EIIElection Integrity Index

Lithuania publishes election results, preliminary returns and audited party-finance statements on the Central Electoral Commission's website (§ 25, § 85, § 73), but there is no downloadable cryptographically-signed verification package with device records and result signatures.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Lithuania votes by paper ballot — § 55 codifies the Central Electoral Committee's role in establishing the ballot-paper specimens, and § 5 of the Seimas Election Law mandates secret-ballot voting on paper.

“specimens and forms of voter certificates, ballot papers, ballot paper envelopes and covering envelopes for voting by post”

§ 73 (referendum) and § 85 (elections) require the Central Electoral Committee to publish results in the Valstybės žinios Official Gazette within statutory deadlines, and § 25 of the Funding Law posts financial statements on the CEC website — any citizen has the data needed to re-tally.

“no later than within 4 days of the referendum vote”

§ 51 (referendums) and the parallel Seimas-law provisions require the polling-district committee to verify each ballot box is empty and seal it before voting starts, with sealed ballot transfer to the constituency committee for counting. Tamper-evident seals; level 2.

“shall make sure that the ballot box is empty and shall seal”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced results-publication provisions; Lithuania's vote-counting is by hand in the polling-district committee, so there is no vote-casting equipment with network connectivity — but the absence is implicit rather than a codified prohibition.

§ 75 and § 77 codify sealed-box opening and counting in the presence of the polling-district committee, with the counting record drawn up and signed, and § 1-303-style retention follows; the surfaced section addresses voter-list updates rather than ballot custody, so chain-of-custody documentation is codified piecemeal across the act.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 24 of the Funding Law mandates an independent financial audit of political parties and campaigns, but Lithuania does not codify a post-election audit of vote-counting equipment — vote counting is by hand in the polling-district committee, so there is no separate machine audit to mandate.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Lithuania has no codified vote-counting audit method — the polling-district committee hand-counts paper ballots and signs the vote-counting record (§ 75, § 77, § 82); the surfaced § 24 mandates audit of party finances, not vote tabulation.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 25 of the Funding Law requires the Central Electoral Commission to post audited financial statements and the auditor's findings on its website, and vote counting itself is observable by election observers and the media (§ 83); there is no separate post-election vote audit whose observation needs codifying.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Lithuania has no codified post-election vote audit, so there is no audit-binding-on-result rule; § 25 governs publication of the (binding) party-finance audit.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced candidate-collaboration disclosure provisions; Lithuania votes on paper at polling stations with no voting-machine software, so there is no voting-system source code to disclose.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced election definitions; Lithuania publishes ballot specimens, envelopes and seals through the Central Electoral Committee (§ 55 Seimas Election Law), but the ballot designs and tabulation rules are not signed or cryptographically committed before polls open.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: There is no voting-system software in Lithuania (paper ballots, hand counting), so no codified post-election software-integrity check exists; § 23 of the Funding Law governs the audit of party-finance, not voting equipment.

§ 83 entitles party and civil-society election observers, and mass-media representatives, to participate in vote counting at polling-district and municipal levels and in the establishment of results; § 59/§ 61 codify the observers' general access right.

“election observers and also representatives of the mass media may participate in the counting of votes in polling districts and municipalities”

Lithuania's election and referendum observer frameworks (§ 49 Referendum Law, § 61 Seimas Law) recognise observers appointed by parties and groups, and the country routinely admits OSCE/ODIHR missions in practice, but the statute does not specifically name international observers.

§ 85 has the Central Electoral Committee proclaim preliminary results to the mass media immediately as constituencies deliver their counts, and § 73 requires final referendum results in the Valstybės žinios within 4 days. Within 48 hours; level 4.

“Preliminary election results may be proclaimed only by the Central Electoral Committee”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Lithuania has no voting-system vendor contracts to cap — voting is by paper ballot with hand counting; the surfaced § 24 governs financial-audit contracts.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 5 of the Seimas Election Law (and § 6, § 2 of the Referendum Law) guarantees the secret ballot — voters vote in person and by secret ballot, and voting by proxy is prohibited.

“Voters shall vote in person and by secret ballot.”

§ 5 (Secret Ballot) permits a voter unable to cast a ballot personally because of physical disability to vote with the assistance of a person they trust, and § 71 codifies voting in medical-treatment and social-care facilities; Lithuania does not codify comprehensive ADA-style polling-place accessibility standards. Level 3.

“At least 25 days before the election, a polling district committee, a diplomatic mission shall provide conditions for the voters to have access to voter lists.”

§ 11 of the Seimas Election Law governs the formation of polling districts and § 71 codifies special polling stations in medical and social-care facilities, but a specific statutory polling-place-per-N-voters floor is not codified.