Australiav0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity13.2%7/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability0.0%
0/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware37.5%
3/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit11.1%
1/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation0.0%
0/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access42.9%
3/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

0.0% · 0/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

The section mandates publication of verification statements about software assessment and assurance, but these are limited to text statements confirming software version and assessment completion. The statute does not require a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures—the specific technical artifacts required by the criterion.

§ view source
2026-06-08
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?0/10.0%

The section establishes procedures for handling discarded ballot papers but does not mandate voter-verifiable paper records or hand-marked ballots. It addresses the physical management of discarded papers rather than requiring voters to create or verify a paper trail of their vote. The existence of a ballot paper does not in itself establish a requirement for voter verification.

a ballot paper has been issued to a voter
§ view source
2026-06-08
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 181C concerns privacy exemptions for personal information in nomination documents and does not address citizen rights to re-tally votes from published precinct data. The section is about what privacy laws do not apply to nomination materials, not about public access to election results or vote tallying data.

§ view source
2026-06-08

Custody Hardware

37.5% · 3/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The section mandates that ballot boxes must be sealed at the end of each day and prohibits opening except as allowed by law, establishing basic tamper-evident protection through the seal requirement. However, the text does not specify tamper-responsive features, automatic logging, or auto-quarantine mechanisms; it addresses physical sealing but not the technical standard or evidence-of-tampering documentation.

§ view source
2026-06-08
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 321DA addresses prohibitions on foreign campaigners authorizing electoral matter and is entirely unrelated to vote-casting equipment or network isolation mandates. The section concerns campaign finance transparency and foreign interference in electoral communications, not the technical specifications or connectivity requirements of voting hardware.

§ view source
2026-06-08
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the physical construction of ballot boxes (secure fastening capability) but does not establish any requirement for chain-of-custody documentation or make such documentation publicly available. The section is silent on documentation, custody procedures, and public access to records.

§ view source
2026-06-08
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?1/1100.0%

The section establishes explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized interference with ballot boxes and ballot papers, which are the physical devices used to store and record votes. The provision criminalizes unlawful opening or interference with these devices and prescribes imprisonment of up to 6 months, directly addressing the requirement for criminal penalties against device tampering.

§ view source
2026-06-08

Post Election Audit

11.1% · 1/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 60 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 addresses the composition and appointment of Redistribution Committees for electoral divisions. It does not contain any provisions regarding post-election audits or audit requirements. The section is concerned with the administrative structure for boundary redistribution, not election auditing.

§ view source
2026-06-08
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 274 describes the scrutiny and counting procedures for House of Representatives elections, including how ballot boxes are opened, votes counted, and results reported. It does not establish or mandate any post-election audit method, fixed-percentage hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures. The section is procedurally focused on the initial and fresh scrutiny of votes rather than post-election verification or auditing.

§ view source
2026-06-08
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly grants scrutineers (who represent parties, candidates, and potentially media and citizen observers under electoral law) access to detailed records of computerised scrutiny proceedings, including preferences, transfers, and progress at each count. This satisfies the requirement for public observation of the audit process.

Subject to subsections (6AA) and (6AB), for proceedings under section 273 and subsections (4) and (5) of this section, the requirements of paragraph 265(1)(c) are met if the scrutineers have access to: (a) a record of the preferences on the ballot papers that have been received by the Australian Electoral Officer and whose details have been stored in the computer (including informal ballot papers, and formal ballot papers that are not sequentially numbered); and (b) a record of the ballot papers that are notionally transferred, or exhausted, at each count; and (c) a record of the progress of the count of the votes, at each count.
§ view source
2026-06-08
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses donation disclosure requirements for candidates, political parties, and donors under the Commonwealth Electoral Act. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility or requirements for public, academic, or authority-level access to such code.

§ view source
2026-06-08
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the physical reproduction and distribution of postal vote application forms and copyright considerations. It contains no reference to software, binary builds, reproducibility, source code, or any technical infrastructure requirements relevant to the reproducible builds criterion.

§ view source
2026-06-08
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 35 addresses the Commission's power to employ temporary and permanent staff and engage consultants. It contains no provisions regarding ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or their publication and signing before polls open. The section is about personnel and staffing arrangements, not election definition or software verifiability.

§ view source
2026-06-08
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

The section requires post-election verification that the software used matches the assessed version and mandates publication of this verification. However, this verification is performed by the Electoral Commissioner (a state actor) and published as a statement, not granted as an affirmative right to independent observers or the public to verify the running binary themselves. The public receives notification of verification rather than the means or right to conduct independent verification.

§ view source
2026-06-08

Transparency Observation

0.0% · 0/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?0/10.0%

The section permits candidates to appoint scrutineers (observers) at scrutiny, which provides some procedural access. However, it establishes significant limitations: scrutineers are capped at the number of officers present, and there is no explicit provision for civil-society observers or partisan observers beyond the candidate's appointed scrutineers. This falls short of 'full procedural access' as required by the criterion.

A candidate may appoint scrutineers to represent the candidate at the scrutiny.
§ view source
2026-06-08
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 365 concerns the grounds for avoiding elections based on procedural errors and immaterial defects. It does not address publication timelines for precinct-level results or any transparency/observation requirements. The section is entirely focused on judicial review standards for election disputes.

§ view source
2026-06-08
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 273AB addresses assessment and verification of counting software accuracy, but does not address whether vote-format or device-protocol standards are open and publicly documented. The section requires independent assessment of software and publication of assurance statements, but contains no provisions regarding open standards or public documentation of protocols.

§ view source
2026-06-08
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the registration and naming requirements for political parties under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. It addresses what party names the Electoral Commission may refuse to register based on criteria such as obscenity, confusion with other parties, or use of the word 'Independent'. The criterion asks about vendor contracts being capped in duration to prevent lock-in, which is entirely unrelated to political party name registration rules. The section contains no provisions about contracts, vendors, or duration limits.

§ view source
2026-06-08
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-08

Voter Access

42.9% · 3/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

This section creates a legally enforceable prohibition on disclosing information that would link an elector's identity to their vote, with criminal penalties (6 months imprisonment or 10 penalty units). The prohibition explicitly covers the core requirement of voter–ballot unlinkability by forbidding communication 'in a manner that is likely to enable the identification of the elector' in relation to their vote.

A person who is, or has been, an officer or a scrutineer shall not either directly or indirectly, divulge or communicate any information with respect to the vote of an elector acquired by him or her in the performance of functions, or in the exercise of powers, under this Act or the regulations in a manner that is likely to enable the identification of the elector.
§ view source
2026-06-08
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?2/540.0%

The section establishes mechanisms to assist voters with vision, motor, or literacy impairments (including appointing an assistant or having officials mark ballots), addressing accessibility needs. However, it does not mandate specific accessibility standards or infrastructure at polling places; it merely requires that assistance be provided to voters who demonstrate such need. The provision is reactive rather than proactive in requiring comprehensive accessibility infrastructure.

§ view source
2026-06-08
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 80 grants the Electoral Commissioner discretionary power to appoint polling places as he or she 'considers necessary,' but does not establish any legal floor, minimum standard, or requirement based on voter density or geographic area. The section is purely permissive and discretionary, not prescriptive of minimum polling place quantities.

§ view source
2026-06-08

Other methodologies for Australia