EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 34-433 addresses the accuracy of voter registration information by requiring state entities to furnish data to the secretary of state for verification purposes. It does not mandate any downloadable public package, certificates, device records, or result signatures. The section is about internal data collection and comparison for registration accuracy, not public verification artifacts related to election results or voting devices.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration accuracy and data collection from state entities and federal sources. It does not address cryptographic receipts, end-to-end verifiability, or any cryptographic voting mechanisms. The criterion concerns voting technology and ballot verification, which is not the subject of this registration accuracy statute.

The statute explicitly requires that all direct recording electronic voting devices used after 2004 must have a voter verifiable paper audit trail. This mandates a voter-verifiable paper record for electronic voting machines, directly satisfying the criterion.

“For all elections conducted after 2004, no direct recording electronic voting device shall be used unless the direct recording electronic voting device has a voter verifiable paper audit trail.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recount applications by candidates and ballot measure supporters/opponents, not citizens generally. It requires application through official channels (attorney general or county clerk) rather than authorizing independent citizen re-tallies from published precinct data. The statute governs who may request an official recount, not whether ordinary citizens can independently verify election results using public data.

The statute requires ballot boxes to be locked and secured with numbered seals, which constitutes a tamper-evident mechanism (seals would show if broken). However, it does not mandate tamper-responsive systems or automatic quarantine procedures, nor does it explicitly require logging of seal integrity checks beyond maintaining a record of seal numbers. This satisfies the basic tamper-evident requirement but falls short of higher standards.

“The ballot boxes used for casting early ballots shall remain locked and secured with a numbered seal until the time of tabulation on election day”

Idaho Code § 34-2410(3) explicitly prohibits vote tally systems from connecting to the internet or receiving/transmitting data via wireless communications. This directly addresses the criterion's requirement that internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity be legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment.

“No vote tally system shall be connected to the internet at any time, and no vote tally system shall receive or transmit data through wireless communications.”

The statute requires the clerk to maintain documentation of chain of custody for ballots, which partially addresses the criterion. However, the section does not mandate that this documentation be publicly available, which is a key component of the criterion question. The statute only requires that documentation be maintained, not disclosed to the public.

“The clerk shall maintain documentation of the security measures taken and the chain of custody of all ballots.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute uses mandatory language ('shall identify and order') requiring the secretary of state to conduct a post-election audit after every primary or general election. The audit applies to 'any election' and specified categories of elections, establishing a legally binding requirement rather than a discretionary option.

“After the completion of all county canvasses for any primary or general election, the secretary of state shall identify and order a postelection audit of certain paper ballots cast in any election”

The statute mandates a hand recount of selected ballots (fixed-percentage method, capped at 5% of precincts) combined with comparison to reported results. This satisfies a basic fixed-percentage hand recount requirement but does not constitute a risk-limiting audit or RLA with reconciliation, which would require statistical methods tied to a specific risk limit.

“The postelection audit shall include, at a minimum, a hand recount of the ballots subject to the audit and a comparison to the results reported by the county for any precincts, days, batches, legislative districts, and tabulation machines selected for audit.”

The statute provides for discretionary additional audits based on findings from mandatory audits, but does not establish automatic triggers for audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The discretionary authority does not satisfy a criterion requiring trigger mechanisms, as it depends on secretary of state determination rather than objective thresholds.

“The secretary of state may order additional postelection audits, without regard to the election or precinct limitations provided in subsection (1) of this section, if he determines that such action is warranted by the findings of the audits ordered pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.”

The statute explicitly grants observer access to postelection audits for news media, interested candidates, political parties, and political committees. The statute mandates that procedures include provisions allowing these entities to appoint designated observers, satisfying the criterion's requirement for parties, media, and citizen access.

