EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

Nebraska Revised Statutes § 32-1109(1) explicitly designates district courts as the courts of original jurisdiction for all election contests involving political subdivision officers. The statute unambiguously vests jurisdiction in 'the several district courts' without discretionary language or ambiguity. This satisfies CONT.EDRI.2 by providing clear statutory specification of the forum for election contest adjudication, enabling prompt and accessible dispute resolution based on codified rules rather than case-by-case jurisdictional determinations.

“The several district courts shall have jurisdiction in cases of contested elections for officers of all political subdivisions of the State of Nebraska.”

The statute specifies a 20-day deadline measured from a defined event ('after the votes have been officially canvassed'). This partially satisfies the criterion. However, the statute uses the term 'notice...shall be given' rather than explicitly framing this as a filing deadline with a court. The section addresses notice to the opposing party rather than explicit filing with the court, creating ambiguity about whether this is the filing deadline or merely a notice requirement. Additionally, there is no explicit cross-reference establishing that this 20-day period is the exclusive window for initiating a contest action in district court, though the jurisdictional statement in subsection (1) implies the court's role. The deadline is codified and tied to a clear event, meeting the core requirement; but the framing as a notice obligation to the opposing party rather than an explicit court-filing deadline introduces procedural ambiguity.

“Notice of such contest shall be given to the person whose election is contested within twenty days after the votes have been officially canvassed.”

This statute establishes one evidentiary rule—that the election official's certificate is prima facie evidence and can be contradicted by witness testimony. This codifies a minimal standard of proof (prima facie) and a narrow rule of admissibility (direct examination witnesses present at ballot inspection). However, the statute does not establish a comprehensive standard of proof governing the overall burden in an election contest (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence) nor does it codify broader evidentiary rules governing admissibility of other types of evidence (expert testimony, statistical analysis, prior election records, etc.). The codified element addresses only ballot examination evidence. The statute satisfies the threshold of setting *a* standard and rule but falls short of comprehensive evidentiary framework.

“The certificate of the election commissioner or county clerk certifying the total number of votes received by a candidate shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certificate, but the persons present at the examination of the ballots may be heard as witnesses to contradict the certificate.”

The statute codifies comprehensive recount procedures including: (1) who counts (county canvassing board per subsection 3); (2) how (same procedures as election day counting per subsection 7, with specific rules for vote counting devices); (3) with what evidence (abstract of votes establishes trigger per subsection 1, ballots are the evidence); (4) timing (fifth Wednesday after election for state candidates per subsection 4, as soon as possible for county candidates per subsection 5); (5) cost allocation (paid by political subdivisions involved per subsection 2); (6) notice and candidate presence (subsection 6 requires notification and allows candidate presence or representation). These substantive procedural rules are all embedded in the statutory text itself, not delegated to regulation or administrative directive. The statute provides sufficient specificity to enable prompt and accessible recount resolution based on statutory rules rather than case-by-case administrative discretion.

“The procedures for the recounting of ballots shall be the same as those used for the counting of ballots on election day. The recount shall be conducted at the county courthouse, except that if vote counting devices are used for the counting or recounting, such counting or recounting may be accomplished at the site of the devices. Counties counting ballots by using a vote counting device shall first recount the ballots by use of the device. If substantial changes are found, the ballots shall then be counted using such device in any precinct which might reflect a substantial change.”

The statute explicitly enumerates a specific trigger for automatic recount: a margin of one percent or less between votes for and against removal. This is a clear, numeric threshold that operates automatically upon satisfaction of the condition, unless the official affirmatively waives recount via written statement. The trigger is codified and non-discretionary, meeting the core requirement of criterion RECT.2 that recount triggers be enumerated in statute. The section does not address general election recounts outside the recall context, but within the recall election framework it establishes a precise margin-based trigger.

“If the election results show a margin of votes equal to one percent or less between the removal or retention of the official in question, the Secretary of State, election commissioner, or county clerk shall order a recount of the votes cast unless the official named on the ballot files a written statement with the filing officer that he or she does not want a recount.”

Section 32-1119(2) explicitly allocates recount costs by statute. The provision unambiguously states that all expenses of a recount shall be paid by the political subdivisions involved in the recount. This is a clear, mandatory cost-allocation rule that does not condition payment on outcome—the subdivisions bear the cost regardless of whether the recount changes the result. The statute thus satisfies the criterion by codifying cost allocation with precision and directness.

“All expenses of a recount under this section shall be paid by those political subdivisions involved in the recount.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This statute addresses the timing and procedures for state political party conventions, including the nomination of candidates and selection of presidential electors. It does not address election certification deadlines—that is, the date by which election officials must declare election results official after voting has occurred. The section governs internal party procedures (convention timing, platform formulation, elector selection) but does not set a statutory deadline for when election results become certified and official. TIME.1 requires a statute that fixes when election certification occurs (the formal declaration that results are official), not when party conventions must be held. This section fails to address the substantive criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.