EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the Board of Elections' powers to regulate campaign finance matching funds, conduct investigations into alleged violations, and issue findings—it has no connection to election auditing artifacts, voting device records, certificates, or result signatures. The criterion asks about technical verification mechanisms for election results; this statute concerns campaign finance enforcement procedures.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions for terms used in Rhode Island election law, including 'Computer ballot,' 'Voting equipment,' and 'Vote.' However, it does not mandate or require that voters receive a voter-verifiable paper trail or hand-marked paper ballots. The definitions describe what voting equipment is used but do not establish a legal requirement for voter-verifiable paper records.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the public availability of voter registration records and related administrative records. It does not address whether citizens have a legal right to re-tally election results from published precinct data, which is the subject of criterion 4.4. The section is about registration transparency, not post-election audit or verification rights.

The section mandates tamper-evident seals (adhesive labels signed in ink by board members) for ballot storage containers, which satisfies the baseline tamper-evident requirement. However, it does not require logging of seal integrity checks, chain-of-custody records, or any tamper-responsive automated quarantine mechanism, falling short of the higher ordinal levels.

“shall place all ballots received from mail voters together with the certified envelopes containing the ballots in a steel box or package and shall seal the ballots and envelopes in open meetings of the board by affixing at least four (4) adhesive labels, and the members of the board shall sign the labels by affixing their signatures in ink to each of the labels”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses eligibility criteria for matching public campaign funds, contribution and expenditure limits, and permissible uses of campaign funds. It contains no provisions relating to vote-casting equipment, network isolation, internet connectivity, or any technical requirements for voting systems. The criterion concerns cybersecurity measures for election infrastructure, which is entirely outside the scope of this campaign finance statute.

The section establishes that voting equipment must remain in the warden's custody during polls and until ballots are sealed and transmitted, addressing physical custody responsibility. However, it does not require documentation of the chain-of-custody nor does it mandate public availability of any such documentation. The statute specifies who has custody but not the documentation procedures that would satisfy the criterion.

“the optical scan precinct count units, memory cartridges, and voted computer ballots shall remain in the care and custody of the warden”

The statute explicitly criminalizes unauthorized tampering with voting equipment, including physically tampering with, injuring, or disarranging equipment, and using equipment known to be improperly set or programmed, with violations classified as felonies. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Any person having the custody of voting equipment under this chapter, or any election or primary officer, who, with intent to cause or permit any voting equipment to fail to correctly register all votes cast, tampers with, injures, or disarranges the voting equipment in any way, or any part of the voting equipment, or who causes or consents to the voting equipment being used for voting at any election or primary with knowledge of the fact that the voting equipment is not in order or not properly set and programmed so that it will correctly register all votes cast, or who, for the purpose of defrauding or deceiving any voter or of causing it to be doubtful for what candidates or question any vote is cast, or of causing it to appear upon the voting equipment that votes cast for one candidate or question were cast for another candidate or question, removes, changes, or mutilates any computer ballot or any part of any computer ballot, or does anything to defeat the will or intention of a voter in casting a lawful vote, shall be guilty of a felony.”

The statute mandates post-election audits but only for presidential preference primary and general elections commencing in 2020, not for every election. Other statewide elections (primary, general, special) are merely authorized but not required as of 2018, and many local or non-statewide elections are not addressed. This falls short of 'every election' as required by the criterion.

“Commencing in 2020, the state board, in conjunction with local boards, must conduct risk-limiting audits after the presidential preference primary and general elections in accordance with the requirements in this section.”

Rhode Island General Laws § 17-19-37.4 mandates risk-limiting audits (RLA) as the audit method for presidential preference primary and general elections beginning in 2020. The statute provides a detailed definition of RLA and requires its implementation by the state board in conjunction with local boards. This satisfies the criterion at level 4 on the ordinal scale.

“Commencing in 2020, the state board, in conjunction with local boards, must conduct risk-limiting audits after the presidential preference primary and general elections in accordance with the requirements in this section.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recount eligibility for write-in candidates, not audit triggers. It establishes vote thresholds for when a write-in candidate may request a recount, but does not trigger additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. Recounts and audits are distinct processes; recount eligibility provisions do not satisfy a criterion about audit triggers.

The statute explicitly requires that risk-limiting audits be conducted 'in public view,' which grants parties, media, and citizens observer access to the audit process. This mandatory public conduct requirement directly satisfies the criterion for observer access.

“The state board, in conjunction with the local boards, shall conduct the audit in public view by manually interpreting the ballots according to rules established by the state board in accordance with chapter 35 of title 42.”

