EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 20507 addresses voter registration administration, confirmation procedures, and removal of ineligible voters. It contains no provisions about downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures related to election verification or audit artifacts. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-11 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly requires that voting systems produce a permanent paper record with manual audit capacity, and specifies that this paper record shall be available as an official record for any recount. This directly establishes a voter-verifiable paper trail requirement. “The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system.” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns a study and report on the feasibility of free postage for absentee ballots. It does not address citizen re-tally rights, precinct-level data publication, or vote verification procedures. The section is entirely administrative and procedural in nature, establishing no mechanism or right related to citizen verification of election results. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Custody Hardware
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the Federal Election Commission's structure, composition, voting requirements, and administrative procedures. It contains no provisions regarding hardware tamper standards, tamper-evident seals, logging mechanisms, or tamper-responsive systems. The criterion concerns technical safeguards for election equipment, which is not addressed in this section. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires the Attorney General to review and report on criminal statutes concerning election offenses and the adequacy of Internet-related penalties. It does not mandate, prohibit, or regulate network connectivity on vote-casting equipment. The section addresses statutory review and reporting, not hardware security requirements. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the administrative transfer of functions from the Federal Election Commission to the Election Assistance Commission. It contains no requirements regarding chain-of-custody documentation for voting equipment or materials, nor does it address public availability of such documentation. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a mandate for the Election Administration Commission to study electronic voting systems and report on issues including fraud prevention and security measures. However, it contains no criminal penalties, authorized or unauthorized, for device access or tampering. It is a procedural directive for research and reporting, not substantive criminal law. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Post Election Audit
22.2% · 2/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | The section requires voting systems to have audit capacity and produce a permanent paper record available as an official record for any recount, but it does not mandate that a post-election audit be conducted for every election. It establishes the capability and availability of records for audits and recounts, but does not require audits to be performed routinely or systematically after each election. “The voting system shall produce a record with an audit capacity for such system.” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | This section mandates a permanent paper record with manual audit capacity and that the paper record must be available as an official record for any recount, which supports basic hand-count auditing capability. However, the statute does not specify the audit method (e.g., fixed percentage, comparison audit, or risk-limiting audit), leaving the actual audit protocol undefined. “The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system.” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30111 addresses the FEC's administrative duties regarding forms, filing systems, public records, and discretionary audits of political committees. It does not establish audit triggers based on election close margins or sworn challenges to election results. The audits described concern campaign finance compliance, not post-election outcome verification. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section grants access exclusively to 'designated congressional election observers'—specifically House or Senate employees designated by congressional committee chairs or ranking minority members. It does not extend observer access to parties, media, or citizens for audits or other election administration procedures. The statute is narrowly limited to congressional observers and does not address public observation requirements. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses enforcement procedures for violations of campaign finance and election laws, including complaint filing, investigations, conciliation, and penalties. It does not address post-election audits or whether audit results are binding on final certified election results. The section is focused on administrative and judicial enforcement of federal election law violations, not audit procedures or their legal effect on certification. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses Census Bureau surveys of voter registration and voting statistics, not voting system source code disclosure. It contains no provisions regarding access to voting system source code by vendors, certifying authorities, academics, or the public. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-11 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a technology pilot program for testing election technology with absent uniformed services and overseas voters. It authorizes the Presidential designee to consider various security techniques including cryptographic voting systems, but does not mandate or establish any requirement that running binaries be cryptographically committed or hashed before polls open. The section is about pilot program authorization and technical considerations, not about pre-election binary commitments. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a study and reporting requirement regarding the feasibility of free absentee ballot postage. It does not address ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or any publication of election materials before polls open. The criterion concerns software verifiability and pre-election publication of ballot specifications, which is entirely outside the scope of this postage study provision. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes voting system standards including voter verification of ballot selections, manual audit capacity, and paper record requirements. However, it does not address verification of the actual running binary code against a committed version, which is a distinct cybersecurity concern related to software integrity. The statute mandates voter-facing verification and post-election audit trails but does not grant rights to verify that deployed voting system software matches any previously committed or certified source code. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | The section provides full procedural access, but only to a narrowly defined class of observers—House and Senate employees designated by congressional committee leadership. The criterion asks about 'party and civil-society observers,' which this statute does not address. Congressional observers are distinct from party representatives or civil-society groups, so while the access granted is comprehensive for that specific observer type, it does not satisfy the broader criterion of general party and civil-society observer access. “A State shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures, including, but not limited to, access to any area in which a ballot is cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, including during pre- and post-election procedures.” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-11 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 30104 addresses reporting requirements for political committees' receipts and disbursements—specifically when campaign treasurers must file financial disclosures. It does not address election results reporting, precinct-level results publication, or any timeline for publishing vote counts. The section is entirely focused on campaign finance disclosure, not election result transparency. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes voting system standards related to ballot verification, paper records, accessibility, and error rates, but does not address or require a public, signed, append-only election event log. The audit capacity and permanent paper record requirements are distinct from a public event log mechanism. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30104 establishes reporting requirements for political committees regarding receipts and disbursements. It does not address vendor certification, multi-vendor operations, or election administration systems. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning multiple certified vendors operating in the same election. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | The section establishes a committee to develop voting system guidelines and requires publication of recommendations in the Federal Register, which addresses transparency and public documentation. However, the statute does not explicitly require that standards be 'open' (non-proprietary) or mandate that protocols themselves be publicly available—only that the Development Committee's recommendations be published. The section does prohibit private sector entities from obtaining intellectual property rights to guidelines, which supports openness, but does not affirmatively establish that vote-format and device-protocol standards will be open and publicly documented. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the organizational structure and staffing of the Election Assistance Commission, including the appointment and terms of the Executive Director, General Counsel, and other personnel. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or measures to prevent lock-in with external vendors. The section is entirely focused on internal Commission staff governance and does not address the criterion concerning vendor contract duration limitations. | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-11 |
Voter Access
42.9% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 0/10.0% | The section acknowledges the right to cast a secret ballot as an issue to be studied and considered, but it does not establish or guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability itself. This is a study directive about best practices, not an enforceable legal requirement implementing ballot secrecy protections for military and overseas voters. “the right of such voters to cast a secret ballot” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | This section mandates accessibility at polling places and explicitly addresses vision disabilities (blind and visually impaired). However, it does not comprehensively define specific accessibility standards for motor or language accessibility, nor does it establish detailed technical requirements. The statute requires accessibility but leaves implementation details to states and localities, rather than prescribing comprehensive mandatory standards. “making polling places, including the path of travel, entrances, exits, and voting areas of each polling facility, accessible to individuals with disabilities, including the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters” | § view source 2026-05-11 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 21082 addresses provisional voting procedures and voting information requirements at polling places, but contains no provisions establishing a legal floor or minimum standard for polling-place density, either per number of voters or per geographic area. | § view source 2026-05-11 |