Austriav0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity15.1%8/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit11.1%
1/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation0.0%
0/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access57.1%
4/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the announcement of a runoff election (engere Wahl) by the federal election authority through public posting and internet notification. It addresses the timing and content of electoral announcements but does not establish any requirement for downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures. The provision is about voter notification, not technical audit or verification artifacts.

§ view source
2026-06-16
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

This section mandates that only official ballots (amtliche Stimmzettel) provided by the election officer can be used for voting. By requiring hand-marked official paper ballots as the sole means of voting, the statute establishes a voter-verifiable paper trail, as the voter physically handles and marks the official ballot paper.

Zur Stimmabgabe darf nur der vom Wahlleiter gleichzeitig mit dem Wahlkuvert dem Wähler übergebene amtliche Stimmzettel verwendet werden.
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2026-06-16
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 108 NRWO describes the Federal Election Authority's procedures for determining preference votes and allocating mandates, including publication requirements in paragraph (6). However, the section does not grant any citizen the legal right to re-tally votes from published precinct data. It addresses only the authority's internal procedures and limited distribution to election observers (§ 20a), not a general right of citizen verification.

§ view source
2026-06-16

Custody Hardware

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The section requires election materials to be transmitted in sealed envelopes (versiegelten Umschlag), which constitutes a tamper-evident seal requirement. However, the statute does not mandate logging of seal integrity checks or tamper-responsive automatic quarantine mechanisms, placing it at the tamper-evident level without additional security layers.

verschlossen und womöglich im versiegelten Umschlag zu übermitteln
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2026-06-16
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for announcing a runoff election to the public through official notice boards and internet-based information services. It does not concern vote-casting equipment, network isolation, or technical security requirements for voting machines. The section is about public notification of election results and candidate information, not equipment connectivity restrictions.

§ view source
2026-06-16
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

The section requires documentation of ballot envelope transfers (Wahlkuverts) including a written record ('Schreiben') of quantities and documented transmission ('nachweislich zu übermitteln'). However, the statute mandates internal chain-of-custody documentation between election authorities but does not explicitly require that this documentation be made publicly available. The criterion requires both full documentation AND public availability.

Die Wahlkuverts sind sodann ungeöffnet mit einem Schreiben, in dem die Anzahl der übermittelten Wahlkuverts anzuführen ist, der Landeswahlbehörde, aus deren Bereich die Wahlkuverts stammen, in einem versiegelten Umschlag auf die schnellstmögliche Art nachweislich zu übermitteln.
§ view source
2026-06-16
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses eligibility requirements for candidacy in Austrian National Council elections, specifically disqualifications based on criminal convictions. It is entirely unrelated to custody, hardware, device access, or tampering with election equipment. The criterion concerns criminal penalties for unauthorized device access in an election context, which is not addressed in this eligibility statute.

§ view source
2026-06-16

Post Election Audit

11.1% · 1/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

Section § 10 requires the Rechnungshof (Austrian Court of Audit) to control and audit parties' election advertising reports and financial statements. However, the section does not establish a mandatory comprehensive post-election audit of the election itself or voting process—it regulates party finance and reporting audits, which is a narrower scope than the criterion's requirement for a post-election audit of every election's integrity and conduct.

§ view source
2026-06-16
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 121 addresses procedures for partial repeat elections (Wiederholungswahl) and the handling of mail-in ballots during such elections. It does not contain any provisions mandating an audit method for post-election verification or ballot counting procedures. The section is procedurally focused on when preliminary results may be announced and when mail-in votes are counted, not on audit requirements.

§ view source
2026-06-16
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the procedure for announcing election results and the Constitutional Court's authority to hear challenges to the election decision within four weeks, but it does not describe triggering additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The provision concerns legal remedies and court procedures, not audit mechanisms.

§ view source
2026-06-16
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 62 of the NRWO addresses the leadership and conduct of the election itself, including maintenance of order and authority of the election official during voting. It does not address post-election audit procedures, observer access, or participation by parties, media, or citizens in any audit process.

§ view source
2026-06-16
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?1/1100.0%

The section establishes that when the Federal Election Authority (Bundeswahlbehörde) reviews numerical findings and determines they are incorrect, it must immediately correct the result, revoke the prior announcements, and publish the correct result. This mandatory language ('hat...zu') makes audit findings legally binding and directly binding on the final certified result.

