EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

This section specifies that appeals from ballot law commission decisions go to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, establishing appellate venue with a clear 5-day filing deadline. However, it does not specify the court of ORIGINAL jurisdiction for election contests. The section addresses only appellate jurisdiction and refers to prior decisions by the ballot law commission (RSA 665:8, II), implying that the commission itself may be the original decision-maker for certain election contests. The statute does not explicitly codify what court or body has original jurisdiction to hear election contest petitions or how such contests are initiated at the first instance. Additionally, the section limits appeals to specific offices (presidential elector, governor, councilor, town/city offices) and explicitly excludes federal and state legislative offices due to constitutional provisions vesting exclusive jurisdiction elsewhere. While venue for appeals is specified, the criterion asks for specification of the court of original jurisdiction, which this section does not clearly establish.

“There may be an appeal to the supreme court from the decisions of the ballot law commission made under RSA 665:8, II as provided in this section and not otherwise. Such appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court within 5 days after the decision of the commission is filed with the secretary of state.”

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 665:16 specifies a concrete filing deadline for election contests: appeals must be filed within 5 days after the ballot law commission's decision is filed with the secretary of state. This satisfies the criterion because it codifies a precise, temporal trigger (5 days after a defined event—the filing of the commission's decision). The deadline is objective and administratively clear, enabling parties to know exactly when their filing window closes. While the scope is limited to certain offices (presidential elector, governor, councilor, town/city offices), the deadline itself is unambiguously defined by statute.

“Such appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court within 5 days after the decision of the commission is filed with the secretary of state.”

Section 665:16 establishes a standard of proof by requiring that findings of fact be 'supported by the requisite evidence,' which is codified language indicating a proof threshold. However, the statute does not define what 'requisite evidence' means, does not specify evidentiary rules (e.g., admissibility, burden allocation, types of evidence permitted), and does not articulate the standard of proof explicitly (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, substantial evidence). The section also limits appeals to 'questions of law' while leaving factual findings final if supported by unspecified 'requisite evidence.' This reflects a partial articulation of standards—the statutory language acknowledges proof requirements—but lacks the specificity needed for complete procedural clarity regarding evidence admissibility and burden of proof. A score of 1 reflects that a standard is set ('requisite evidence') without detailed evidentiary rules.

“Findings of fact made by the commission shall be final if supported by the requisite evidence.”

This section establishes TIMING and NOTICE requirements for recounts with statutory clarity: the secretary of state must begin recounting no later than the Wednesday following the recount request deadline, at a designated state facility in Concord, with notice to applicants and opposing candidates. However, the section explicitly delegates the substantive recount PROCEDURES themselves to administrative rules ('rules and procedures governing the recount') rather than codifying them in statute. The section does not define who physically counts ballots, the methodology for counting, chain-of-custody procedures, what evidence triggers invalidation of ballots, or how disputed ballots are resolved. While the procedural framework (timing, venue, notice) is statutory, the operational mechanics are left to administrative discretion. This represents partial satisfaction: strong statutory clarity on procedural triggers and deadlines, but substantive counting procedures are not statutorily defined.

“The secretary of state shall give a reasonable notice thereof to the applicant and to each of the opposing candidates. The secretary of state shall also prepare and distribute to the applicant and to each of the opposing candidates the rules and procedures governing the recount”

This section (§ 660:6) addresses the EFFECTS and PROCEDURE of a recount (declaration, certificate, fee refunds, appeal mechanism) but does not enumerate the triggers that initiate a recount. It presupposes a recount has already been requested or ordered, referencing prior procedural steps. The section does reference RSA 660:2 (fee requirements) and RSA 665:8, II (appeal to ballot law commission), suggesting triggers are codified elsewhere in the statute. To fully satisfy RECT.2, the triggers themselves—margin thresholds, sworn affidavits, timing windows, or other enumerated conditions—must appear in the statute. This section assumes a recount has been initiated but does not state what activates that initiation. Partial credit is appropriate because the statute does contain structured recount procedure and fee refund rules tied to margins (one percent threshold in § 660:6, III), but this section alone does not enumerate the initial triggers.

“If the recount shall show that some candidate other than the one declared elected upon the original canvass of votes has the greatest number of votes cast for the office, the secretary of state shall declare said candidate to be elected; and, unless the result is changed upon an appeal taken to the ballot law commission, as provided in RSA 665:8, II”

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 669:31 clearly codifies cost allocation for petition-based recounts. The statute establishes a tiered fee structure based on the vote margin between the applying candidate and the declared winner (ranging from $10 to $40, plus potential additional costs). Critically, it also specifies outcome-based refund mechanisms: fees are fully returned if the applicant wins the recount, and excess fees are returned if the applicant loses by less than one percent. This satisfies RECT.3 by establishing both the initial cost burden (applicant pays) and the allocation of costs contingent on recount results, all within statutory language.

The statute explicitly codifies the legal effect of a recount finding: the secretary of state's declaration of the result is final, establishing that recount findings are binding. The statute further clarifies the only mechanism that can alter this binding effect—an appeal to the ballot law commission within 10 days. This unambiguously codifies that recount findings are mandatory and binding unless overturned through the specified appellate process, directly addressing the criterion's requirement that the effect of a recount finding be codified in statute.

“the secretary of state shall declare said result which shall be final unless the result is changed because of an appeal taken within 10 days to the ballot law commission”

This section specifies a mechanism for declaring a candidate elected following a recount (with a conditional appeal process to the ballot law commission), and mandates issuance of a certificate within 10 days if the recount applicant wins. However, it does not establish a statutory deadline for the *initial* certification of the election result itself—i.e., when the secretary of state must complete the canvass and declare a result before any recount is requested. The section addresses post-recount certification timing and procedures, but does not codify the primary certification deadline that would satisfy TIME.1. Cross-reference to RSA 665:8 is required to assess whether a complete statutory certification scheme exists, but this excerpt alone does not set forth the certification deadline required by the criterion.

“If the recount shall show that some candidate other than the one declared elected upon the original canvass of votes has the greatest number of votes cast for the office, the secretary of state shall declare said candidate to be elected; and, unless the result is changed upon an appeal taken to the ballot law commission, as provided in RSA 665:8, II, such candidate shall be entitled to a certificate of election.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 660:5 regulates the CONDUCT of a recount—ballot collection, counting methods, visual inspection, participant rights, and dispute resolution during the recount itself. It does not address whether certification can or must be stayed pending completion of a recount or election contest. The section contains no language preventing or requiring certification to be delayed while a recount is underway. TIME.2 specifically requires 'a mechanism to stay certification while a recount or contest is pending'—a procedural safeguard that presupposes certification authority and triggers for halting it. Section 660:5 addresses only how the recount is conducted, not temporal coordination between recount completion and certification deadlines. A separate statutory provision (likely in RSA 660:1-4 or another title addressing certification deadlines and prerequisites) would be needed to satisfy this criterion.