EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign contribution methods (checks, credit cards, cash, and electronic payments) and verification of contributor identity. It does not concern voting system verification artifacts, certificates, device records, or result signatures—the subject matter of criterion 4.1. The statute is entirely off-topic for public verification of election results.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 11-101 is a definitional section that establishes terminology for Maryland election law, including definitions of 'canvass,' 'vote tabulation,' 'vote tallying,' and 'counting center.' It contains no language addressing cryptographic receipts, end-to-end verifiability, voter-accessible proofs, or any mechanism to prove ballot inclusion without revealing votes. The section is entirely about naming and defining procedural concepts, not about voting technology or verification methods.

The statute explicitly requires preservation and use of voter-verifiable paper records in recounts, mandating that a local board preserve the voter-verifiable paper record corresponding to each duplicate ballot and permitting manual recount of these records. This establishes a legal requirement for voter-verifiable paper records to exist and be maintained.

“the petitioner shall select the method for conducting the recount. (2) The petitioner may select only one of the following methods: (i) rescanning the ballots using: 1. the same vote tabulating equipment that was used in the election; or 2. alternative vote tabulating equipment, if alternative equipment is available and its use is feasible, as determined by the State Board; (ii) a manual recount of voter–verifiable paper records”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs recount petitions by defeated candidates, not citizen re-tallying rights. It explicitly limits the right to petition for a recount to 'a candidate for public or party office who has been defeated based on the certified results,' which excludes ordinary citizens. The statute contains no provision allowing any citizen to re-tally from published precinct data.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 10-314 addresses procedures for closing polls, securing equipment, and handling election materials, but does not establish or mandate any tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards. The section discusses general security and material sealing procedures without specifying technical tamper standards for voting equipment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns filing and public availability of reports by contested election committee treasurers. It is entirely unrelated to vote-casting equipment or network isolation requirements for such equipment.

The statute requires the State Board to establish chain of custody procedures for ballot drop box materials, which addresses documentation requirements. However, the statute does not explicitly state that documentation must be full/complete or that procedures must be publicly available, only that they must be established. The requirement for public availability is absent from the text.

“The State Board shall establish chain of custody procedures governing removal of election–related materials from ballot drop boxes and the return of the materials to the local board.”

The section explicitly establishes criminal penalties (felony, fine up to $10,000, imprisonment up to 3 years) for unauthorized access and tampering with voting equipment, including unauthorized possession of keys to voting equipment. This directly satisfies the requirement for explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony and is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 3 years or both.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recounts upon petition (a discretionary process initiated by petitioners), not mandatory post-election audits that occur for every election. The statute governs procedures when a recount is requested and conducted, not an automatic audit requirement for all elections.

The statute mandates a fixed-percentage hand recount audit following each statewide general election. Subsection (d) specifies that the manual audit must cover at least 2% of precincts statewide and at least 1% of votes by category from the previous comparable general election, which constitutes a fixed-percentage manual audit rather than a risk-limiting or comparison audit methodology.

“a manual audit of voter–verifiable paper records in accordance with subsection (d) of this section”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 12-108 addresses duplicate ballot creation, preservation, and recount procedures, but does not establish any audit triggers based on close margins or sworn challenges. The section only specifies methods for conducting recounts after a petitioner has already initiated one, without triggering additional audits on its own.

The statute explicitly requires the State Board to allow public observation of the manual audit process. While the phrase 'to the extent practicable' introduces a limitation, the statute clearly grants access to parties, media, and citizens (as members of the public) to observe the audit process.