Ergibt sich aus diesen Schriftstücken die Unrichtigkeit der Ermittlung, so hat die Bundeswahlbehörde sofort das Ergebnis der betroffenen Ermittlungen richtigzustellen, die Verlautbarung der Landeswahlbehörde und der Bundeswahlbehörde zu widerrufen und das richtige Ergebnis zu verlautbaren.
§ view source
2026-06-16

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

The section specifies that official ballots must be manufactured only by order of the Federal Election Authority and provides detailed requirements for ballot layout, format, and distribution. However, it does not explicitly address whether ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules are signed and published before polls open, nor does it address the software verifiability dimension or digital publication requirements relevant to modern election integrity standards.

Der amtliche Stimmzettel darf nur auf Anordnung der Bundeswahlbehörde hergestellt werden.
§ view source
2026-06-16
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16 of the BPräsWG addresses procedural rights for candidates to challenge numerical election result determinations made by regional election authorities, and the federal election authority's review and correction of those determinations. The section concerns post-election result verification and administrative appeals—it does not address software verification, binary matching, or any commitment-and-verification mechanism for election software code or executables.

§ view source
2026-06-16

Transparency Observation

0.0% · 0/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 63 addresses the procedural opening of polling stations, ballot distribution, and initial voting by election officials. It does not mention or establish rights for party or civil-society observers to access polling procedures. The criterion requires explicit provision of observer access rights, which this section does not contain.

§ view source
2026-06-16
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 5 of the NRWO addresses the allocation of mandates to electoral districts based on census data and their publication in the Federal Law Gazette. It does not contain any provisions regarding the timing requirements for publishing precinct-level election results after polls close. The section concerns apportionment and redistricting procedures, not result publication timelines.

§ view source
2026-06-16
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

The section requires detailed documentation of election procedures in a protocol (Niederschrift) and mandates recording of specific election actions, including invalidated ballots numbered sequentially. However, the statute does not explicitly require the log to be public, signed in a manner ensuring authenticity, or append-only in the technical sense required by the criterion. The documentation is internal to the electoral authority.

Die Wahlbehörde hat hierauf die von den Wählern des Regionalwahlkreises abgegebenen Wahlkuverts zu öffnen, die Stimmzettel zu entnehmen, deren Gültigkeit zu überprüfen, die ungültigen Stimmzettel mit fortlaufenden Nummern zu versehen und festzustellen
§ view source
2026-06-16

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16

Voter Access

57.1% · 4/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly mandates that voters must destroy defective ballots in front of the election authority and take them away 'for the purpose of safeguarding ballot secrecy' (zwecks Wahrung des Wahlgeheimnisses). This demonstrates a legal guarantee that ballot secrecy is protected by preventing any linkage between voter identity and specific ballot papers. Additionally, section (4) requires ballots to be placed in an envelope before being deposited in the urn, further ensuring secrecy.

Der Wähler hat den ihm zuerst ausgehändigten amtlichen Stimmzettel vor der Wahlbehörde durch Zerreißen unbrauchbar zu machen und zwecks Wahrung des Wahlgeheimnisses mit sich zu nehmen.
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2026-06-16
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?3/560.0%

The statute mandates specific accessibility accommodations for voters with visual impairments (ballot templates) and allows companions for voters with physical, sensory, or cognitive disabilities. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards across all categories (vision, motor, language) that must be available at every polling place, nor does it define detailed technical accessibility requirements or language access provisions.

blinden oder schwer sehbehinderten Wählern sind seitens der Wahlbehörde als Hilfsmittel zur Ermöglichung der Wahlausübung Stimmzettel-Schablonen zur Verfügung zu stellen
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2026-06-16
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

The section establishes that one polling place should ordinarily be designated for each electoral district (Wahlsprengel), which creates a floor tied to geographic subdivision rather than voter population. However, the rule is framed as default practice ('in der Regel') and permits deviations—including consolidation of multiple districts into one polling place if facilities are adequate. This weakens the binding nature of the floor and makes it more guideline than legal floor.

ist in der Regel für jeden Wahlsprengel innerhalb desselben ein Wahllokal zu bestimmen
§ view source
2026-06-16

Other methodologies for Austria