EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
31.3% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0.5/150.0% | § 21-8 codifies that before 21:00 on election day, no information on election results may be published. § 10-11(5) codifies announcement of second-count results. § 21-6 codifies election-statistics reporting to the Ministry and Statistics Norway. § 11-6 codifies publication of the Storting election protocol. Public verification artifacts (results + protocols) are codified. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | § 7-5 codifies that the vote-receiver stamps the ballot, voter places the ballot in an urn. Norway uses paper ballots exclusively; the entire voting regime is voter-verifiable paper. § 10-5 codifies double counting of paper ballots. § 5-13 codifies state-printed paper ballots. Paper-trail mandate codified by the entire structure of the Act. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 1/1100.0% | § 10-5(4) codifies that 'the counting shall be public', enabling citizen observation/re-tally during the canvass. § 11-6 / § 12-4 / § 13-4 codify publication of election protocols. § 10-15 codifies that protocols document the election conduct. Combined, citizen access to count-level data is codified. “Opptellingen skal være offentlig.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Custody Hardware
37.5% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 1/520.0% | § 6-5 codifies that 'ballot urns used during voting shall be sealed' (Valgurner som brukes ved stemmingen, skal være forseglet). § 6-13 codifies secure storage and transport of election material. Sealed-urn mandate is statutorily codified though brief — ordinal level 1 (sealed required, no tamper-evident multi-seal regime specified). “Valgurner som brukes ved stemmingen, skal være forseglet.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 1/1100.0% | § 6-13 codifies that 'the election board shall ensure that election material is stored and transported in a secure manner' (Valgstyret skal sørge for at valgmateriellet oppbevares og transporteres på sikker måte). § 6-14 codifies regulations for packing, storage, transport, and handover of election material. § 10-16 codifies parallel for ballots. Custody-documentation mandate codified. “Valgstyret skal sørge for at valgmateriellet oppbevares og transporteres på sikker måte.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | § 16-1(b) codifies that a complaint may be lodged when 'an act has occurred that fulfils the objective elements in Penal Code §§ 151, 152, 153 or 154' — referring to the Norwegian Penal Code's election-tampering provisions (electoral fraud, ballot-box tampering, etc.). § 16-11(1)(b) makes such acts a ground for declaring the election invalid. Cross-reference to criminal penalties codified. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Post Election Audit
55.6% · 5/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | § 10-11 codifies a mandatory second count of every ballot from the first count. Combined with § 10-5(1) (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint), which codifies that 'all ballots shall be counted two times in the municipality' (Alle stemmesedler skal telles to ganger i kommunen), and § 10-8 (manual first count), Norway codifies a built-in audit of every ballot in every election. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | § 10-8(1) codifies that 'the first counting of ballots shall be done manually' (Den første opptellingen av stemmesedler skal skje manuelt). § 10-11(2) codifies that the second count may be either manual or machine ('Valgstyret bestemmer selv om den andre opptellingen skal skje manuelt eller maskinelt'). § 10-5(1) codifies double-counting of every ballot. Ordinal level 2: full hand count of 100% of ballots required (stronger than fixed-percentage audit; not risk-limiting by name). “Den første opptellingen av stemmesedler skal skje manuelt.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0.5/150.0% | § 17-1 codifies that a re-election shall be held if the Storting, Supreme Court, or National Election Board declares an election invalid. § 17-2 codifies acting representatives during a re-election. Triggers for re-election (the strongest 'beyond mandatory' remedy) codified. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0.5/150.0% | § 2-7 codifies public display (utlegging til offentlig ettersyn) of the electoral roll. § 21-8 codifies the results-publication rules. § 10-5(4) (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies that 'the counting shall be public' (Opptellingen skal være offentlig). Combined with § 21-7 (accredited national + international observers' right to observe election conduct), public observation of counting is codified. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 1/1100.0% | § 10-4 codifies that the election board has authority to approve ballots from valid votes placed in ballot envelopes and to decide on doubtful ballots — board decisions are binding on the canvass. § 16-11 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies the National Election Board's authority to declare an election invalid where rule breaches affected mandate distribution. The dual-count results bind the canvass under § 10-11(5). | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Software Verifiability
