EIIElection Integrity Index

The section mandates distribution of signed protocol copies with result signatures to authorized parties and requires scanning/transmission of protocols and technical device records to the Central Election Commission, but does not explicitly mandate a downloadable public package containing all these materials as an integrated, publicly accessible digital artifact.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 213б addresses transparency and security measures for machine voting systems, including source code access, cryptographic key management, and pre-election verification procedures. However, it does not mention or address per-voter cryptographic receipts, voter-verified paper trails, or any mechanism for individual voters to obtain cryptographic proof of vote inclusion. The section focuses on system-level security and party observer access rather than end-to-end verifiability mechanisms available to individual voters.

The section mandates that voting is conducted with general paper ballots ('хартиени бюлетини'), which are further described as white ballots made of solid opaque paper with sequential numbers and security features. This establishes a legal requirement for paper ballots as the voting method, thereby creating a voter-verifiable paper trail.

“Гласуването се извършва с общи хартиени бюлетини”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 170 addresses campaign financing transparency and verification procedures conducted by the Court of Accounts (Сметната палата), including checks on donation sources and financial disclosures. It does not address precinct-level election result data, citizen audit rights, or any mechanism allowing citizens to re-tally voting results from published precinct data. The section concerns campaign finance compliance, not vote tabulation verification.

The section mandates that ballot boxes be transparent and sealed with paper tape stamped with the precinct electoral commission's seal and signed by commission members present. This establishes a tamper-evident seal requirement through physical sealing and official markings, satisfying the baseline tamper-evident standard without logging or auto-quarantine provisions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 172 addresses campaign finance reporting requirements, including submission of financial reports to the Court of Audit by parties, coalitions, and initiative committees within 30 working days after election day. This section concerns post-election financial accountability and disclosure, not the technical specifications or network isolation of vote-casting equipment used during elections.

The section requires the Central Electoral Commission to prepare and publish a security plan describing measures for storage and transport of technical devices for machine voting, but it does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The statute addresses planning and transparency of security measures rather than establishing a requirement for detailed custody records.

“съхранение и транспорт на техническите устройства за машинно гласуване”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses qualifications and disqualifications for members of municipal election commissions, focusing on education requirements, language proficiency, and criminal history related to fitness for office. It does not address criminal penalties for unauthorized device access or tampering with election hardware.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 114 addresses the rights of election observers to be present at various stages of the election process, including data entry and result verification. It does not establish or mandate a post-election audit requirement for every election. The section concerns observer access, not mandatory audit procedures.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 385 addresses the allocation of European Parliament mandates to parties and coalitions using the Hare-Niemeyer method. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audit procedures or audit methods of any kind. This section is entirely about mandate distribution and does not address election auditing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the complaint procedure for sectional election commissions abroad, allowing challenges to be submitted to the Central Election Commission with expedited resolution. It does not address audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges as contemplated by criterion 3.3 on post-election audits.

The section mandates real-time streaming of district electoral commission meetings and publication of protocols, decisions, and election results online, which provides transparency and indirect public access to proceedings. However, it does not explicitly grant in-person observer access to parties, media, and citizens during audits or verification processes—only remote viewing via internet. The criterion specifically asks about 'observer access,' which typically implies direct physical presence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 161 of the Bulgarian Election Code addresses candidate leave entitlements during campaign periods. It is entirely unrelated to post-election audits or the binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes. The section does not address audit procedures, audit binding authority, or certification of election results.

The statute mandates access to source code and software documentation for the machine voting system to designated representatives of parties/coalitions that received over 4% of votes in recent parliamentary elections—a restricted but non-vendor group. This exceeds vendor-only secrecy but falls short of full public disclosure, placing it between academic NDA access and public availability.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires publication of cryptographic identifiers derived from the software build process, including source code and built software components, before election day. However, the statute does not explicitly require a cryptographic hash/commitment of the running binary itself to be published before polls open, only identifiers from the build process and public cryptographic keys.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 333 describes the procedural sorting and handling of ballots after the polls close and ballot boxes are opened—specifically how ballots are categorized into piles based on their validity, marking characteristics, and official seals. It addresses post-election ballot processing, not pre-election publication of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules. The criterion requires advance publication of election definition materials before polls open, which is not addressed in this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 435 addresses the physical removal of items from the voting table before opening the ballot box and access controls for ballot handling by commission members. It does not address software verification, binary code matching, or post-election integrity checks related to software systems. This section concerns ballot box procedures, not cryptographic or software verification mechanisms.

The section explicitly grants party representatives and observers the right to be present during the opening of ballot boxes and determination of voting results in the polling station. It further provides for observers' presence subject to registration requirements, and ensures direct visibility including video recording or real-time broadcast, which collectively constitutes procedural access to observe the critical counting process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses incompatibilities for European Parliament candidacy (conflicts of interest and dual positions), not international observer access to elections. It is entirely unrelated to whether OSCE/EU/IFES observers are admitted to observe elections.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 344 addresses the publication of final results by the Central Electoral Commission at the national level (within 3 days for announcement and 7 days for official gazette publication), but contains no requirement for precinct-level results to be published within any specified timeframe, let alone within 24 hours of poll closure.

The section requires regional election commissions to announce decisions publicly and maintain a public register of complaints and signals (point 21), but does not establish a legally required, signed, append-only election event log specifically. The disclosure requirements are present but do not meet the full technical and legal specification of an immutable, chronologically ordered, append-only log with mandatory signatures.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 66 addresses incompatibilities and conflicts of interest for members of district election commissions. It contains no provisions regarding certified vendors, multi-vendor systems, or vendor operations in elections. The section is entirely about personnel eligibility rules and has no relevance to the criterion concerning multiple certified vendors.

The section requires that parties, coalitions, NGOs, and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences receive access to devices, documentation, and source code during the certification process. However, this provides access only to registered observers and specific stakeholders during certification, not public documentation of open protocol standards. The criterion asks whether standards are open and publicly documented generally, which this section does not explicitly establish.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses penalties for individuals who act as proxies with annulled credentials in elections. It is entirely unrelated to vendor contracts, contract duration, or vendor independence issues. The criterion concerns vendor lock-in prevention through contract duration caps, which is not addressed anywhere in this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 129 concerns campaign deposit requirements for political parties, coalitions, and initiative committees participating in elections. It addresses financial deposits, not source-code escrow or vendor certification requirements. This section is entirely unrelated to the criterion regarding source-code escrow as a condition of certification.

The section explicitly guarantees secret ballot voting (тайно гласуване) as a fundamental principle governing all elections. This legal requirement directly ensures voter-ballot unlinkability by mandating that voting must be conducted in secret, making it impossible to link individual voters to their specific ballots.

“с тайно гласуване”

The section addresses accessibility for voters with permanent disabilities by providing an alternative voting mechanism (mobile ballot box) rather than requiring accessibility standards at every polling place itself. This is a conditional accommodation rather than a comprehensive accessibility mandate applicable to all polling locations.

The section establishes a legal floor on polling-place density by limiting the maximum number of voters per polling section to 1,000. This ensures a minimum density of polling places—specifically, at least one polling place per 1,000 voters—which directly satisfies the criterion of a legal floor on polling places per number of voters.

“В една избирателна секция се включват до 1000 избиратели”