EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-1023 addresses digital impersonation of candidates and other persons, establishing civil remedies through declaratory relief. It contains no provisions regarding downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, result signatures, or any election verification artifacts. The section is entirely outside the scope of election integrity verification procedures.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-152 addresses voter registration forms and the information required thereon. It does not address cryptographic receipts, end-to-end verifiability, or any technology related to proving vote inclusion. The section's mention of a 'voter receipt' in subsection B is limited to evidence of valid registration for provisional ballot purposes, not a cryptographic proof of vote inclusion.

Arizona A.R.S. § 16-444(4) defines the 'electronic voting system' as explicitly requiring votes to be recorded on a paper ballot by marking. This establishes a voter-verifiable paper trail as a legal requirement for electronic voting systems used in Arizona.

“a system in which votes are recorded on a paper ballot by means of marking, and such votes are subsequently counted and tabulated by vote tabulating equipment”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the contents and distribution of the official canvass—specifically what information must be recorded and to whom it must be mailed or delivered. It does not address whether citizens have a legal right to access precinct-level data or to conduct their own re-tally. The statute is silent on citizen verification rights.

The section mandates that ballot return envelopes be tamper evident when properly sealed, which matches the level 2 requirement (tamper-evident seals required). However, the statute does not address logged inspection of tampering or auto-quarantine procedures, so it does not reach levels 4 or 5.

“Ensure that the ballot return envelopes are of a type that does not reveal the voter's selections or political party affiliation and that is tamper evident when properly sealed.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-911 addresses exemptions from the definition of 'contribution' in campaign finance law. It deals entirely with what constitutes political contributions and what is exempt from that definition. It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, internet access, or any cybersecurity or hardware isolation requirements for voting systems.

The statute requires documentation of ballot box transfers in emergency situations and other special circumstances, but it does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody requirement for all ballot handling. Additionally, the statute requires reports to be filed with the officer in charge of elections but does not explicitly mandate that such documentation be made publicly available—only that reports be made to political party chairpersons in certain circumstances.

“All election board members who accompanied the locked ballot box to the new location and the one or two election board members who verified the ballot box's arrival shall file a report with the officer in charge of elections that describes the actions taken by the election board members.”

The statute explicitly criminalizes tampering with election results through unauthorized device access (computer, machine, or other device) and imposes a class 3 felony penalty. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized access to election hardware.

“A person who knowingly substitutes, forges, counterfeits or tampers with ballot tabulations or totals or election results by electronic means or through the use of a computer, machine or other device is guilty of a class 3 felony.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses court-ordered recounts in contested elections, not mandatory post-election audits of every election. It describes the procedure when a recount is certified by a superior court following an election contest, which is a remedial measure for specific disputes, not a systematic audit requirement applied universally to all elections.

This section mandates a fixed-percentage hand recount (5% of precincts) for court-ordered recounts in legislative, statewide and federal candidate races, which corresponds to the ordinal level 2 (fixed-% hand recount). However, this applies only to recounts ordered by courts in contested elections, not as a general post-election audit requirement, limiting its scope to a partial satisfaction of the audit method criterion.

“the county chairpersons of the political parties entitled to continued representation on the ballot or the chairperson's designee shall select at random without the use of a computer five percent of the precincts for the recounted race for a hand count”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: A.R.S. § 16-602 establishes a mandatory hand count audit for all countywide elections involving electronic voting machines, but it does not provide for additional audits triggered by close margins or sworn challenges. The statute specifies a fixed random selection method (at least two percent of precincts) that applies regardless of election outcome margins or challenges. There is no provision in this section for escalated or supplementary audits based on vote closeness or formal objections.