The statute explicitly provides that when a risk-limiting audit results in a full manual tally, those manual vote counts shall replace the previously reported vote counts for purposes of determining official contest results. This language directly establishes that audit results (when a full manual tally occurs) are legally binding and override the initial machine tabulation.

“If a risk-limiting audit of a contest leads to a full manual tally of the ballots cast using the voting system, the vote counts according to that manual tally shall replace the vote counts reported pursuant to §§ 17-19-36 and 17-19-37 for the purpose of determining the official contest results pursuant to §§ 17-22-5.2 and 17-22-6 .”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure of voter address information under a confidentiality program and contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning software verifiability and source code disclosure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This statute addresses accessible voting methods for blind, visually impaired, and disabled voters through special Braille and tactile mail ballots. It does not address software, binary builds, reproducibility, or any aspect of election system source code or compilation—topics that are central to the software verifiability criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires the Secretary of State to prepare ballot layouts and coding, and to transfer ballot preparation information to the state board, but does not explicitly mandate that ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules be publicly signed and published before polls open. The section addresses preparation and testing of equipment but does not establish a publication or signing requirement as a prerequisite to election day.

“The secretary of state shall be responsible for the coding and layout of all computer ballots to be used in each election under contract, including the printing of the ballot and the preparation of the device to ensure that the ballots are compatible with the device, and shall transfer all information relative to the ballot and its preparation to the state board.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute specifies voting equipment requirements, including physical audit trails and hand-countable ballots for accuracy checks, but does not address verification of software binaries or the ability to verify that the actual running binary code matches a previously committed version. The criterion requires a right to verify software at the binary level, which this section does not grant.

The statute explicitly grants representatives of recognized political parties with proper credentials the right to sit at a table and observe who is voting, and also allows party watchers to observe voting outside the enclosed space and assist checkers. This provides clear procedural access for party observers to monitor the voting process.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 17-9.2-3 addresses restoration of voting rights for individuals convicted of felonies and does not address precinct-level results publication requirements or timelines. The section is entirely focused on felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement procedures.

The section requires that a copy of the printout tape (which includes a timed audit trail) be made available to the public at the polling place. However, this does not constitute a legally required 'public, signed, append-only election event log' as specified by the criterion. The statute requires public availability of a document but does not establish it as an official event log maintained in append-only form with signing requirements throughout the election process.

“A copy shall be made available to the public at the polling place”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses notification, affidavits, and enforcement responsibilities for state vendors but does not address whether multiple certified vendors are permitted to operate simultaneously in the same election. The section is procedural in nature and does not establish or permit multi-vendor capability.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the filing and reporting of affidavits for state vendors who meet spending thresholds, and their disclosure obligations to the board of elections. It does not contain any requirements, limitations, or caps on the duration of vendor contracts. The criterion concerns whether contracts are time-limited to prevent perpetual lock-in; this section is entirely procedural and administrative regarding disclosure, not substantive contract terms.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section expresses an intent to safeguard mail ballot voters from 'invasion of privacy,' which is conceptually related to ballot secrecy. However, it is a statement of legislative purpose and construction principles rather than an enforceable legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. It does not establish specific procedures, mechanisms, or requirements that would legally guarantee and make enforceable the secrecy of the ballot itself.

“by assuring that the procedures set forth in this chapter controlling the application and balloting processes are strictly enforced, and by safeguarding the mail ballot voter from harassment, intimidation, and invasion of privacy”

The statute mandates that the Secretary of State specify accessible voting equipment to accommodate voters who are blind, visually impaired, or disabled, enabling private and independent voting. However, the requirement is limited by the qualifier 'to the extent reasonably available,' which introduces discretion, and the scope focuses on vision and disability accommodation but does not explicitly address motor accessibility or language accessibility standards. This represents a partial mandate for accessibility rather than a comprehensive standard.

“shall specify to the extent reasonably available state-of-the-art voting equipment that can accommodate voters who are blind, visually impaired, or are otherwise disabled, in order to afford all voters, regardless of abilities, an opportunity to cast their ballot privately and independently”

The statute requires that polling places be 'sufficient' to avoid 'excessive waiting' but does not establish a numerical floor (e.g., minimum polling places per N voters) or a geographic area requirement. The language is qualitative rather than quantitative, making it discretionary rather than a mandatory minimum standard that could be verified objectively.

“The number of polling place units and voting booths must be sufficient to permit the election to run smoothly without excessive waiting of voters”