EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: I.C. § 34-2011 addresses only the timing of trial in election contests—specifying a 30-day window from service of summons and complaint. It contains no enumeration of parties with standing to contest elections. The section is procedural-temporal, not substantive regarding who may bring a contest. To satisfy CONT.EDRI.1, the statute must enumerate standing categories (candidate, voter, party, AG, etc.). This section does not perform that function. Standing enumerations, if they exist in Idaho code, would appear elsewhere in Chapter 20 (e.g., earlier sections defining who may file).

Idaho Code § 34-2121 explicitly specifies the court of original jurisdiction for election contests. For legislative elections, it assigns jurisdiction to the district court in the respective legislative district. For statewide executive offices, it assigns jurisdiction to the district court whose jurisdiction includes the state capitol. This is a clear, statutorily codified designation of venue and jurisdiction that eliminates discretion and provides prospective clarity to litigants about where to file. The provision satisfies the EDRI criterion for procedural clarity by establishing deterministic rules rather than leaving jurisdiction to case-by-case discretion.

“A district court in the respective legislative district has jurisdiction over the primary contest involving a legislative election. For election contests involving statewide executive offices, the district court whose jurisdiction includes the state capitol has jurisdiction.”

Idaho Code § 34-2108 explicitly specifies a filing deadline for election contests: twenty (20) days after the election. This deadline applies to both legislative contests (subsection 1) and executive department contests (subsection 2). The deadline is tied to a clearly defined event ('after the election'), and the statute further prohibits amendment of the notice after this 20-day period expires (subsection 6). This satisfies the criterion because the filing deadline is unambiguously codified in statute with reference to a defined temporal trigger.

“Within twenty (20) days after the election, whenever any elector of a legislative district chooses to contest the election of any member of the legislature from that district, the elector must give written notice of the contest and leave a copy of the notice of contest with the office of the secretary of state.”

Idaho Code § 34-2033 establishes a standard for evidence production (that courts may order 'such evidence as it deems necessary'), but it delegates the detailed evidentiary rules to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure rather than codifying them directly in the election statute. The section does not specify a standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing, preponderance) for election contests, nor does it codify specific admissibility rules within the statute itself. The delegation to civil procedure rules is procedurally clear but falls short of the criterion's preference for codification of evidentiary standards within the election dispute-resolution framework itself. This represents a partial satisfaction: a standard is implicitly set (necessity and materiality via civil procedure), but without statutory codification of proof standards or specific evidentiary rules in the election code.

“The court may order the production of such evidence as it deems necessary for the proper disposition of the primary contest pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.”

The statute codifies recount procedures with specificity on: (1) who counts (county clerk); (2) how (hand-tally of random sample, comparison with automated tabulation, conditional recount method based on variance threshold); and (3) sampling thresholds and variance thresholds with numeric specificity. However, the statute does not address several procedural dimensions: (a) evidence standards or documentation requirements for hand-tally validity; (b) chain of custody or ballot security during recount; (c) observer rights or notice requirements; (d) what constitutes a 'ballot' or resolution of ambiguous ballots; (e) cost allocation; (f) timeline or deadline for completion; (g) effect or finality of recount results; (h) who certifies the recount and under what conditions. The statute defines conditional triggers for full recount methodology but leaves the operational and evidentiary detail of the hand-tally process and its verification to administrative implementation. This is stronger than pure discretion but weaker than comprehensive statutory codification of all recount elements.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a mandatory postelection audit procedure, but it does not enumerate triggers for recounts. The statute mandates audits of selected ballots after county canvasses are complete, with selection based on a random lottery of precincts limited to no more than 5% of precincts (or 1 precinct minimum). However, this is a routine audit triggered by completion of canvassing, not a recount with enumerated triggers such as margin thresholds, sworn challenges, or other petition-based mechanisms. The section addresses audit procedures, cost allocation, and observer rights, but does not codify the triggers (e.g., margin percentages, candidate requests, discrepancy findings) that would initiate an actual recount under Idaho law. A full assessment of recount triggers would require review of I.C. § 34-2301 et seq. (Chapter 23), which is cited but not provided here. This section alone does not satisfy the criterion because it governs audits, not recount triggers.

Idaho I.C. § 34-2306 explicitly allocates recount costs by statute. The provision establishes a clear rule: if a recount would change the election outcome when projected across all precincts, the county or state bears the cost and refunds any amounts paid by the petitioning candidate. The statute also specifies precise thresholds (number of precincts and vote totals) that must be met to trigger cost relief eligibility, varying by office type (federal/state, state legislative, county, and city/district). This satisfies the criterion because cost allocation is codified with a deterministic trigger (whether the recount would change the result) and applies uniformly by statute rather than discretionary determination.

“If the results of the recount indicate a difference, which if projected across all the precincts of the office in question would change the result of the election in favor of the candidate requesting the recount or change in the measure being recounted, then the cost of such recount shall be borne by the county or state and the sums of money theretofore paid for the recount shall be returned to the candidate or person who requested the recount of a ballot measure.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: I.C. § 34-2305 prescribes the procedural manner of conducting a recount—location, visibility, timing, and completion. It designates the Attorney General and county prosecuting attorney as final authorities on questions arising during the recount process. However, the statute does not codify the legal effect or binding force of a recount finding. There is no explicit statement that a recount result is binding on certification, that it mandates an amendment of the official canvass, or that it has any other specified legal consequence. The section addresses the mechanics of recounting but not the consequences of the recount outcome, leaving the legal effect of recount findings unclear and not fully codified.

The statute codifies a 10-day deadline for conducting the canvass of election results, which is a fixed procedural timeline. However, the criterion asks whether the CERTIFICATION deadline (when results become 'official') is set by statute. This section addresses canvassing (the counting and verification process) but does not explicitly define when certification is complete or when results become officially certified. The section delegates the manner of canvassing to Chapter 12, and requires the county clerk to 'certify the election results' but does not state a deadline for that certification step itself or define the legal effect of certification. The statutory framework is partially clear on timing but incomplete regarding the moment results become official.

“The board of county commissioners shall conduct the canvass of the election results within ten (10) days after the election, in the manner provided in chapter 12, title 34, Idaho Code.”