to the secretary of state by 8:00 a.m. the day after the election, which is approximately 24-32 hours depending on poll closing time. However, the section does not explicitly mandate public publication of precinct-level results within 24 hours; it addresses delivery to the secretary of state and public inspection at reasonable times at the local level, without specifying a timeline for public availability.

“One copy of the election return shall be forwarded by the town or ward clerk to the secretary of state in both paper and electronic form no later than 8:00 a.m. on the day following a state election”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses coercion of political contributions by employers and businesses and has no relevance to vendor independence, certified vendors, or election administration systems. It is entirely outside the scope of the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter checklist preparation, composition, and maintenance procedures. It does not address vote-format or device-protocol standards, which are the subject of criterion 5.2. The section is entirely unrelated to vendor independence or the openness of voting system protocols.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates political contributions and donor disclosure requirements. It does not address ballot secrecy, voter-ballot unlinkability, or the mechanisms that protect the secrecy of individual voter choices. The criterion concerns the confidentiality of voting itself, which is a separate topic from campaign finance restrictions.

The section mandates that each polling place have at least one accessible voting system, addressing some accessibility needs (particularly for voters with vision or motor impairments using electronic systems). However, it does not comprehensively specify accessibility standards for vision, motor, and language access across all polling place infrastructure, materials, and personnel support—only requiring one electronic accessible system per location.

“Every city, every town, and every school district which has adopted an official ballot system shall: (a) Ensure that each polling place has at least one accessible voting system.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 659:73 addresses the content and reporting of election returns, moderator certificates, and post-election documentation. It contains no provisions regarding polling place density, the number of polling places relative to voter population, or geographic distribution requirements for polling locations.