EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 365A addresses judicial review of disputed elections and the admissibility of delivery failures as grounds for voiding an election result. It contains no provisions regarding conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for commissioners or senior election staff. The section does not establish, reference, or implement any statutory disclosure mechanism.

Section 355 codifies a statutory right to petition the High Court to dispute elections or returns, specifying standing (candidates and qualified voters), timeline (40 days post-return of writ), and venue (High Court Registry). This establishes a clear judicial-review mechanism for election administration outcomes with defined procedural safeguards.

“be filed in the Registry of the High Court within 40 days after: (i) if the polling day for the election in dispute is not the polling day for any other election—the return of the writ for the election”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Commission is established by statute (the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) rather than by the Constitution. While this provides strong statutory grounding (scoring 1 on the ordinal scale), the criterion explicitly asks whether the commission's existence is set in the Constitution rather than statute alone. Australia's Constitution does not establish the AEC; it is a creature of statute.

The statute does provide some structural protection: the Chairperson must be selected by the Governor-General from a list of three eligible Federal Court judges submitted by the Chief Justice (judiciary involvement in filtering), and the non-judicial appointee must hold a senior public service office. However, the critical appointment power is exercised unilaterally by the Governor-General (the executive), and there is no legislative role in appointment, confirmation, or veto. The judiciary's role is limited to list-submission, not direct appointment. This falls short of the multi-branch control envisioned by COMM.2, where no single branch unilaterally dominates.

The section establishes fixed-term appointment (up to 7 years) and re-eligibility, satisfying the length element. However, it does not specify staggered cycles (all commissioners could be appointed and removed simultaneously), and § 8(5) grants the Governor-General unilateral power to set removal grounds via executive determination rather than codifying them in statute. This creates vulnerability to executive discretion despite the nominal term protection.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 9 addresses only leave-of-absence procedures for commissioners and contains no language regarding composition, appointment, political balance, party representation, supermajority confirmation, or judicial selection. It is a narrow procedural provision unrelated to the structural safeguards required by COMM.4.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 126 governs the procedural requirements for registering political parties with the Electoral Commission. It establishes eligibility criteria, application procedures, and documentation requirements for party registration. The section does not address the Electoral Commission's budget structure, funding mechanisms, or whether the Commission's budget is a separate statutory line item protected from executive reallocation. This section is entirely procedural and does not engage with institutional funding independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 306 addresses disclosure of political donations to elected officials; it contains no provisions establishing, structuring, or protecting election infrastructure budgets or funding cycles. The section is purely about donation transparency and reporting requirements, not budgetary allocation or multi-year funding mechanisms for election administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 302E prohibits foreign donations to third parties (non-party political actors) for electoral purposes, but does not address funding of the election authority itself or election administration vendors. FUND.3 requires a statutory ban on foreign-source funding flowing to the government body or vendors that administer elections; this section regulates donor conduct in the political sphere, not election administration institutional funding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30 establishes appointment and termination of the Electoral Officer for each election cycle, with no statutory protections for career tenure, merit-based employment conditions, or civil-service status. The appointment terminates automatically upon election completion, demonstrating ad hoc rather than career professional structure. No reference to merit protection, independent personnel standards, or ongoing employment guarantees is provided.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 228 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 addresses the administrative procedures for forwarding and handling declaration votes—specifically the chain of custody, record-keeping, and verification obligations of presiding officers, Assistant Returning Officers, and Divisional Returning Officers. It contains no statutory requirement, mandate, or definition regarding training for election officials or poll workers. The section prescribes duties but not the training framework, content, or frequency necessary to perform them.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 321DA addresses foreign campaigner prohibitions and civil penalties for unauthorized electoral matter; it contains no whistleblower protection mechanisms, statutory safeguards for staff reporting irregularities, or any provisions related to employee protections. This section regulates electoral conduct, not election administration staff accountability or protection.

The section codifies a security-assessment requirement for computer systems and mandates an independent, government-accredited assessor (Australian Signals Directorate), which addresses evaluators and some procedural elements. However, the statute does not codify certification criteria, a public-comment period, or a detailed timeline beyond 'before the next Senate election.' The accreditation standard and risk-assessment methodology are delegated to external bodies rather than specified in statute, leaving gaps in full codification of the certification process.

“The Electoral Commissioner must arrange for an independent person or body (the accredited assessor ) accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate to conduct a risk assessment (a security risk assessment ) of the security of the computer systems (including the systems for scanning ballot papers and counting votes) used to scrutinise the votes in a Senate election for a particular State or Territory in compliance with section 273A.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 337 addresses criminal penalties for electoral fraud in witnessing and signing electoral papers; it contains no institutional framework governing recertification of voting systems, equipment, procedures, or vendors. Recertification triggers are not codified in this section, nor does it establish any mechanism for periodic review or material-change certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 96B addresses voting entitlements for Antarctic electors and roll annotation procedures; it contains no statutory grounds or procedures for revoking any certification. CERT.3 requires decertification grounds and procedures (typically applicable to election vendors or officials), which are entirely absent from this section.