“Such an audit shall be open to attendance by news media personnel. By directive issued at least sixty (60) days prior to the election, the secretary of state shall determine the procedures by which the postelection audit is to be conducted. Such procedures shall be developed in consultation with county clerks and shall include provisions allowing each interested candidate and political party, and each political committee that publicly reported expending money on a ballot question for which the results will be audited, to appoint a designated observer.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the nomination and candidacy qualifications for delegates to a constitutional convention, including petition requirements, candidate declarations, and certification procedures. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits or the binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes. The section is entirely about pre-election nomination processes, not audit procedures or their legal effect.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns disclosures that taxing districts must provide to voters about bonded indebtedness proposals. It does not address voting system source code accessibility, vendor disclosure requirements, or any technical aspects of election systems. The criterion is inapplicable to this statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This statute concerns the furnishing of registered elector lists to the public and restrictions on their use. It does not address software, binary reproducibility, or source code transparency. The criterion relates to election system software infrastructure, which is entirely outside the scope of this section's subject matter.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses accuracy of voter registration information through data collection and verification from various state and federal agencies. It does not address software, cryptographic commitments, binary hashing, or any election-day technical requirements related to voting system binaries.

The statute requires the secretary of state to provide sample ballot layout and certify candidate names before the election, which addresses publication of ballot contests and layouts. However, the section does not address whether these materials are 'signed' or published in a manner that enables verification of tabulation rules, nor does it explicitly require publication to the public before polls open (only to county clerks).

“The secretary of state, no later than September 7, shall provide the necessary general election sample ballot layout to each of the county clerks.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines terms used in Idaho's voting machine and vote tally system chapter, but contains no provisions regarding verification of running binaries, source code, software integrity, or post-election auditing mechanisms. It is purely definitional and does not address the criterion of granting rights to verify that actual running binary matches committed binary.

The statute mandates that county clerks permit authorized party and candidate representatives to serve as watchers with rights to observe election conduct. It further specifies that watchers are entitled to observe any activity at their location and may remain present through ballot counting and central counting station operations, providing substantive procedural access to the election process.

“shall, if requested, permit any one (1) person authorized by a candidate, several candidates or political party, to be present to serve as a watcher to observe the conduct of the election”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses public logic and accuracy tests for voting machines, including requirements for public notice and testing procedures. It does not mention or address international observer access, OSCE/EU/IFES observers, or any international observation programs.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses public logic and accuracy testing of voting machines prior to election day, focusing on system functionality and accuracy verification. It does not address the publication timeline for precinct-level results after polls close, which is the subject of the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses examination and certification of voting machines by the Secretary of State, including requirements for testing and documentation. It does not establish or require a public, signed, append-only election event log as part of voting system operations or election administration.

The statute allows any voting machine or vote tally system that receives state certification to be used in elections, with no restriction limiting elections to a single vendor. Multiple certified vendors can therefore operate simultaneously in Idaho elections.

“Any voting machine or vote tally system that receives the certification of the secretary of state may be used for conducting elections in this state.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the accuracy of voter registration information and data sharing between state entities and the Secretary of State. It does not address vote-format standards, device protocols, or open protocol standards for voting systems. The criterion relates to voting technology standards, which is not the subject matter of this registration-focused statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 34-433 authorizes the secretary of state to contract with commercial data providers to verify and audit voter registration information, but it contains no language restricting or capping the duration of such contracts. The statute is silent on contract term limits or renewal restrictions.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly guarantees the absolute secrecy of all ballots in accordance with the Idaho Constitution, and further specifies that unique identifiers assigned to ballots are 'never associated with the identity of the voter,' thereby ensuring voter-ballot unlinkability. This dual protection—constitutional guarantee and statutory design of non-identifying ballot marking—satisfies the criterion.

The statute requires election board clerks to provide assistance to voters with physical or other disabilities, addressing motor and vision accessibility at polling places. However, it does not establish specific accessibility standards (such as equipment specifications, language accessibility, or facility accessibility requirements), nor does it mandate comprehensive accessibility measures beyond instruction and assistance for marking ballots.

“The election board clerks shall instruct electors on how to record their votes on the voting machine or vote tally system, and shall give assistance to any elector who declares that he is unable by reason of physical or other disability to record his vote on the machine or vote tally system”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute requires designation of 'a suitable polling place for each election precinct' but does not establish any legal floor or minimum standard regarding the number of polling places per voter population or per geographic area. The focus is on procedure (designating by the fifth Friday) and facility requirements (accessibility, secret ballot capability) rather than density requirements.