EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 66 codifies voter-identity verification (ID card, biometric/non-biometric passport, etc.) — voter authentication, not a public verification package. Armenia does not codify a downloadable signed verification package. | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | Article 59 codifies the ballot-paper specification: 'The sample of the ballot paper shall be established by the relevant electoral commission in such a way as to ensure secrecy of voting.' Combined with Article 61 (paper-ballot storage in safe), Article 64 (sealed-box voting), Article 68 (open paper-ballot count), Armenia mandates voter-marked paper ballots as the only voting medium. | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 102 codifies the National-Assembly-election challenge mechanism — but standing is limited to candidates and parties, NOT general citizens. Article 75 codifies CEC publication of results but does not grant citizens raw precinct data for independent re-tally. | § view source 2026-05-17 |
Custody Hardware
25.0% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | Article 60 of the Electoral Code codifies tamper-evident seals: CEC-approved samples of electoral-commission and individual-member seals, plus ballot-box seals. Reinforced by Article 61 (ballot papers, envelopes, self-adhesive stamps, and seals stored in a 'fire-resistant safe' in the voting room) and Article 64 (pre-vote sealing procedure on voting day at 7:00 in plain view of commission members). Ordinal level 2: tamper-evident seals required. “Samples of the seals of electoral commissions and of the individual seals of” | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
Post Election Audit
33.3% · 3/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | Article 50 codifies the recount-of-voting-results mechanism: candidates, parties running in elections, candidates for community head, and proxies who were present at the summarisation may request recount. While not 'every election' automatically, the audit-by-request mechanism is statutorily codified — combined with Article 73 (district commission validity-check of all precinct protocols), creating de facto layered audit. | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | Article 50 codifies the recount method as a manual hand-recount of paper ballots (Armenia's voting is paper-only). Ordinal level 2: fixed-mechanism hand recount, not an RLA or comparison audit (those concepts presuppose electronic counting). | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 60 codifies physical seals on commission members, ballot boxes, and 'technical equipment' approved by the Central Electoral Commission. The 'technical equipment' refers to biometric voter-ID terminals, not voting software — and the article codifies physical sealing, not software-integrity verification. | § view source 2026-05-17 |
Transparency Observation
87.5% · 7/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | Article 32 of the Electoral Code grants observers, mass-media representatives, and visitors comprehensive rights: presence at commission sittings, presence in the voting room, observation of voting/counting/summarisation. Reinforced by Article 30 (right of observation mission), Article 31 (accreditation procedure), Article 65 (procedure for entry into voting room). “An observer, mass media representative, visitor shall have the right to:” | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 1/1100.0% | Article 30 of the Electoral Code explicitly grants observation-mission rights to '(1) international organisations and those foreign non-governmental organisations whose charter objectives include issues of democracy and protection of human rights' — international observers admitted by statutory default. Reinforced by Article 31 (accreditation procedure). “The following shall have the right to act as observation mission during elections:” | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 5/5100.0% | Article 75 codifies an EXPLICIT 24-hour publication deadline: 'No later than 24 hours after the end of voting, based on the election results in the electoral precincts, received from district electoral commissions, the Central Electoral Commission shall summarise the results of elections of the National Assembly, Councils of Elders of Yerevan.' Ordinal level 5: within 24 hours. “No later than 24 hours after the end of voting, based on the election results in” | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 51 enumerates CEC functions including 'supervision over the lawful and uniform application of the Code' but doesn't codify open vote-format/device-protocol standards (none needed for paper voting). | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
Voter Access
28.6% · 2/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | Article 6 of the Electoral Code declares 'Voting shall be held by secret ballot. Secrecy of voting shall not only be the right, but also the responsibility of an elector. Control over the free expression of will of an elector shall be prohibited.' Reinforced by Constitution Article 7 (constitutional secret-ballot principle), Article 57 (voting room must protect secrecy), Article 1 (foundational principles). | § view source 2026-05-17 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-17 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 1/1100.0% | Article 16 codifies a polling-place density mandate: 'The authorised body shall — no later than 45 days before the voting day — with the participation of the head of community and member of district electoral commission, form electoral precincts, taking into account local and other conditions.' Reinforced by Article 44 (precinct commission of at least 7 members per precinct) and Article 52 (district commission supervision). Each community has codified geographic distribution of precincts. | § view source 2026-05-17 |