EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prohibits photographing, copying, or distributing marked ballots, with narrow exceptions for persons with visual impairments and legal proceedings. It addresses ballot secrecy and prevents evidence of vote choice from being created or shared, which is contrary to the criterion's requirement for a downloadable public package of election integrity artifacts (certificates, device records, and result signatures). The statute does not mandate or contemplate any public verification package. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The section mandates that electors mark ballots by hand using a cross or other mark, creating a hand-marked paper record. This satisfies the criterion for voter-verifiable paper trail as it requires a physical, voter-marked paper ballot that serves as the verifiable record. “mark the ballot with a cross or other mark in the circular space opposite the name of the candidate of his or her choice” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | The section grants electors and candidates the right to contest elections through court application, which provides a formal legal mechanism for challenging results. However, it does not explicitly address the ability to conduct independent re-tallies from published precinct data; it addresses only court-based contestation on specific grounds (eligibility and irregularities/fraud). The criterion asks specifically about the right to re-tally using published data, which is a different procedural right than judicial contestation. “Any elector who was eligible to vote in an electoral district, and any candidate in an electoral district, may, by application to a competent court, contest the election in that electoral district on the grounds that” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
Custody Hardware
25.0% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The section mandates that ballot boxes be sealed with seals provided by the Chief Electoral Officer, which satisfies the requirement for tamper-evident measures. However, the statute does not specify the technical standard of those seals, does not require logging of seal integrity checks, and does not establish tamper-responsive protocols such as automatic quarantine. “seal the ballot box with the seals provided by the Chief Electoral Officer” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 319 provides definitions for terms used in Part 16 (Communications) of the Canada Elections Act, including network, network operator, online platform, and prime time. It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, internet connectivity, Wi-Fi, cellular networks, or any technical requirements for voting systems. This section is entirely about communication and broadcasting terminology and is irrelevant to the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The section requires recording of seal conditions, which is a minimal form of custody documentation. However, it does not require or address full chain-of-custody documentation (tracking every transfer, handler, time, and location) or public availability of such records. The requirement is limited to seal condition examination and recording by the returning officer. “examine and record the condition of the seals affixed to it” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses criminal offences related to ballot printing, forgery, and ballot box manufacture, but does not establish criminal penalties for unauthorized device access or tampering with electronic voting or ballot-counting equipment. It focuses on physical ballot document crimes rather than cybersecurity or device security breaches. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
Post Election Audit
22.2% · 2/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses criminal offences related to election conduct violations (removal of posted documents, false declarations, and candidates' limitations on parliamentary freedom), not post-election audit requirements. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion asking whether post-election audits are legally mandated. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | The section mandates a hand recount (judicial recount) but only in a narrow circumstance when the margin is less than 1/1000 of votes cast. This is a triggered recount rather than a systematic fixed-percentage audit of all elections, and does not implement a comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or reconciliation approach. It represents a partial audit method that is margin-based rather than fixed-percentage. “If the difference between the number of votes cast for the candidate with the most votes and the number cast for any other candidate is less than 1/1000 of the votes cast, the returning officer shall make a request to a judge for a recount” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | The section grants presence rights to candidates and their representatives during ballot counting and declaration verification, which is a limited form of observation. However, it does not extend observer access to parties generally, media, or citizens—only to candidate representatives—and it addresses ballot counting rather than post-election audit activities specifically. This is observer access for a subset of stakeholders at a related but distinct stage. “A candidate or his or her representative may be present for the verification of the declarations referred to in paragraph 227(2)(c) and the counting of ballots” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the administrative reimbursement of audit expenses up to a maximum amount, not whether audit results are legally binding on certified election results. It describes payment procedures from the Consolidated Revenue Fund but contains no provisions regarding the legal force or binding nature of audit findings on final certified results. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure of documents and information between the CRTC and the Commissioner regarding voter contact calling services compliance. It does not concern voting system source code accessibility or vendor disclosure requirements, which is the subject of the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the Chief Electoral Officer's authority to implement public education and information programs about the electoral process, voter rights, and accessibility for persons with disabilities. It does not address ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or cryptographic signing and publication of election materials before polls open. The criterion concerns technical election definition documentation and verification, which is entirely outside the scope of this public education provision. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | The section permits candidate representatives and electors to observe at polling stations, but it does not establish rights for independent civil-society observers or explicitly guarantee 'full procedural access' beyond physical presence. The authorization and admission process involves prescribed forms and solemn declarations, and access is restricted to enumerated categories without a clear guarantee of unfettered observation procedures. “two representatives of each candidate or, in their absence, two electors to represent each candidate” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the judicial recount process and procedural requirements (application timelines, deposits, summons, etc.), but does not establish any requirement for publishing precinct-level results within any timeframe. The criterion concerns timely publication of election results; this section governs post-election judicial remedies. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 126 of the Canada Elections Act addresses ballot security and fraud prevention through prohibitions on forging, unauthorized printing, and ballot box tampering. It does not address vendor certification, vendor independence, or the number of certified vendors permitted to operate in an election. This section is about ballot integrity controls rather than vendor licensing or multi-vendor capability. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses compliance agreements between the Commissioner and persons/entities accused of election law violations. It does not govern vendor contracts, procurement, or contract duration caps for services or goods. The criterion concerns vendor independence and contract lock-in prevention, which is outside the scope of this enforcement provision. | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-05 |
Voter Access
57.1% · 4/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | This section establishes a legal duty to maintain vote secrecy and includes multiple prohibitions against disclosing how any individual voted, preventing the linkage between voters and their ballot choices. The restrictions on obtaining, displaying, or communicating information about how specific ballots were marked directly guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability. “Every person present at a polling station or at the counting of the votes shall maintain the secrecy of the vote.” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | The section mandates assistance for electors with disabilities (including vision and reading impairment) and requires provision of templates for visually impaired voters at every polling station. However, it addresses only vision and general disabilities; it does not explicitly address motor accessibility, language accessibility, or other comprehensive accessibility standards beyond on-request assistance. “On request by an elector who is unable to read or because of a disability is unable to vote in the manner described by this Act, an election officer who is assigned to the polling station shall assist the elector in the presence of another election officer who is assigned to the polling station.” | § view source 2026-06-05 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | The section establishes a minimum threshold of 250 electors per polling division, which relates to polling-place density by setting a floor on the number of voters per division. However, this addresses electors per polling division rather than polling places per voters or per geographic area, and it permits exceptions at the Chief Electoral Officer's discretion, making it not a strict binding floor. “Each polling division shall contain at least 250 electors unless the Chief Electoral Officer agrees otherwise.” | § view source 2026-06-05 |