EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 25-433 addresses mail ballot procedures, including mailing, return envelopes, signature verification, and canvassing, but contains no provision requiring a downloadable public package of certificates, device records, or result signatures. The statute focuses on operational procedures for mail voting rather than public verification artifacts or election transparency mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires all voting systems to use voter-verified paper ballots, with provision for voter inspection and verification before casting. It further mandates that paper ballots serve as the official ballot for audits and recounts, directly satisfying the criterion for a legally required voter-verifiable paper trail.

“All voting systems used for elections in this state held on or after January 1, 2024, shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot with a distinctive watermark established by the secretary of state.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs confidentiality of commission records and complaint handling procedures. It does not address citizen access to published precinct data or the right of any citizen to conduct a re-tally. The section is about record confidentiality, not about data publication or re-tally rights.

The statute requires ballots to be placed in sealed bags or sacks with sealing methods approved by the secretary of state, which suggests tamper-evident seals are contemplated. However, the section does not explicitly mandate tamper-evident or tamper-responsive standards, nor does it require logging or auto-quarantine features. The standard is implicit rather than explicitly stated.

“Such bags or sacks shall be sealed and appropriately labeled. The method of sealing and labeling shall be a method approved by the secretary of state and directed by the county election officer.”

The statute explicitly prohibits optical scanning equipment from having any capability to connect to the internet, communications networks, cellular networks, or wireless technologies. This directly mandates network isolation on vote-casting equipment.

“shall not have the capability nor shall any component of an optical scanning system have the capability to be connected to the internet or to any other communications or computer network, including, but not limited to, a local area network, wireless network, cellular network or satellite network, or to use bluetooth or any other wireless communications technology”

The section requires that ballots be sealed and labeled, which are minimal chain-of-custody documentation steps. However, it does not mandate comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation (such as written records of who handled materials, when, and where) nor does it require that such documentation be publicly available. The statute addresses packaging and sealing procedures but lacks explicit requirements for full custody records or public disclosure.

“Such bags or sacks shall be sealed and appropriately labeled. The method of sealing and labeling shall be a method approved by the secretary of state and directed by the county election officer.”

The statute explicitly establishes a criminal penalty (severity level 9 nonperson felony) for unauthorized access to optical scanning equipment. This directly satisfies the criterion of explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“accessing without authorization or facilitating the unauthorized access to optical scanning equipment”

The statute uses mandatory language ('shall conduct') requiring a post-election audit for every election where canvassers certify results. The audit covers 1% of all precincts (minimum one precinct) and reviews specific contested races based on election type, making it a legally mandated post-election audit procedure.

“After an election and prior to the meeting of the county board of canvassers to certify the official election results for any election in which the canvassers certify the results, the county election officer shall conduct a manual audit or tally of each vote cast, regardless of the method of voting, in 1% of all precincts, with a minimum of one precinct located within the county.”

The statute mandates a manual audit and tally of votes in a fixed percentage (1%) of precincts, which constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount method. This is explicitly required before county board certification and applies to all elections.

“the county election officer shall conduct a manual audit or tally of each vote cast, regardless of the method of voting, in 1% of all precincts”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires the audit to be conducted in a public setting and authorizes candidates and entities to appoint poll agents to observe the audit. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for observer access to audits.

“The audit shall be conducted in a public setting. Any candidate or entity who is authorized to appoint a poll agent may appoint a poll agent for the audit.”

The statute states that audit results 'shall be used' by the canvassers when certifying official results, which suggests the audit informs the certification process. However, the language does not establish that audit results are legally binding on the final certified result—the canvassers retain discretion in how they 'use' the results, and the statute does not mandate that discrepancies discovered in the audit must be resolved in favor of the audit or that the audit result overrides the election night returns. The provision only requires additional audits if discrepancies 'cannot be resolved,' leaving ambiguity about the ultimate binding authority.

“the results of the audit shall be used by the county board of canvassers when certifying the official election results”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance regulations, specifically charges for political advertising space and disclosure requirements for political advertisements. It contains no provisions related to voting system source code accessibility or software verifiability of election systems.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions of voting systems, ballot types, and electronic poll books, but does not address whether ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules are signed and published before polls open. The section is definitional in nature and does not establish any requirement for pre-election publication or signing of election materials.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly grants authorized poll agents (party and civil-society observers) the right to request and examine ballots during the canvass process. The phrase 'fully opened in a condition that such agent may fully and carefully read and examine' demonstrates procedural access to observe ballot counting, satisfying the criterion for observer rights.

“During the original canvass by election boards, the judge announcing the vote on any ballot shall, upon request of any authorized poll agent, exhibit such ballot fully opened in a condition that such agent may fully and carefully read and examine the same.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses certification of presidential preference primary results to political parties and procedures for selecting delegates to national conventions. It does not address precinct-level results publication timelines or any publication speed requirements.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute permits counties to use different voting systems within the same county (e.g., combining electronic systems with optical scanning or paper ballots), but this addresses mixing different system types rather than multiple certified vendors of the same system type. The section does not explicitly authorize multiple vendors to supply voting systems for simultaneous use in a single election, which is the core element of multi-vendor capability.

“may use such a system in all or any part of the voting areas within the county or in combination with an optical scanning voting system or with regular paper ballots”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs hearing procedures before the Kansas Secretary of State, including evidentiary rules, testimony requirements, and public access to proceedings. It does not address vote-format standards, device protocols, or any technical specifications related to voting systems or election technology. The criterion concerns open and publicly documented standards for voting systems, which is outside the scope of administrative hearing procedures.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses criminal penalties and removal of commission members/employees for confidentiality violations under Kansas election law. It does not concern vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or measures preventing vendor lock-in. The section is irrelevant to the criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates voting 'in absolute secrecy' and requires paper records of votes, which are foundational to ballot secrecy. However, the section does not explicitly address voter–ballot unlinkability (the principle that cast ballots cannot be linked back to individual voters), which is a distinct legal guarantee from simple voting secrecy. The paper record requirement could actually create linkability risks if records are not properly managed, though the statute does not directly address this.

“shall provide for voting in absolute secrecy, except as to persons who request assistance due to temporary illness or disability or a lack of proficiency in reading the English language”

The statute mandates that polling places be accessible to voters with disabilities using either permanent or temporary means, which addresses physical accessibility concerns. However, the statute does not specify or enumerate particular accessibility standards for vision, motor, or language access, making it less comprehensive than the criterion's specific focus on those three modalities.

“all polling places shall be accessible by either permanent or temporary means to any voter having a disability”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the election and appointment of precinct committeemen and committeewomen, their eligibility requirements, contact information, and vacancy procedures. It does not address polling-place density, the number of polling places, or any floor or minimum standard for polling places per voters or geographic area.