EIIElection Integrity Index

Cal. Elec. Code § 15104(a) makes the processing of vote-by-mail ballot return envelopes 'open to the public, both prior to and after the election' and § 15104(b) requires grand-jury + party representatives to be present. § 19273 makes the VVPAT the official paper record. Together these constitute a public-verification surface, though not a single downloadable signed package.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19270(a) prohibits SOS certification of any DRE voting system without an accessible VVPAT. § 19273 makes the VVPAT the official record. § 19274 ensures durable paper for the retention period. Comprehensive voter-verifiable-paper mandate.

“The Secretary of State shall not certify or conditionally approve a direct recording electronic voting system unless the system includes an accessible voter verified paper audit trail.”

Cal. Elec. Code § 19381 requires precinct boards to 'immediately transmit UNSEALED' a copy of the result of votes cast — 'OPEN TO PUBLIC INSPECTION.' § 15371 + § 15500 require results to be compiled and posted publicly. § 15281 requires posting at the polling place for 48+ hours. Together: any citizen can record + re-tally precinct totals.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19323 requires the elections official to deliver to each polling place 'one envelope containing the seal for sealing the machine after the polls are closed.' Combined with § 19320 (machine preparation procedures), § 15279 (sealing ballots in 'strong envelope' with all precinct-board signatures), § 18564 (felony penalty for tampering), § 19006/§ 19101 (statewide certification standards and ongoing testing), CA codifies tamper-evident seals PLUS logged inspection — ordinal level 4.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19205 explicitly mandates: '(a) No part of the voting system shall be connected to the internet at any time. (b) No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network...' Strongest network-isolation language in any scored jurisdiction.

“No part of the voting system shall be connected to the internet at any time.”

Cal. Elec. Code § 15551 codifies court-order custody of the sealed voted-ballot package if a contest or criminal prosecution is pending — ballots cannot be destroyed and remain under court custody. Combined with § 15279 (ballots 'carefully sealed in a strong envelope' with all precinct-board signatures on the seal — though that section wasn't FTS-surfaced for this datapoint) and § 18564 (criminal penalty for tampering with election materials), CA codifies a chain-of-custody regime with court-enforced retention.

Cal. Elec. Code § 18564(a) imposes felony imprisonment of 2-3-4 years for tampering with the correct operation of voting equipment before or during an election. § 18564.5 adds civil-action authority for the SoS, AG, and local elections officials. Strong tamper-penalty regime.

“Any person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years who, before or during an election: (1) Tampers with, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, the correct operation of”

Cal. Elec. Code § 19204.5(a) prohibits SOS certification of any voting system that cannot facilitate a ballot-level-comparison risk-limiting audit. Combined with § 19270 (VVPAT mandate), § 19233 (random software audits), and the 1% manual tally codified in Div 15 (canvass), CA mandates audit at multiple layers.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19204.5 codifies the RISK-LIMITING AUDIT (RLA) method: SoS may not certify voting systems incapable of ballot-level comparison RLA. CA was the first US state to operationalize RLAs (SB 360, 2018). Combined with the longstanding 1% manual tally (Div 15) and § 15302 reconciliation, CA scores ordinal level 4 (risk-limiting audit). Level 5 ('RLA + reconciliation') would require explicit codified reconciliation between the two — present but separate.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

