EIIElection Integrity Index

KRS 117.125(23) requires every approved voting system to 'produce a real-time audit log record... and produce a paper record with a manual audit capacity which shall be available as an official record for any recount,' and (14) to preserve the paper ballot as an official record available for any audit. KRS 117.383(8) makes the hand-to-eye audit publicly viewable and video-streamed. Verification artifacts are codified, though not consolidated into a single downloadable public verification package.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

KRS 117.125 requires every approved voting system to: (12) 'provide each voter an opportunity to verify votes recorded on the permanent paper ballot... by producing a voter-verified paper audit trail'; (13) 'use an individual, discrete, permanent, paper ballot cast by the voter for tabulating purposes'; and (14) 'preserve the paper ballot as an official record available for use in any audit or recount.' KRS 117.001(26) defines the VVPAT in detail. A voter-verifiable paper trail is mandated.

“Provide each voter an opportunity to verify votes recorded on the permanent paper ballot, either visually or using assistive voting technology, by producing a voter-verified paper audit trail”

KRS 117.383(10) requires the county board to produce 'accurate precinct-by-precinct summaries of tabulation sheets showing the results of each precinct,' and KRS 117.383(8) opens the hand-to-eye audit to public viewing. Precinct-level result data is published and the audit is publicly observable, but a formal re-tally right is limited to candidates through the recount process under KRS Chapter 120.

KRS 117.076(10)-(12) codifies a tamper-evidence regime: voting equipment used for in-person absentee voting must remain locked with a 'tamper-resistant seal,' and before and after each day the seal must be checked, recorded, and witnessed by an election official of a different political party, with irregularities reported to the county or Attorney General. KRS 117.155 requires the county clerk to lock the operating mechanism and cover it with a tamper-resistant seal; KRS 117.295 imposes a 30-day post-election equipment lockdown under continuous video surveillance. Mandatory tamper-evident sealing codified (ordinal 3/5).

KRS 119.115(3)(f) makes it a Class D felony for an election official or custodian to 'directly connect... a voting machine, voting equipment, or voting system that tabulates or aggregates votes to a public network, including the internet, at any time.' KRS 117.125(25) reinforces this by barring any approved voting system from connecting to a network. Network isolation of vote-tabulating equipment is codified and criminally enforced.

“Directly connects or attempts to directly connect a voting machine, voting equipment, or voting system that tabulates or aggregates votes to a public network, including the internet, at any time.”

KRS 117.135 codifies chain-of-custody for voting equipment: on acquisition it must be 'immediately placed in the custody of the county clerk,' remain in the clerk's custody at all times except during voting or court proceedings, be protected from tampering, and be secured and locked so access is restricted to county board members. KRS 117.295 adds the 30-day locked-and-video-surveilled post-election custody period. Chain-of-custody documentation codified.

KRS 119.115 codifies explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access: unauthorized possession of a key to a voting machine, equipment, or system is a Class A misdemeanor (subsection 1); willfully tampering with, disarranging, defacing, or destroying a voting machine, e-poll book, or voting system — or tampering with the sealed record of the vote — is a Class D felony (subsection 2); and an election official who unlawfully opens or disarranges voting equipment is guilty of a Class D felony (subsection 3).

KRS 117.383(8) mandates a post-election audit: the State Board of Elections must provide for 'the conducting and review of an election audit' establishing a hand-to-eye audit in which the Secretary of State randomly selects, 'in all counties of the Commonwealth,' one ballot scanner and one race for a hand-to-eye audit performed by each county board of elections. A mandatory post-election audit in every county is codified.

KRS 117.383(8) codifies the audit method: a hand-to-eye audit in which a randomly selected scanner and race in every county are hand-counted by two poll workers of different parties, the two independent tallies must match (repeated until they do), the hand totals are compared to the machine register tape, and any discrepancy triggers an election investigation that broadens until resolved, with findings reported to the Attorney General and Secretary of State. A detailed mandatory randomized hand-count audit codified — robust, though not a statistical risk-limiting audit (ordinal 3/5).

KRS 120.157 codifies an automatic-recount trigger beyond the mandatory audit: in any regular or special election for the General Assembly, Congress, or a statewide constitutional office, 'a recount of the vote shall be required when a candidate is defeated by a margin of not more than one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the votes cast.' A margin-based audit/recount trigger is codified.

