EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 13 NRWO addresses the appointment timeline, oath-taking, and procedural duties of election board chairs and representatives. It requires an oath of impartiality (subsection 2) but contains no statutory requirement for public disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The oath mechanism is a form of accountability but does not constitute conflict-of-interest disclosure as defined by COI.1.

Section 37 of the NRWO addresses voter registry procedures (enrollment, posting, corrections, complaints) but does not explicitly codify the right to seek judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it define standing, timeline, or venue for judicial challenges. While the section mentions 'Beschwerden' (complaints) and references the WEviG (election law amendment act), it does not provide sufficient statutory detail about judicial review mechanisms. Clarification would require examination of other statutory sections or the WEviG itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Bundeswahlbehörde's existence and core mandate are grounded in statute (the NRWO of 1992) rather than in the Austrian constitution. The criterion asks whether the election commission is set in the constitution; this section establishes it by statutory law alone, which scores lower on the ordinal scale (1 rather than 2).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes party-controlled nomination of election board members (Beisitzer and Ersatzbeisitzer) submitted to executive branch officials (federal interior minister, state governors, election directors). No statutory role for legislature or judiciary in appointment; the executive branch (with party input) unilaterally controls composition of electoral bodies. This represents single-branch executive control, not multi-branch appointment structure required by COMM.2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes a precinct election board (Sprengelwahlbehörde) but provides no statutory definition of term length, staggered cycles, or grounds for removal. The mayor (Bürgermeister) appoints the chair and deputies with no mentioned term protection or removal safeguards. Appointment discretion rests entirely with the municipal executive, creating vulnerability to political replacement outside any statutory framework.

§ 19 Abs. 4 NRWO mandates that the composition of election commissions (Wahlbehörden) must be adjusted to reflect current party strength (Parteienstärke) following National Council elections, and §§ 14-16 establish that party representation is proportional to electoral support. This creates a statutory requirement for political balance indexed to actual election results, automatically rebalancing commissions when party representation changes. The mechanism is codified in statute and self-executing, not subject to discretionary appointment.

“so sind die der neuen Parteienstärke entsprechenden Änderungen durchzuführen”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section (§ 26b BPräsWG) addresses procedural arrangements for a single rerun of the 2016 Austrian presidential election runoff, including voter registration, ballot procedures, and timing. It contains no provisions regarding election authority funding, budget structure, or financial independence. The statute does not establish any independent funding mechanism or statutory budget line item for election administration.

This section establishes a statutorily-grounded, multi-year funding mechanism that removes election administration funding from annual political renegotiation. The compensation rate is indexed automatically to inflation (the consumer price index) on a yearly basis, with threshold safeguards, and municipalities receive federal reimbursement on a formula-driven, non-discretionary basis. This satisfies FUND.2 because the funding cycle is set by statute, operates on a predetermined escalator mechanism, and shields election costs from in-cycle political reallocation.

“Der in Abs. 1 festgesetzte Vergütungssatz vermindert oder erhöht sich, beginnend mit dem 1. Jänner 2025, jährlich in dem Maß, das sich aus der Veränderung des von der Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich verlautbarten Verbraucherpreisindex 2020”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § PartG § 6 regulates political party donation limits and disclosure requirements under Austria's Party Financing Act, not election authority funding. It does not address funding of election administration institutions, their staff, or election administration vendors. FUND.3 requires statutory prohibition of foreign-source funding for the election authority itself; this section concerns only private donations to political parties.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 6 NRWO establishes ad-hoc election committees (Wahlbehörden) formed anew before each election, composed of citizens fulfilling jury-duty-like obligations (öffentliches Ehrenamt), not career professional staff. The statute requires rotation and prohibits multiple concurrent functions but contains no civil-service protections, merit-based hiring, employment contracts, or professional career structures. Election administration appears to be conducted by temporary, citizen-volunteers without statutory job protection or career advancement provisions.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 10a BPräsWG addresses procedural rules for voter identification, ballot handling, and the use of electronic voting registers at polling stations. It contains no provision whatsoever regarding voting-equipment certification, evaluators, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment processes. The section is silent on vendor oversight and the certification infrastructure required by CERT.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.