§ 19006 declares legislative intent for transparent certification but doesn't directly codify audit-observer access. However Div 15 (Canvass) at § 15104 (vote-by-mail processing 'shall be open to the public') and the RLA process under § 19204.5 inherit Cal. Elec. Code's public-process default. Partial — observer access is codified via the open-canvass framework but not as an audit-specific right in the candidates.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19270(a) makes VVPAT certification non-negotiable for any DRE system — the paper audit trail is therefore the official record under § 19273(b) (not in this datapoint's FTS results, but referenced). The RLA outcome under § 19204.5 is binding on the certified result, making audit findings legally enforceable.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19212(a)(1) requires the vendor or certifying county to deposit an EXACT COPY OF THE APPROVED SOURCE CODE with the Secretary of State within 10 business days of certification. Section 19214 requires SOS to publish full certification reports and supporting documentation to the public (with limited security-sensitive redactions). This puts CA at ordinal level 4 ('academics under NDA') — the code is held by the certifying authority and review access is regulated.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 15302 codifies the official canvass tasks (inspection, reconciliation, recount) — not reproducible builds of voting software. CA does not codify a reproducible-build requirement.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 18564 criminalizes tampering with voting equipment but does not codify pre-poll publication of signed ballot definitions. § 19400 (ballot-on-demand systems) regulates manufacturing standards. CA mandates voter-information guides with sample ballots (per Div 13/9) but those weren't surfaced for this datapoint.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19233 mandates that 'The Secretary of State shall conduct random audits of the software installed on direct recording electronic voting systems ... to ensure that the installed software is identical to the software that has been approved for use on that voting system.' This is the post-election software-integrity verification right.

Cal. Elec. Code § 15104(a) opens vote-by-mail processing/counting to the public. § 15104(b) requires presence of a grand jury member + at least one Republican + one Democratic county central committee member. § 19362 requires polling-place + voting machine to be in plain view of precinct board AND poll watchers.

“The processing of vote by mail ballot return envelopes, and the processing and counting of vote by mail ballots, shall be open to the public, both prior to and after the election.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Cal. Elec. Code § 15281 requires the precinct board to 'sign and post conspicuously on the outside of the polling place a copy of the result of the votes cast,' which must remain posted 'for at least 48 hours after the official time fixed for the closing of the polls.' This is precinct-level results posted publicly within hours of close — ordinal level 4 (within 48h).

“The copy shall remain posted for at least 48 hours after the official time fixed for the closing of the polls.”

§ 19273 makes the VVPAT paper trail the official record, accessible per public-inspection rules; § 19271 defines accessibility for the cast vote record. The VVPAT + canvass-tutanak hybrid serves as the event-log analog. Not a single signed append-only log but a functionally-equivalent paper-trail regime.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19215 governs the multi-vendor regime: 'If a voting system or part of a voting system has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State, the vendor or, in cases where the system is publicly owned, the jurisdiction shall notify the Secretary of State and all local elections officials who use the system.' Multiple certified vendors operate concurrently in CA elections (Dominion, ES&S, Hart, etc.).

Cal. Elec. Code § 19101(a) requires SOS to 'adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems that meet the minimum requirements of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and that incorporate best practices in election technology.' Standards are codified and publicly published.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 18521 criminalizes vote-buying ('any money, gift, loan, or other valuable consideration') but does not address vendor contract duration. CA does not codify a duration cap on voting-equipment vendor contracts in the FTS-surfaced candidates.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19212(a)(1) explicitly requires source-code escrow with the Secretary of State within 10 business days of certification. Strongest source-code-escrow language across scored jurisdictions.

“the vendor or county seeking certification or approval of the voting system shall cause an exact copy of the approved source code”

Cal. Const. Art. II § 7 declares 'Voting shall be secret' as constitutional principle. Reinforced by § 18562.5 (misdemeanor for observing-and-disclosing during vote-by-mail processing), § 15281 (results-posting carve-out 'to protect a person's right to cast a secret ballot'), and § 19283 (remote vote-by-mail standards must preserve voter secrecy).

“SEC. 7. Voting shall be secret.”

Cal. Elec. Code § 19240 mandates voting-system compliance with the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 accessibility provisions for individuals with disabilities, including non-visual access. § 19283 requires the SoS to adopt remote-accessible vote-by-mail standards. § 19270 requires DRE systems to include an ACCESSIBLE VVPAT. CA's regime exceeds minimum HAVA — but the candidates surface 'some' rather than 'comprehensive' (level 5 would require full motor + language + visual mandate at every polling place).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 15280 codifies precinct-board duties but does not codify a per-voter or per-area density floor for polling places. § 15281 covers posting requirements, not density. CA's Voter's Choice Act (Div 14) does establish ballot-drop-box density (1 per 15,000 registered voters) but that wasn't surfaced for this datapoint; for the predominant polling-place regime, no statutory floor was surfaced.