The statute explicitly grants party representatives observer access to hand counts (a form of audit) and permits them to record the proceedings. While the section specifically mentions party representatives, it establishes a clear right of observation and documentation during the audit process, satisfying the criterion's requirement for observer access to audits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance enforcement procedures and investigation authority. It does not address post-election audits or whether audit results are binding on certified election results. The section is about enforcement of campaign finance violations, not election audits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses political advertising and fundraising disclosure requirements, not voting system source code accessibility. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code, vendor disclosure, certification authority access, or any related topics.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses precinct register preparation, content, delivery, and use restrictions. It does not address software reproducibility, binary builds, source code publication, or any technical requirements for election system software. The criterion concerns reproducible builds of production binaries from public source code, which is entirely outside the scope of this statutory section.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-444 provides definitions and general applicability of election laws for electronic voting systems in Arizona. It does not address whether ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules are signed and published before polls open. The section is definitional in nature and does not impose requirements regarding pre-election publication or signing of election materials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses digital impersonation of candidates and citizens, establishing civil remedies for non-consensual publication of manipulated recordings or images. It does not address software verification, binary matching, or post-election integrity checks of voting systems or election software. The statute is entirely focused on defamation-type relief for deepfakes and similar media, not election technology verification.

The statute explicitly mandates that counting center proceedings shall be conducted under the observation of representatives of each political party and the public, ensuring full procedural access for domestic observers. Additionally, the section provides detailed procedural frameworks for observer participation, including specific rules for candidate and ballot measure committee representatives.

“All proceedings at the counting center shall be under the direction of the board of supervisors or other officer in charge of elections and shall be conducted in accordance with the approved instructions and procedures manual issued pursuant to section 16-452 under the observation of representatives of each political party and the public.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-956 addresses voter education duties of the Citizens Clean Elections Commission, including development of voter education documents, sponsorship of debates, and enforcement of campaign finance rules. It does not contain any provisions regarding precinct-level election results or timelines for publishing such results.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute permits adoption of multiple 'type or types, make or makes, model or models' for statewide certification, suggesting multiple vendors' equipment can be certified. However, the text does not explicitly address whether multiple certified vendors can operate simultaneously in the same election—it only addresses what can be certified statewide. The section focuses on certification authority rather than operational multi-vendor deployment in individual elections.

“The committee shall submit its recommendations to the secretary of state who shall make final adoption of the type or types, make or makes, model or models to be certified for use in this state.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: A.R.S. § 16-1023 addresses digital impersonation and deepfakes in political contexts. It is entirely unrelated to vote-format standards, device protocols, vendor independence, or open standards for voting systems. The section deals with civil remedies for fraudulent digital media impersonation, not election technology infrastructure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: A.R.S. § 16-153 addresses voter registration confidentiality and sealing procedures for eligible persons. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or restrictions on vendor lock-in. This section is unrelated to the vendor independence criterion.

The statute explicitly requires that computer programs (source code) for vote tabulating devices be filed with the secretary of state and held in escrow for a three-year period. This directly satisfies the criterion of requiring source-code escrow with the state as a condition of using vote tabulating devices in elections.

The section requires voting booths designed to enable marking ballots in secrecy, which addresses physical ballot secrecy during voting. However, it does not establish voter–ballot unlinkability (the voter's identity remaining unconnected to the ballot cast), which is the specific requirement of the criterion. The statute mandates secrecy during marking but does not guarantee or address the enforceable separation of voter identity from ballot in the broader election administration process.

“The voting booths shall be durably constructed and shall be of sufficient size and so designed as to enable the voter to mark the voter's ballot in secrecy.”

The section mandates an accessible mail voting option specifically for voters with visual impairments, addressing one accessibility need. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) required at every polling place, nor does it comprehensively address motor or language accessibility beyond the mail option mentioned.

“including voting by the use of an accessible vote by United States mail option for persons who are blind or have a visual impairment”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes that the board of supervisors 'shall establish a convenient number of election precincts' and designate polling places, but contains no specific numerical floor, density requirement, or ratio of polling places to voters or geographic area. The statute allows flexibility (consolidation, combining precincts, voting centers) and requires only 'reasonable and adequate' polling places when early voters may reduce in-person turnout, but does not mandate a concrete floor.