KRS 117.383(8) makes the hand-to-eye audit public: the sealed ballot boxes and tabulator tally tape 'shall be accessible for public viewing,' the ballots are unsealed 'in the presence of... public witnesses,' and a video recording of the audit 'may be streamed for public internet viewing' and is subject to the Kentucky Open Records Act. KRS 120.157(5) requires the county board to authorize news media to observe a recount. Public observation of audits codified.

KRS 120.157(7) gives the automatic recount binding force on certification: 'no certificate of election shall be issued by the State Board of Elections while the recount is pending,' and the certified recount result determines the certificate of election. The hand-to-eye audit under KRS 117.383(8), however, escalates a discrepancy to an investigation rather than directly amending the result, so audit binding force is only partially codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 121.256 governs civil enforcement of campaign-finance disclosure — unrelated to voting-system source code. Kentucky voting systems are examined by the State Board of Elections under KRS 117.379, but no public source-code disclosure or accessibility is codified.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 120.005 and the parallel definitions sections define 'voting system' as equipment used to 'define ballots,' but no provision requires ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules to be signed and published before polls open.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 117.001 defines an 'audit log' and a 'voter-verified paper audit trail,' but the Election Code grants no right to verify that the actual running software binary matches a pre-committed version.

KRS 117.315 codifies challenger/observer rights: each political party is entitled to challengers at each precinct, and bona fide candidate groups and the State Board may appoint challengers and inspectors. KRS 117.316 enumerates challenger duties, KRS 117.318 governs their conduct, and KRS 117.076(9) and KRS 117.087 extend challenger rights to in-person and mail-in absentee voting. Comprehensive domestic observer rights codified.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

KRS 117.275 codifies precinct-level counting and reporting: votes are counted and tabulated at the precinct on election night, the equipment is locked and sealed, return sheets are transmitted, and the county board distributes a 'precinct-by-precinct summary of results.' Authorized representatives of candidates and the news media witness the count. Precinct-level results are produced and distributed promptly, though without an explicit 24-hour publication deadline (ordinal 3/5).

KRS 117.125(23) requires every approved voting system to 'produce a real-time audit log record for the voting system,' and KRS 117.001(1) defines the audit log as a detailed record of all actions and events including log-in attempts, election setup, ballot preparation, diagnostics, and error messages. KRS 117.383(7) provides for review of any audit log. A real-time audit log is mandated, though not framed as a public, signed, append-only log.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 117.379 allows any person or corporation owning, manufacturing, or selling a voting system to request examination by the State Board of Elections — implicitly permitting multiple vendors to seek certification — but no explicit multi-vendor capability or open-competition mandate is codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 121.005 and KRS 121.120(6) require a 'nonproprietary standardized format... using industry standards' for electronic campaign-finance reporting, but no open, publicly documented vote-format or voting-device-protocol standard is codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 121.330 restricts no-bid government contracts awarded to campaign contributors, but the Election Code codifies no duration cap on voting-system vendor contracts.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 121.256 governs civil enforcement of campaign-finance law. No source-code escrow requirement is codified as a condition of voting-system certification.

KRS 117.125(1) bars approval of any voting system that does not 'ensure secrecy to the voter in the act of voting so that no person can see or know for whom any other voter has voted or is voting,' except for voters requiring assistance. KRS 118.025(1) requires that voting in all primaries and elections be 'by secret paper ballot.' Ballot secrecy is guaranteed.

“Ensure secrecy to the voter in the act of voting so that no person can see or know for whom any other voter has voted or is voting”

KRS 117.125(24) requires every approved voting system to 'be accessible for individuals with impairments, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind or visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation, including privacy and independence, as for other voters.' KRS 117.065 requires polling places to meet voter-accessibility requirements, KRS 117.255 codifies assistance for voters requiring it, and KRS 117.088 establishes unassisted-voting accommodation for blind and visually impaired voters. Comprehensive accessibility mandate codified (ordinal 4/5 — the blind/VI unassisted-voting provision is framed as a pilot program).

KRS 117.065 requires the county board of elections to 'establish the voting place for each precinct' by January 15 each year, ensuring a polling place per precinct with codified voter-accessibility requirements. The effective density floor is set by the statutory cap on precinct size (KRS 117.055), which did not surface for this datapoint.