EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires a paper record of each electronically generated ballot that can be reviewed and used for recounts, but it does not mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures. The criterion requires specific technical artifacts for public verification; the statute addresses voter-level ballot verification and recount capability, which are distinct requirements. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-15 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly requires that a paper record of electronically generated ballots be provided and that voters can review and correct it at the time of casting. This creates a voter-verifiable paper trail requirement that satisfies the criterion. “The director shall provide for a paper record of each electronically generated ballot that can be reviewed and corrected by the voter at the time the vote is cast” | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs the formal application procedures and representation requirements for requesting an official recount, not the independent right of citizens to re-tally from published precinct data. It addresses candidate and voter petitions for official recounts, not unilateral citizen verification or re-tallying using public election results. The criterion asks about citizens independently re-tallying from published data, which is a different legal right than requesting an official recount through this application process. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
Custody Hardware
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the creation and powers of the Redistricting Planning Committee, focusing on preparations for legislative redistricting, including compiling census data, election information, and procuring computerized systems for redistricting plans. It contains no provisions concerning tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards for election equipment. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses public notice requirements for precinct boundary and polling place changes. It does not concern vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or any aspect of election hardware security or network isolation. The section is entirely about voter notification procedures and is unrelated to the criterion regarding internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity prohibitions on voting machines. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires that ballots and certificates be sent in sealed packages to the director and election supervisors, establishing some custody procedures. However, it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation (such as signatures, dates, transfer logs, or witness verification at each handoff point) nor does it explicitly require that such documentation be publicly available. The statute delegates detailed custody procedures to the director's discretion rather than mandating them by law. “The director may authorize election boards in precincts in those areas of the state where distance and weather make mail communication unreliable to forward their election results by telephone or radio.” | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains only definitional language for election-related terms. It does not address criminal penalties for unauthorized device access or tamper prevention. Criminal penalties would typically appear in a different section of the statutes dealing with election crimes or offenses. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
Post Election Audit
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural form and requirements for filing recount applications, not post-election audits. It deals with who can request a recount, what information must be included, and who may represent applicants and observe the process. It does not establish or mandate any post-election audit requirement for every election. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a table of contents listing article headings and section numbers for election recounts, with most sections marked as repealed. It does not describe any actual audit method, mandate, procedure, or requirement. The section provides no substantive content about what audit method is mandated. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-15 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-15 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedures for certifying, auditing, and paying election expenses (costs and administrative matters), not the legal force or binding nature of post-election audit results on certified election outcomes. It does not address whether audit findings must be applied to modify or affirm final certified results. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance expenditure reporting and disclosure requirements, not voting system source code accessibility. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code, certification authority access, or public disclosure of software. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section criminalizes unlawful interference with elections, including unauthorized alteration of ballots and election materials. It does not address software reproducibility, binary builds, or source code verification requirements. The criterion concerns technical requirements for election software builds; this statute concerns election fraud and ballot tampering crimes. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-15 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | The section addresses testing and certification of counting programs but does not explicitly mandate the publication or signing of ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules before polls open. It establishes that the ballot counting review board shall test and certify counting programs, but contains no specific requirement for pre-election publication or digital signatures of election definition materials. “the director may adopt regulations that provide procedures for the tabulation of electronically generated ballots or optically scanned ballots, including procedures for tests of the counting programs developed for each precinct tabulator to ensure that the system is functioning properly” | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires software to be tested and certified under AS 15.20.900, but it does not grant a right to verify that the actual running binary matches a previously committed one. The statute addresses testing and certification procedures and paper record requirements for voter verification, but does not establish mechanisms for post-election verification of binary code integrity. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
Transparency Observation
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly grants observers (watchers) appointed by party committees, candidates, and civil-society organizations the right to be present in voting and counting locations with full visual access to all official actions throughout the entire voting and counting process. This provides comprehensive procedural access for party and civil-society observers. “The watcher may be present at a position inside the place of voting or counting that affords a full view of all action of the election officials taken from the time the polls are opened until the ballots are finally counted and the results certified by the election board or the data processing review board.” | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 15.07.195 addresses confidentiality of voter registration records and does not address international observer access to elections or observation procedures. The criterion concerns whether OSCE/EU/IFES international observers are admitted by default, which is unrelated to this section's subject matter of protecting certain voter information from public disclosure. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the term of office and swearing-in procedures for a U.S. senator elected at a special election. It contains no provisions regarding the publication timeline for precinct-level election results, which is the subject matter of criterion 6.3. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-15 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes approval standards for voting machines and vote tally systems but does not address whether multiple vendors can operate in the same election. It specifies approval criteria and conditions but contains no language permitting or restricting multiple vendors' simultaneous operation. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses confidentiality of voter registration records and exceptions for disclosure to various parties and agencies. It contains no information about vote-format, device-protocol standards, or the openness of technical specifications for voting systems. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning open protocol standards for voting devices. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a definitions provision that defines terms used throughout Alaska's election statutes. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, their duration, caps on contract length, or any mechanism to prevent vendor lock-in. The criterion concerns contract management and vendor independence, which is outside the scope of this definitional section. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-15 |
Voter Access
71.4% · 5/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The statute mandates that voters place their marked ballots in a secrecy sleeve before placing that sleeve in an outer envelope bearing the voter's certificate. This structural requirement—separating the ballot from voter identification—legally guarantees ballot secrecy by ensuring the ballot itself remains unlinked to the voter's identity, while the voter's certificate remains on the outer envelope only. | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | The statute mandates accessible voting equipment for voters with disabilities including blind and visually impaired individuals, satisfying vision and motor accessibility requirements. However, it does not comprehensively address language accessibility standards and does not explicitly guarantee such equipment at every polling place (the director has discretion to limit machines to one per precinct unless additional machines are needed for disability accommodations). “the director shall provide balloting equipment that would allow voters with disabilities, including those who are blind or visually impaired, to cast private, independent, and verifiable ballots” | § view source 2026-06-15 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 1/1100.0% | The statute establishes a legal floor for voting booths per voter volume: at least one booth per 100 votes cast in the previous election. This directly addresses polling place density by establishing a minimum ratio of voting facilities to voter turnout, ensuring adequate access. “At every polling place, at least one voting booth shall be furnished and not less than one voting booth or screen shall be furnished for each 100 votes or fractional part of 100 votes cast in the previous election.” | § view source 2026-06-15 |