EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses signature verification and identification requirements for mail-in ballot envelopes but does not mandate or address downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures. It is about voter identification and ballot authentication procedures, not public verifiability artifacts or cryptographic verification systems.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute establishes that a paper ballot is a valid vote for electronic voting systems, suggesting a paper trail exists. However, the section does not explicitly require voters to verify the paper record before it is cast, nor does it mandate that the paper ballot is the official record of the voter's intent for all voting methods. It addresses paper ballots as an outcome of electronic voting but does not fully establish a voter-verifiable paper trail requirement as a general legal mandate.

“A paper ballot printed to reflect the voter's choices constitutes a valid vote.”

The section requires the Secretary of State to publish election results by precinct, which establishes a public record that could in theory support citizen re-tallying. However, the statute does not explicitly authorize or protect any citizen's legal right to re-tally from those results, nor does it state that results must be published in a format enabling independent verification or aggregation. The language is permissive regarding publication ('may...publish') and does not affirmatively grant citizens a right of access or re-tallying.

“The Secretary of State shall retain the election results for at least five years and shall collate, arrange, computerize, or publish reports arranging the election results.”

The statute mandates that programming boards and related materials be sealed and stored, which establishes a tamper-evident seal requirement. However, there is no mention of logged access, documentation of seal integrity checks, or tamper-responsive measures such as automatic quarantine of compromised equipment.

“All tapes, programming boards, and other materials used with vote counting devices for the election shall be sealed and stored with the ballots and election materials for that election for the amount of time required by law.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration records, public access to voter lists, and security breach notification requirements. It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or internet isolation standards. The section is entirely about the management and distribution of voter registration data, not the technical specifications or connectivity restrictions of voting machines.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses fraudulent assistance of illiterate voters and ballot manipulation as criminal offenses, but does not establish or require chain-of-custody documentation procedures or public availability of such documentation. The criterion concerns custody documentation requirements, which is a procedural/administrative matter distinct from the criminal prohibition articulated here.

This section establishes criminal penalties for destruction, falsification, and tampering with ballots and election materials, but it does not explicitly address unauthorized access to election devices or hardware. The statute focuses on tangible ballot materials and paper records rather than electronic voting systems or device tamper protection. While the general intent aligns with election integrity, the criterion specifically asks about criminal penalties for unauthorized device access, which this section does not explicitly cover.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for resolving tied elections through recounts and lot drawings, not post-election audits. It does not establish or mandate audit requirements for any elections.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for resolving tie votes through lot drawings and legislative selection following recounts, not audit methods. It does not mandate or describe any audit methodology (hand recount percentages, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures). The section is about tie-breaking, not post-election auditing.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the election and qualifications of state officials but does not address audit procedures, observer access, or post-election audits. It is irrelevant to the criterion about public observation of audits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the board of state canvassers' duty to canvass votes, which is characterized as ministerial in nature. However, it does not address whether audit results are binding on final certified results, nor does it establish any audit procedures or legal consequences for audit findings. The section governs vote canvassing, not post-election audits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure and financial reporting requirements for candidates and elected officials. It does not address voting system source code accessibility or vendor disclosure requirements, which is the focus of criterion 1.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs voter registration records, their public availability, distribution procedures, and security breach notification. It contains no provisions regarding cryptographic commitment of running binaries, hash publication, or any pre-election software verification measures. The criterion concerns software verifiability and cryptographic practices; this section addresses voter data management only.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for registered voters without a residence address in the county, requiring them to take an oath and establishing a mailing address for ballot receipt. It does not address ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or any requirement that these materials be signed and published before polls open.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses petition signature verification procedures and permits the use of software to assist in processing petitions, but explicitly prohibits its use for signature verification. The section does not address post-election integrity checks, binary verification, or any mechanism to verify that software matches a committed version. The criterion concerns technical verification of election software, which is not the subject of this statute section.

The statute grants poll watchers (including party and civil-society appointees) explicit procedural access to observe all proceedings and duties at polling places throughout the election process. This directly satisfies the requirement for full procedural access to observers.

“a poll watcher may be present during all proceedings at the polling place governed by the Election Act and may watch and observe the performance in and around the polling place of all duties under the act”

The statute provides credentials to international election monitoring organizations but does not explicitly guarantee admission 'by default' or specifically mention OSCE, EU, or IFES by name. The language requires prior notice to the Secretary of State rather than establishing automatic or default access rights.

“the Secretary of State shall provide the national or international election monitoring organization with the proper credentials for each poll watcher for whom the Secretary of State receives notice”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute requires reporting to the Secretary of State within eight weeks after county canvass, which falls far short of the 24-hour publication requirement specified in the criterion. Eight weeks is approximately 56 days, making this incompatible with any timeline between 24 hours and 48 hours.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance reporting requirements for agents, independent contractors, and petition signature gatherers. It contains no provisions regarding certified vendors, election systems, or multi-vendor capability. The statute is about disclosure and expenditure reporting, not vendor certification or competition.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses poll hours and ballot receipt deadlines for elections in Nebraska. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, or vendor independence. The section is entirely procedural regarding election timing and is unrelated to the criterion's focus on open protocol standards for voting systems.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns candidate eligibility requirements for filing for elective office, including voter registration, party affiliation, and disclosure penalties. It has no bearing on vendor contracts, contract duration, or vendor independence in election systems.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates provision of 'secrecy sleeves' as equipment, which is a physical mechanism intended to protect ballot secrecy. However, the section merely requires election officials to provide these materials—it does not explicitly guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability as a legal right, nor does it establish enforceability mechanisms or substantive protections for ballot secrecy beyond requiring equipment availability. The criterion asks for a legal guarantee and enforceability of unlinkability, which this section does not establish.

“secrecy sleeves”

The statute mandates comprehensive accessibility at all polling places by requiring compliance with the ADA and HAVA, and specifies detailed requirements for vision accessibility (signage with letter size specifications), motor accessibility (wheelchair access, ramps, lifts, elevators), and polling place modification or relocation to remove architectural barriers. The section further requires training for all poll workers on accessibility standards.

“All polling places shall be accessible to all registered voters and shall be in compliance with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, and the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002, as amended.”

The statute specifies a ratio for voting booths (1 per ~100 registered voters) but does not establish a floor for the number of polling places themselves per voter or geographic area. The criterion asks about polling-place density, not booth density. The statute allows designation of polling places outside precincts when suitable structures don't exist but provides no minimum polling place requirement.