Kazakhstanv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity17.0%9/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability0.0%
0/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit22.2%
2/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access42.9%
3/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

0.0% · 0/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter register familiarization and correction procedures, not the creation or publication of downloadable cryptographic packages containing certificates, device records, or result signatures. It pertains to voter list management and access, which is a different topic from the technical verification artifacts required by criterion 4.1.

§ view source
2026-06-02
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 41 addresses voting procedures, personal voting requirements, ballot distribution, and voting accommodations, but does not address technology, voter-verifiable paper records, or VVPATs. The section requires paper ballot-papers and signature confirmations in registers, but does not establish any legal requirement for voter-verifiable paper trails or technology-based verification mechanisms.

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2026-06-02
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 125 addresses the establishment and publication of election results by territorial election commissions but contains no provision granting citizens the right to conduct independent re-tallies or audits of precinct-level data. The section does not authorize citizen verification or re-tally procedures beyond the commission's official tallying process.

§ view source
2026-06-02

Custody Hardware

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The statute requires checking for 'seals or stamps on the ballot-boxes,' which indicates tamper-evident measures are mandated. However, the section does not specify logging of seal integrity checks or any tamper-responsive auto-quarantine mechanism, so it does not reach the higher levels of the ordinal scale.

shall check the ballot-boxes for availability or absence of ballots in them, integrity of ballot-boxes, seals or stamps on the ballot-boxes
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2026-06-02
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 28 addresses the right to conduct pre-election campaigns, media access, debate participation, and campaign material distribution. It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network isolation, internet connectivity restrictions, or any technical security measures for voting systems. The section is entirely focused on campaign conduct and public access to media, not election security infrastructure.

§ view source
2026-06-02
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 40 addresses the procedural opening of polling stations and checking of ballot boxes for integrity, but does not establish requirements for full chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such documentation. The section describes pre-voting checks by commission members but does not mandate the creation, maintenance, or public disclosure of custody records.

§ view source
2026-06-02
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02

Post Election Audit

22.2% · 2/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 56 of the Constitution addresses the exclusive responsibilities of the Mazhilis (lower chamber of Parliament), including acceptance of draft laws, confirmation of the Prime Minister candidate, and announcement of presidential elections. It does not contain any provision requiring or mandating post-election audits for every election.

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2026-06-02
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?2/540.0%

The section mandates a recount mechanism, but it is discretionary (triggered only by written request) rather than a systematic fixed-percentage hand recount. It does not establish a mandatory audit protocol, risk-limiting audit, or comparison audit framework. The recount is limited to a single instance and appears to be a remedial measure rather than a structured post-election audit.

The precinct election commission (territorial election commission for the election of deputies of the Senate), at the request of an authorized representative submitted in writing, shall conduct a recount of votes only once within the period established by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.
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2026-06-02
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 58 of the Constitution addresses the structure and duties of parliamentary chamber chairpersons, including their role in nominating candidates for the Central Election Commission. It does not address public observation of audits, audit procedures, or observer access during post-election processes. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion regarding public observation of election audits.

§ view source
2026-06-02
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 58 addresses the structure, election, and duties of Parliament Chamber chairpersons. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit procedures, or the legal binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes. This section is unrelated to the criterion.

§ view source
2026-06-02

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

no FTS match
2026-06-02
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 86 of the Kazakhstan Constitution addresses the composition, election, and jurisdiction of Maslikhats (local representative bodies). It does not contain any provisions regarding ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or their publication and signing before polls open. The section is entirely outside the scope of election definition publication requirements.

§ view source
2026-06-02
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02

Transparency Observation

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?0/10.0%

The section establishes that observers are permitted at polling stations and provides some procedural access to observe ballot boxes and voting booths. However, it does not specify the full scope of observer rights, their accreditation procedures, access to voter lists, ability to observe the entire voting and counting process, or other procedural guarantees necessary for comprehensive procedural access. The text grants only qualified observational access rather than full procedural rights.

an opportunity should be provided for observers, proxies, representatives of the media and members of the election commission to observe the ballot boxes, entering and leaving the booths for secret voting
§ view source
2026-06-02
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

The section mentions that observers of foreign states and international organizations may be present at polling stations on voting day, but does not establish that they are admitted 'by default' nor does it specifically name OSCE/EU/IFES. The provision allows their presence but lacks the affirmative, automatic admission framework the criterion requires.

observers of foreign states and international organizations who may be accompanied by an interpreter
§ view source
2026-06-02
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?2/540.0%

The section establishes publication timelines for election results (10 days for presidential/parliamentary results, 7 days for maslikhat deputies), but these apply to overall results by commissions rather than precinct-level results. The criterion specifically asks about precinct-level (polling station) results within 24 hours, which is a narrower requirement than what the statute addresses. The statute does require data presentation 'by electoral districts' but does not mandate 24-hour publication of precinct-level results.

§ view source
2026-06-02
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 14 describes the authorities and responsibilities of territorial election commissions in Kazakhstan, covering tasks such as supervising election legislation, registering candidates and proxies, managing lower commissions, and conducting elections. The section contains no provisions regarding vendors, certification of vendors, or multi-vendor capability in elections. This is a different topic entirely.

§ view source
2026-06-02
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 28 addresses the right to conduct pre-election campaigns, access to media, debates, and campaign materials. It does not address vote-format standards, device protocols, or technical specifications for voting systems. The criterion concerns technical standards for election devices and systems, which is outside the scope of this campaign-related provision.

§ view source
2026-06-02
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 28 governs pre-election campaign rights and access to media and online platforms on a contractual basis, but contains no provisions establishing duration caps for vendor contracts. The section requires equal terms and non-discriminatory treatment of candidates, but does not address contract duration limits that would prevent vendor lock-in.

§ view source
2026-06-02
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-02

Voter Access

42.9% · 3/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly mandates that elections of the President, deputies, akims, and other officials shall be held 'by secret ballot,' which is the primary legal mechanism that guarantees voter–ballot unlinkability and prevents the linking of a voter's identity to their ballot choice. This directly satisfies the criterion for ballot secrecy as a legally enforceable principle.

by secret ballot
§ view source
2026-06-02
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?2/540.0%

The law mandates accessibility for voters with disabilities at polling stations, but the language is general and does not specify particular accessibility standards (vision, motor, language, etc.). It requires 'conditions' and 'unimpeded access' without detailing what accommodations must be provided, how they will be implemented, or which disability categories are covered.

When equipping a polling station, conditions must be provided for unimpeded access of voters who are citizens with disabilities and for voting in it.
§ view source
2026-06-02
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 126 concerns the registration of elected members of local government bodies by territorial election commissions and the procedures for appealing invalid elections. It does not address polling-place density, minimum numbers of polling places, voter-to-polling-place ratios, or geographic distribution requirements for polling places.

§ view source
2026-06-02

Other methodologies for Kazakhstan