EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
37.5% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 1/1100.0% | 14 kap. 25 § codifies that 'the election result shall be announced by posting on the agency's physical bulletin board AND published on the agency's website' — public-verification artifact statutorily codified. 13 kap. 4 § codifies announcement of canvass time/place. 15 kap. 8 § codifies parallel for appeals. 2 kap. 8 § codifies party-designation publication in Post- och Inrikes Tidningar. Multi-channel public verification. “valresultatet kungöras genom att det anslås på myndighetens fysiska anslagstavla och publiceras på myndighetens webbplats.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | 6 kap. 4 § codifies that 'ballots shall be size A6 (105×148 mm). They shall be made of paper of the same quality for all ballots. All ballots for a particular election shall have the same color.' 7 kap. 2 § codifies the paper-ballot voting procedure (ballot in envelope, sealed). 6 kap. 2 § codifies ballot content. Sweden's regime is exclusively paper. “Valsedlar skall ha storleken A 6 (105¥148 millimeter). De skall vara av papper som har samma kvalitet för samtliga valsedlar.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 1/1100.0% | 13 kap. 1 § codifies that the county-administrative-board final count is public. 12 kap. 1 § codifies that the municipal count is public. 11 kap. 1 § codifies that the polling-station count is public. 8 kap. 1 § codifies the polling-place layout. Citizen access to ALL count stages is codified — citizens may observe and tally independently. 14 kap. 25 § codifies result publication on agency website. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Custody Hardware
37.5% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | 9 kap. 15 § codifies that 'if vote-reception is interrupted, each ballot urn and the electoral roll shall be sealed and stored securely. When vote-reception is to continue, the vote-receivers shall first show those present that the seals have not been opened.' 9 kap. 3 § codifies that the presiding vote-receiver must show those present that each urn is EMPTY before vote-reception begins. 13 kap. 6 § makes improperly-stored ballots invalid. Comprehensive tamper-evident regime codified. “Om röstmottagningen avbryts skall varje valurna och röstlängden förseglas och förvaras på ett säkert sätt. När röstmottagningen skall fortsätta, skall röstmottagarna först visa dem som är närvarande att förseglingarna inte har öppnats.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 1/1100.0% | 10 kap. 7 § codifies that 'continuous notes shall be kept of vote-reception in a polling station' and that if vote-reception is interrupted 'the notes and election material received shall be stored securely during the interruption.' 8 kap. 10 § codifies envelope custody handover to valnämnden. 8 kap. 11 § codifies sealed sorting/forwarding. 12 kap. 5 § codifies messenger-ballot envelope custody. 13 kap. 6 § makes improperly-stored ballots invalid. Comprehensive chain-of-custody codified. “Det ska fortlöpande föras anteckningar över röstmottagningen i en röstningslokal.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
Post Election Audit
61.1% · 6/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | 12 kap. 1 § codifies the second-tier mandatory count: 'On the Wednesday after election day the municipal election commission shall meet to review and count the votes not counted at the polling stations. The meeting is public.' 11 kap. 1 § codifies the first (preliminary) public count. 13 kap. 1 § codifies the THIRD-tier final count by the county administrative board (länsstyrelsen). Sweden codifies triple-count of every ballot — strongest mandatory-recount regime in the corpus. “På onsdagen efter valdagen ska valnämnden sammanträda för att granska och räkna de röster som inte räknats i vallokalerna. Sammanträdet är offentligt.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | 11 kap. 5 § codifies that 'a cast ballot envelope may only be opened after it has been removed from a ballot urn for counting under the provisions of this chapter or chapter 12.' 12 kap. 6 § codifies that the municipal commission keeps a protocol of its count. 11 kap. 1 § (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies that the preliminary count is public and uninterrupted. Ordinal level 2: 100% manual count by hand at the polling station, then 100% manual review by municipal commission, then 100% manual final count by county administrative board — stronger than fixed-percentage audit. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0.5/150.0% | 15 kap. 7 § codifies that appeals received by the decision-maker that arrive at the Valprövningsnämnden within the appeal period shall be taken up for review even if the original filing was misrouted — escalation procedure. 15 kap. 5 § codifies appeal of results-establishment decisions to the Valprövningsnämnden. Triggers for review of the canvass beyond the mandatory triple count codified through the appeals framework. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 1/1100.0% | 13 kap. 1 § codifies that 'the county administrative board shall conduct the final vote count. The proceeding is public and shall be conducted without delay.' 12 kap. 1 § codifies that the municipal commission's count meeting is public. 11 kap. 1 § codifies that the polling-station count is public. 8 kap. 1 § codifies polling-place screening. Every count stage is statutorily public. “Länsstyrelsen skall göra den slutliga rösträkningen. Förrättningen är offentlig och skall göras utan dröjsmål.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 1/1100.0% | 14 kap. 1 § codifies that 'the central election authority shall, on the basis of the final vote count, distribute mandates… and establish which candidates have been elected.' Mandate distribution flows directly from the recount-binding final count under 13 kap. 1 §. 14 kap. 13 § codifies application to other elections. 15 kap. 5 § codifies appeals procedure. Recount results binding on certification. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Software Verifiability
