EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
18.8% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-2 defines 'audit trail' / 'audit capacity' as a continuous record from ballot creation through tabulation. Trail exists but no codified public-verification artifact (e.g. cryptographic receipt) for voters. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (nomination petition form) was the only FTS hit — wrong domain. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-1 (purpose) and § 24C-12 (procedures) reference printed/recordable voter actions, but no explicit voter-verifiable-paper-audit-trail (VVPAT) requirement was surfaced. Most precincts use optical-scan paper ballots under Article 24A; Article 24C governs DRE. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-15 supports retabulation on discrepancy. Citizen-petition recount rights are in § 22-9.1 (95%-margin + 5-electors-on-question), but that section did not surface for this FTS query. “if there is an obvious discrepancy regarding the total number of votes cast in any precinct, shall have the ballots for that precinct audited” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
Custody Hardware
31.3% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 1/520.0% | 10 ILCS 5/17-3 codifies physical ballot-box procedures (public opening, locking, key-custody by a single judge); applies to permanent/non-permanent box variants. Procedural, not a hardware standard. “Before voting begins, the ballot box shall be publicly opened and exhibited” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: 10 ILCS 5/24C-12 describes DRE counting procedures; no network-isolation provision surfaced. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/18A-10 codifies sealed-container chain-of-custody for provisional ballots transported to county clerk; partial chain-of-custody for one ballot class. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | 10 ILCS 5/29-7 makes tampering with voting machines / counting devices a Class 4 felony (interfere with operation, alter results, place illegal votes). § 29-20 adds Class 3 felony for vote-by-mail ballot tampering. “Any person who tampers with any machine or device used in connection with voting or the counting of votes” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
Post Election Audit
16.7% · 2/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-15 codifies a precinct-level audit triggered by an obvious discrepancy. Not a routine across-the-board audit; on-condition only. “if there is an obvious discrepancy regarding the total number of votes cast in any precinct, shall have the ballots for that precinct audited” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 1/520.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-15.1 codifies discovery recount + audit procedures: DRE equipment tested, official ballots audited, redundant count available on request. Method codified but no risk-limiting / RLA standard. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-13 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-13 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: 10 ILCS 5/9-13 governs campaign-finance audits (Board ordering political-committee audits), not the binding force of election audits/recounts. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
Software Verifiability
16.7% · 2/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 1/520.0% | 10 ILCS 5/23-15.1 codifies a mandatory source-code escrow at the State Board of Elections, but the code is held 'strictly confidential' as vendor IP and exempt from FOIA — escrow exists but no public disclosure. “within 90 days after the adoption of rules or upon application for voting-system approval, place in escrow all computer code for its voting system” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: 10 ILCS 5/4-33 governs computerization of voter records, not voting-system build reproducibility. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: 10 ILCS 5/4-33 governs voter records; not a pre-deployment voting-system audit. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-6.1 (acceptance testing for DRE equipment) and § 24C-9 (pre-election testing) provide a pre-election testing framework. Surfaced sections include § 24C-9 testing but the specific quote was not extracted in this pass. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-13 |
Transparency Observation
31.3% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | 10 ILCS 5/19A-60 (early voting) grants pollwatcher observation of 'all proceedings' incl. signature-comparison oversight. § 7-34 (primary) and § 17-23 (general) codify domestic observer/pollwatcher rights with enumerated qualifications. “Pollwatchers shall be permitted to observe all proceedings” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-13 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 1/520.0% | 10 ILCS 5/7-54 governs primary canvass/proclamation, § 17-22 governs general-election precinct returns. Returns are codified but no specific 'publish within X hours' speed requirement was surfaced. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-2 defines 'audit trail' to include 'a log of machine activities and routine and unusual intervention by authorized and unauthorized individuals' — internal log codified, but not specifically a public-facing event log. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
Vendor Independence
50.0% · 2/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/24C-16 (DRE approval) and § 24A-16 (optical-scan approval) permit any system meeting requirements — multiple-vendor capable. No active multi-vendor mandate. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: 10 ILCS 5/9-15 enumerates State Board duties (forms, manuals, public-information access); no open-protocol standard for voting systems. | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0.5/150.0% | 10 ILCS 5/1A-9 caps technical-consultant contracts at 60 days (extendable once for 30) — applies to Board consultants, not directly to voting-system vendor contracts. “contracts with technical consultants, other than hearing officers and attorneys representing the Board in litigation, shall terminate no more than 60 days after the commencement of the specified duties and may be extended once for a period of no more than 30 days” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 1/1100.0% | 10 ILCS 5/23-15.1 codifies mandatory escrow of voting-system computer code at the State Board within 90 days of approval. Clear yes on escrow mechanism. “place in escrow all computer code for its voting system with the State Board of Elections” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
Voter Access
28.6% · 2/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | Illinois Constitution Article III § 4 codifies the secrecy-of-voting guarantee at the highest tier. 10 ILCS 5/17-8 implements via voting-booth design (3-sided + curtain, screened from observation). § 17-14 protects assistance-mode secrecy. “insure secrecy of voting and the integrity of the election process” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 1/520.0% | 10 ILCS 5/17-14 codifies in-poll disability/illiteracy assistance with elector's-choice protections. § 19-2.6 codifies print-disability vote-by-mail accommodations. § 7-48 covers other accessibility provisions. “requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, physical disability or inability to read, write or speak the English language” | § view source 2026-05-13 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: 10 ILCS 5/16-5 governs ballot printing/distribution; no minimum-density polling-place provision surfaced. Polling-place establishment is largely delegated to local election authorities (§ 11-2 et seq., not surfaced). | § view source 2026-05-13 |