EIIElection Integrity Index

§ 48³(7) requires publication of the voter application, the vote verification application and website integrity data before voting; § 48⁸(7) adds publication of the system source code. Estonia codifies a public verification toolset, though not a single signed downloadable package of certificates, device records and result signatures.

“Prior to the start of electronic voting, the State Electoral Office publishes the voter application, the vote verification application and the data necessary for ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the website on the election website.”

§ 48¹⁰ codifies a voter's right to verify, via a separate verification application, that their electronic vote reached the system according to their intention — individual (cast-as-intended / recorded-as-cast) verifiability, mandated rather than merely permitted. It stops short of full end-to-end verifiability proving inclusion in the final tally, so it maps just below the top of the ordinal.

“A voter has an opportunity to verify whether the application used for electronic voting has transferred the vote cast by the voter to the electronic voting system according to the voter’s intention.”

Estonia's polling-place and advance voting use hand-marked paper ballots deposited in sealed ballot boxes and hand-counted by voting-district committees (§ 57) — the paper ballot is the voter-verifiable record. (Electronically cast votes are the separate i-voting channel.)

“A voting district committee opens the ballot boxes after the close of voting.”

Ascertainment of results is public at both the voting-district committee (§ 57) and National Electoral Committee (§ 61) levels, and § 19⁴ gives everyone the right to observe. Estonia does not, however, codify a specific citizen right to re-tally from published raw precinct data.

“The ascertaining of the voting results in the National Electoral Committee is public.”

§ 36 of the Riigikogu Election Act requires voting-district committees to inspect and seal ballot boxes before voting opens and to seal the openings of advance-voting boxes after voting closes — tamper-evident sealing is mandated. No tamper-responsive auto-quarantine or codified seal-logging regime, so this maps to the 'seals required' level.

“Voting district committees inspect and seal ballot boxes before the voting opens.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced complaint-form sections — the word 'telecommunications' refers to a complainant's contact details. Estonia mandates no network isolation of vote-casting equipment; its nationwide internet-voting model is the architectural opposite of an air-gap.

§ 48⁸ requires that all operations processing electronic votes be logged, that the collector component be retained until votes are destroyed, and that the process audit verify the transfer of the electronic ballot box to the State Electoral Office — codified chain-of-custody documentation for the electronic channel, though the logs are not codified as publicly available.

“All operations related to the processing of electronic votes are logged.”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 48⁷ requires, before every electronic voting, a risk assessment, an audit of the applied security measures and technical penetration testing; § 48⁸ adds a mandatory process-and-data audit by an information-systems auditor. A post-election integrity audit is mandatory for the electronic channel at every election.

“Before electronic voting begins, the following is carried out with regard to the electronic voting system:”

Estonia mandates a security/process audit — penetration testing and a security-measures audit before voting (§ 48⁷) plus a process-and-data audit including a second counting of electronic votes (§ 48⁸). This is a process and integrity audit rather than a fixed-percentage hand recount or a margin-driven risk-limiting audit, so it maps to the lower-middle of the ordinal.

“Before electronic voting begins, the following is carried out with regard to the electronic voting system:”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 59¹(7) makes the counting of electronically cast votes public, and § 19⁴/§ 23⁴ give everyone the right to observe the acts and procedures of electoral committees — covering the integrity verification conducted in the presence of an information-systems auditor.

“Counting of votes cast by electronic means is public.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced party-finance and constitutional-procedure sections; none codifies whether the electronic-voting integrity audit is legally binding on the certified result. (§ 59¹(9), surfaced elsewhere, conditions signing of the e-voting result on integrity verification but stops short of a codified audit-binding rule.)

§ 48⁸(7) of the Riigikogu Election Act mandates that the State Electoral Office publish the source code for the electronic voting system and the verification application before every election — public disclosure, not vendor-only or NDA-gated. Only the voter-application source is withheld, so disclosure is near-comprehensive but not total.

“The State Electoral Office organises the publication of the source code for the electronic voting system and the verification application before the elections. The source code for the voter application is not published.”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 48⁸(7) requires publication of the e-voting system source code and verification application before the elections, and § 48³ publishes the running applications and website integrity data before voting opens — a strong pre-poll transparency commitment. The statute does not, however, require a published cryptographic hash of the production binary.

“The State Electoral Office organises the publication of the source code for the electronic voting system and the verification application before the elections.”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 19⁴ of the Riigikogu Election Act (and parallel § 23⁴/§ 16¹/§ 20¹) grants everyone the right to observe the acts and procedures of electoral committees and elections managers, including the right to record the numbers of security seals — a broad domestic-observer regime open to party and civil-society observers alike.

“Everyone has the right to observe the acts and procedures of the National Electoral Committee and elections managers.”

Estonia's observation right under § 19⁴ extends to 'everyone' with no nationality restriction — OSCE/ODIHR and other international observers are admitted by default on the same footing as domestic observers (Estonia routinely hosts ODIHR i-voting observation missions).

“Everyone has the right to observe the acts and procedures of the National Electoral Committee and elections managers.”

§ 48⁸(2) mandates correct, timely and complete disclosure of voting results; voting-district committees count immediately after polls close and the State Electoral Office enters results into the election information system immediately (§ 59¹(8)) — codified timely publication, mapping to the within-48h level.

“The publication of voting results must ensure the correct, timely and complete disclosure of the voting results received from the electronic voting system.”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

The standard form of electronic votes is established by published resolution of the National Electoral Committee (§ 59¹), and § 48⁸ requires publication of the system source code — Estonia's vote format and protocol are publicly documented, though not framed as a formal open standard.

“An electronic vote which does not contain the registration number of the candidate or which does not comply with the standard form established by the National Electoral Committee is null and void.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced party-finance and electoral-administration sections; Estonia operates its electronic voting system in-house through the State Electoral Office (§ 14) and codifies no vendor contract-duration cap.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Ballot secrecy is constitutionally guaranteed (§ 60, § 156: 'Voting shall be secret') and § 48⁶ extends it in detail to electronic voting — vote encryption, separation of personal data from the vote before counting, and a guarantee that a re-voting voter cannot prove which vote counted (coercion resistance).

“Electronic voting must be organised in such a manner that the principle of secrecy of the vote is respected at every stage of the voting process, including after the electronic vote has been annulled.”

Estonia codifies several accessibility measures — the i-voting voter application must support the visually impaired (§ 48³(6)), in-person voters with a physical disability may be assisted by another voter of their choice (§ 32(6),(9)), and home voting is available — but there is no comprehensive standalone polling-place accessibility-standards regime, so this maps to the 'some' level.

“The voter application has support for the visually impaired.”

§ 19 of the Riigikogu Election Act sets a geographic floor — at least one voting district, each with a polling place, must be formed in every rural municipality, city and Tallinn city district. This is a per-area floor rather than a per-N-voters ratio.

“At least one voting district is formed within the territory of each rural municipality and city, and of each city district of Tallinn.”