EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses verification of voter registration applicant information through an agreement with the Social Security Administration. It does not concern public verification artifacts, downloadable packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures related to election integrity auditing or transparency. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion being evaluated.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section defines electronic voting systems as requiring votes to be recorded on a paper ballot by marking, which creates a voter-verifiable paper trail. This establishes that the voting system must produce a hand-marked paper record that voters can verify.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the selection procedures for county and state executive committees of political parties. It contains no language regarding citizen rights to re-tally election results, access to precinct data, or verification procedures. The criterion concerns citizen verifiability of election outcomes, which is entirely unrelated to the topic of this statute.

The statute mandates tamper-evident seals (numbered metal seals placed on ballot boxes) and requires a separate record of seal numbers to be kept by the clerk. However, there is no explicit requirement for logging when seals are inspected or broken, nor any tamper-responsive automatic quarantine mechanism. The tamper-evident component satisfies part of the criterion but falls short of the full logging requirement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses mandatory training of election managers and clerks, including training requirements, compensation, and public notice procedures. It contains no provisions regarding network isolation, internet connectivity, Wi-Fi, cellular connectivity, or any technical requirements for vote-casting equipment.

The section requires documentation of ballot box seals (seal numbers recorded by the clerk), but does not mandate a full chain-of-custody record tracking the movement, handling, and custody of ballot boxes and materials throughout their lifecycle. It also does not explicitly require that such documentation be publicly available.

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties for tampering with voting machines, including felony imprisonment of 3–10 years for willful tampering. It also penalizes unauthorized possession of voting machines or keys as a misdemeanor with jail time and fines, which addresses unauthorized device access.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns filing fees for candidates entering primary elections. It is unrelated to post-election audits, which are procedures for verifying election results after voting concludes. The statute text contains no provisions regarding audit requirements.

The section requires DRE systems to produce a permanent paper record available for recounts, which enables manual auditing. However, it does not mandate any specific audit method (e.g., fixed-percentage hand recount, comparison audit, or risk-limiting audit). It only requires the capability and availability of paper records for potential recounts, without specifying when or how audits must be conducted. This supports manual recounts but does not establish a mandatory audit protocol.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute grants observer access to the pre-election testing of tabulating equipment and requires it to be witnessed by political parties, candidates, press, and public. However, this addresses pre-election testing and certification, not a post-election audit. The criterion asks about post-election audit observation, which is a distinct requirement that would typically involve observation of the counting, verification, and reconciliation processes after votes are cast. While the section mentions tabulating equipment must pass 'the same test at the conclusion of the count,' it does not clearly establish that parties, media, and citizens have guaranteed observer access during the actual post-election audit process itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the transmission and tabulation of election returns by county commissioners and the Secretary of State, establishing that certified county vote totals represent the final results. However, it contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit procedures, or the binding force of any audit results on certified election outcomes. The criterion asks about audit results specifically, which this section does not address.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the compilation and dissemination of campaign disclosure reports for candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion regarding voting system software verifiability and source code disclosure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires testing of tabulating equipment using predetermined ballot configurations before counting begins, which ensures the equipment functions correctly. However, it does not address publishing ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules to the public before polls open—it only mandates internal pre-election testing with predetermined test ballots. The requirement for such publication as a signed, public artifact is absent from this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a centralized voter registration database system and its management procedures, but it does not address post-election integrity checks or the verification of running binaries against committed code. The statute focuses on database functionality, data conversion, security controls for unauthorized access, and advisory committee structure—not on post-election software verification or binary matching.

The statute grants poll watchers rights to challenge voter qualifications, which represents one procedural access point. However, the section addresses only one narrow aspect of observer access (challenging voter qualifications) and does not establish comprehensive procedural access rights for observers across the full range of election operations. Full procedural access would require broader guarantees about observer presence, information access, and involvement in other election procedures beyond voter challenges.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for filling vacancies in municipal offices through appointment or special election. It does not contain any requirements regarding the publication or reporting of election results, precinct-level or otherwise. The criterion concerns result publication speed, which is entirely outside the scope of this vacancy-filling statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 23-15-883 concerns exceptions to labor restrictions for state highway and public road maintenance and construction contracts. It is entirely unrelated to election administration, certified vendors, or voting systems. It does not address multi-vendor capability or any election integrity matter.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a centralized voter registration database system and requires adherence to 'standard, industry accepted file format,' but it does not address vote-format or device-protocol standards for voting equipment or election devices. The criterion concerns open and publicly documented standards for voting technology, which is outside the scope of voter registration system specifications covered here.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions for election law terms (election, candidate, political committee, contribution, expenditure, etc.) but does not address vendor contracts or contract duration caps. It is entirely about campaign finance and political committee definitions, not vendor management or procurement.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires electronic voting systems to provide for voting in secrecy when used with voting booths, which addresses ballot secrecy. However, it does not establish voter-ballot unlinkability as a distinct guarantee or specify enforcement mechanisms to prevent linkage of votes to individual voters. The requirement is conditional on booth usage and does not comprehensively address the technological or procedural unlinkability that modern voter-ballot unlinkability guarantees typically entail.

“Provide for voting in secrecy when used with voting booths”

The statute requires DRE units to be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including vision and language accessibility, but allows compliance through just one accessible unit per polling place rather than comprehensive accessibility at every polling place. This addresses some accessibility needs but does not mandate comprehensive accessibility for all voters at all voting stations.

The section establishes a mandatory minimum ratio of voting compartments/shelves/tables to voters, requiring at least one per 200 electors. This directly addresses polling-place density by setting a legal floor on the number of voting facilities available to voters.