11.1% · 1/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0.5/150.0% | 6 kap. 2 § codifies the information that may appear on ballots (party designation, constituency, etc.). 6 kap. 4 § codifies that ballots be size A6, of paper of uniform quality, with the same color for each election. 13 kap. 7 § codifies ballot-invalidity grounds. 11 kap. 2 § codifies precinct counting procedure. Public ballot specification codified through the Act itself. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0.5/150.0% | 9 kap. 5 § codifies that vote-receivers must check outer envelopes for messenger ballots. 9 kap. 6 § codifies pre-acceptance check that ballot envelopes are properly prepared and that the voter is on the electoral roll. 9 kap. 9 § codifies window-envelope and outer-envelope checks for postal ballots. Multi-stage verification of every cast ballot codified. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Transparency Observation
56.3% · 5/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0.5/150.0% | 1 kap. 6 § codifies incompatibility rules for European Parliament members. § 11 kap. 1 § codifies that vote counting at the polling station is public and uninterrupted; 12 kap. 1 § codifies public municipal count meeting; 13 kap. 1 § codifies public final count. Sweden codifies public counting (rather than a separate accredited-observer regime) — public has explicit right to observe, but there is no separate observer-accreditation framework codified for partisan/NGO observers. | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 3/560.0% | 14 kap. 25 § codifies result publication on the agency's website following mandate distribution. 11 kap. 1 § codifies that polling-station counts are published immediately after polls close (preliminary results). 12 kap. 1 § codifies municipal commission counting on Wednesday after election day. 14 kap. 26 § codifies parallel for county-level publication. 4 kap. 26 § codifies notice publication in Post- och Inrikes Tidningar. Ordinal level 3: preliminary precinct results available within hours of poll close (under 11 kap. 1 § 'omedelbart efter' = immediately after). “valresultatet kungöras genom att det anslås på myndighetens fysiska anslagstavla och publiceras på myndighetens webbplats. Därmed är valet avslutat.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 1/1100.0% | 13 kap. 5 § codifies that 'the county administrative board shall keep a protocol of the proceeding.' 12 kap. 6 § codifies that the municipal commission keeps a protocol of its count. 9 kap. 16 § codifies that a protocol shall be kept of vote-reception at a polling station. 14 kap. 26 § codifies that the protocol is presented for public review at result publication. 11 kap. 3 § codifies handover of protocols to the municipal commission. Multi-tier public protocol regime codified. “Länsstyrelsen skall föra protokoll över förrättningen.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No candidate sections returned by FTS. | no FTS match 2026-05-19 |
Voter Access
50.0% · 4/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | 8 kap. 1 § codifies that 'at a polling station there shall be an appropriate number of separated places (voting screens) where voters can vote WITHOUT INSIGHT' (utan insyn). 7 kap. 3 § codifies that 'each voter shall be ALONE behind a voting screen and themselves prepare their votes.' 8 kap. 2 § codifies that ballots be available at a separated place where voters take them 'each for themselves without insight.' Comprehensive ballot-secrecy mandate codified. “På ett röstmottagningsställe skall det finnas ett lämpligt antal avskilda platser (valskärmar) där väljarna kan rösta utan insyn.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 2/540.0% | 7 kap. 3 § codifies that voters with functional limitation (funktionsnedsättning) may receive help on request from vote-receivers OR from a person of their choice. 8 kap. 2a § codifies that voters with functional limitation may receive help selecting ballot papers from vote-receivers. 4 kap. 20 § codifies that 'each municipality shall ensure that there are suitable premises that can be used as polling places, which in terms of location, ACCESSIBILITY, and opening hours give voters good opportunities to vote.' 15 kap. 12 § codifies witness procedure. Ordinal level 2: comprehensive accessibility + disability-assistance framework codified. “Väljare som på grund av funktionsnedsättning eller liknande inte själva kan göra i ordning sina röster, ska dock på begäran få hjälp med detta av röstmottagarna i den utsträckning som behövs.” | § view source 2026-05-19 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0.5/150.0% | 9 kap. 1 § codifies polling-place provisions. 9 kap. 3 § codifies polling-place opening procedure. 4 kap. 20 § (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies that 'for each polling district (valdistrikt) there shall be a polling place' — explicit one-per-precinct rule. 11 kap. 1 § codifies post-poll procedure at the polling place. Polling-place provision is codified per polling district; a strict numeric voters-per-place floor is not codified (Sweden uses geographic polling districts averaging ~1,400 voters per district under SCB census definitions). | § view source 2026-05-19 |