“The State Board shall allow for public observation of each part of the manual audit process to the extent practicable.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute explicitly states that audit results 'may not have any effect on the certified election results,' meaning they are not legally binding on the final certified result. The audit is described as being 'used to improve the voting system and voting process for future elections,' establishing it as a quality assurance mechanism rather than a mechanism that can alter or overturn certified results.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure requirements for political action committees making independent expenditures and electioneering communications. It has no bearing on voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses unauthorized use, distribution, and possession of ballots—a matter of ballot security and fraud prevention. It contains no requirements or references to reproducible builds, public source code, binary reproducibility, or software development practices. The section is entirely outside the scope of software verifiability criteria.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration and absentee voting procedures for incarcerated eligible voters in correctional facilities. It does not address ballot contests, ballot layouts, tabulation rules, or publication/signing of election materials before polls open. The criterion concerns software verifiability and pre-election publication of election definitions, which is entirely outside the scope of this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 11-309 establishes post-election auditing procedures including automated software audits and manual audits of paper records, but does not address verification that the actual running binary of the voting system matches a previously committed binary. The section concerns accuracy verification of vote tabulation results, not source code or binary integrity verification.

The statute grants challengers and watchers designated by candidates, political parties, and groups of voters comprehensive procedural access to polling places, including early entry, continuous presence during voting, post-close-of-polls observation, and the right to record voter participation information. The section further requires specific positioning to enable effective observation of voting procedures.

“a challenger or watcher has the right to: (1) enter the polling place one-half hour before the polls open; (2) enter or be present at the polling place at any time when the polls are open; (3) remain in the polling place until the completion of all tasks associated with the close of the polls under § 10-314 of this subtitle and the election judges leave the polling place; (4) maintain a list of registered voters who have voted, or individuals who have cast provisional ballots, and take the list outside of the polling place; and (5) enter and leave a polling place for the purpose of taking outside of the polling place information that identifies registered voters who have cast ballots or individuals who have cast provisional ballots.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires the State Board to make precinct-level results available in electronic format, satisfying the transparency requirement. However, the statute does not specify a timeline for publication (within 24 hours, 48 hours, or any other deadline), so it cannot satisfy the 24-hour requirement. A one-week default assumption for general legal compliance yields a score of 2.

“the State Board shall make available in an electronic format a report of election results for each candidate or question voted on at the election: (i) by precinct”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 9-102 establishes voting system certification requirements and accessibility standards, but does not mandate a public, signed, append-only election event log. While the section requires voter-verifiable paper records and audit trails for recounts, it does not specifically require an election event log with the specified characteristics (public, signed, append-only).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the decertification of voting systems by the State Board but does not establish or permit the use of multiple certified vendors in elections. It concerns removal of certification, not authorization of multiple vendors to operate simultaneously.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter informational materials and signage to be posted in polling places. It contains no language regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, vendor specifications, or open documentation of technical voting systems. The criterion concerns the transparency and openness of voting device protocols, which is entirely absent from this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses attribution and reporting of campaign contributions by officers, directors, and partners of business entities doing public business, along with record-keeping requirements. It does not address vendor contracts or contract duration caps.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses employer payroll deduction programs for campaign contributions and recordkeeping requirements. It contains no provisions regarding source-code escrow, vendor certification, or any election system vendor requirements. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion.

The statute explicitly requires that voting systems must 'protect the secrecy of the ballot' as a mandatory certification standard. This legal requirement directly addresses ballot secrecy and voter–ballot unlinkability, making it a binding enforceable standard that voting systems must meet to be certified and used in Maryland.

“protect the secrecy of the ballot”

The statute mandates that at least one voting system in every polling place must provide comprehensive accessibility complying with subsection (f), which requires independent, private casting and verification via visual and nonvisual means (including audio and enhanced visual display) consistent with the ADA and Help America Vote Act. This represents a comprehensive accessibility mandate applied uniformly across all polling places.

“At least one voting system in each polling place on election day shall provide access for voters with disabilities in compliance with subsection (f) of this section.”

The statute establishes mandatory minimums for early voting centers based on county voter population, creating a legal floor that scales with the number of registered voters. This directly addresses polling-place density by specifying required numbers of voting locations per voter population tier.

“(2) A county with fewer than 50,000 registered voters shall have one early voting center established in the county. (3) A county with at least 50,000 registered voters but fewer than 100,000 registered voters shall have two early voting centers established in the county.”