11.1% · 1/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0.5/150.0% | § 5-13 codifies that the Ministry is responsible for printing ballots containing the names of registered political parties for Storting, county council and municipal council elections. § 10-4 codifies how ballots in envelopes are approved. § 7-5 codifies stamping of ballots. Public ballot specification is codified though without cryptographic signing. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0.5/150.0% | § 10-12 codifies that in the second count the election board shall control the conduct of the election in the municipality and register personal preference votes. § 10-15 codifies protocols documenting election conduct. The dual-count regime (§ 10-5) functions as the integrity-verification mechanism for Norway's paper-based system. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Transparency Observation
56.3% · 5/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-7(1) codifies that the Ministry may accredit 'national and international election observers from institutions or organisations to observe the conduct of elections to the Storting, county councils, or municipal councils.' § 21-7(2) makes it an OBLIGATION (plikt) for municipalities and counties to receive accredited observers and facilitate observation. Comprehensive observer mandate. “Departementet kan akkreditere nasjonale og internasjonale valgobservatører fra institusjoner eller organisasjoner til å observere gjennomføringen av valg til Stortinget, fylkesting eller kommunestyrer.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 1/1100.0% | § 21-7(1) explicitly codifies accreditation of INTERNATIONAL election observers (internasjonale valgobservatører) alongside national observers, on equal footing. § 21-7(2) requires municipalities + counties to receive accredited international observers and facilitate observation. Explicit codified international-observer access — among the clearest in the corpus. “Departementet kan akkreditere nasjonale og internasjonale valgobservatører” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 2/540.0% | § 21-8 codifies that before 21:00 on election day no information on election results may be published. § 11-6 / § 12-4 / § 13-4 codify announcement of protocols 'as soon as possible' after the canvass. Norwegian municipalities typically report precinct results within hours after 21:00. Ordinal level 2 — precinct results within the canvass-completion window after the statutorily-enforced 21:00 release time. “Før klokken 21 på valgdagen er det ikke tillatt å” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0.5/150.0% | § 10-15 codifies protocols (protokoll) maintained by polling-place leaders and the election board over election conduct. § 11-6 codifies publication of the protocol. § 12-4 / § 13-4 codify publication of protocols at county and municipal levels. Protocol-keeping codified, though without cryptographic signing or append-only requirement. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
Voter Access
28.6% · 2/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | § 6-9(1) codifies that 'the voter shall, shielded and unseen, choose ballot, make any changes and fold the ballot, so that it is not visible what the voter has voted' (Velgeren skal avskjermet og usett velge stemmeseddel...). § 21-3 codifies confidentiality (taushetsplikt) for any person who through election duties learns how a voter voted. § 1-1 codifies the foundational secret-ballot principle. Comprehensive ballot-secrecy mandate. “Velgeren skal avskjermet og usett velge stemmeseddel, gjøre eventuelle endringer og brette sammen stemmeseddelen, slik at det ikke er synlig hva velgeren har stemt.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 1/520.0% | § 6-7(1) codifies that 'the election board shall ensure that polling places are universally designed' (Valgstyret skal sørge for at valglokalene er universelt utformet) with reference to the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act § 17. Voters must be able to enter without help. § 6-7(2) codifies the carve-out for special grounds with public notice. § 6-8 codifies assistance for voters with functional limitations. Universal-design mandate explicitly codified. “Valgstyret skal sørge for at valglokalene er universelt utformet, jf. likestillings- og diskrimineringsloven § 17.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | § 8-2 codifies vote-receivers at Norwegian foreign-service stations abroad (rights for citizens abroad to vote). § 7-3 codifies vote-receivers on Svalbard and Jan Mayen. § 7-5 codifies in-municipality advance voting. Polling-place provision is codified per municipality but no statutory voters-per-place density floor is specified — left to local discretion. | § view source 2026-05-19 |