EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the administrative provision of copies of the Register of Political Parties to returning officers in the context of Dáil elections. It does not concern public verification artifacts, certificates, device records, result signatures, or downloadable packages for citizen verification of election results. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | Section 82(6) explicitly requires the special voter to record their vote upon a ballot paper in secret, creating a hand-marked paper record. This satisfies the criterion for a voter-verifiable paper trail, as the voter physically marks the ballot paper themselves, creating a tangible record they can verify. “The special voter shall thereupon record in secret his vote upon the ballot paper and, when he has so recorded his vote, shall fold the ballot paper so that his vote is concealed” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 44 of the Referendum Act 1994 addresses procedural requirements for presenting referendum petitions to the High Court, including filing deadlines, security deposits, and notice to officials. It does not address citizen rights to re-tally votes from published precinct data or any verification rights related to electoral tallying. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
Custody Hardware
25.0% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The statute mandates sealing of postal voter ballot boxes with multiple official seals, which constitutes a tamper-evident measure (seals would show evidence of tampering). However, it does not specify tamper-responsive features, automated logging, or quarantine procedures, so it falls short of the higher ordinal levels. “shall be sealed with the seal of the returning officer and the seals of such of the agents as desire to affix their seals” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section amends the Postal and Telecommunications Services Act, 1983 to regulate postal delivery of election documents by returning officers and to establish free postage schemes for electoral materials. It does not address network isolation, internet connectivity, Wi-Fi, or cellular connectivity requirements for vote-casting equipment. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The section requires the returning officer to make provision for safe custody of postal ballot boxes, which implies some form of custody measures. However, it does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The requirement is vague and does not address the documentation or transparency components of the criterion. “the returning officer shall make provision for the safe custody of such ballot box” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
Post Election Audit
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | The section permits recounts at the discretion of the local returning officer or when requested by agents, and allows the referendum returning officer to direct recounts in 'appropriate cases,' but does not establish a mandatory post-election audit that is legally required for every election as a matter of course. The discretionary language ('may,' 'if required,' 'in an appropriate case') indicates that audits are not universally mandatory. “The local returning officer may and, if required by an agent appointed under paragraph (c) of section 26 (1) , shall recount the votes recorded on all the ballot papers” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 115 addresses the timing and continuity of vote counting by the returning officer. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit methods, hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures. The section is entirely procedural regarding when counting occurs, not what auditing mechanisms are mandated. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | This section provides access to candidate agents at the vote count, but does not explicitly grant access to media or the general public as observers. Access for citizens and media is discretionary (requires returning officer permission), falling short of a guaranteed observer access framework. The section addresses counting rather than formal post-election audit procedures. “The returning officer, his assistants and clerks, members of the Garda Síochána on duty and the agents of the candidates duly appointed for the purpose under this Act may be present at the counting of the votes and no other person shall be present without the permission of the returning officer.” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 122 addresses the exclusion and transfer of votes during the counting/tabulation process in a proportional representation election. It has no bearing on post-election audits or the binding force of audit results on certified outcomes. This section is procedurally about vote transfers, not electoral audits. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 8 of the Referendum Act 1994 addresses the confidentiality of how individuals voted in referendums. It is entirely unrelated to voting system source code accessibility or software verifiability. The section protects voter privacy in legal proceedings but contains no provisions regarding disclosure of voting technology source code. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 207 of the Electoral Reform Act 2022 addresses offences and penalties for political parties and their officers in relation to electoral conduct. It is entirely unrelated to software, binary code, reproducible builds, or any technical requirements for election systems. The criterion concerns software verifiability and reproducible builds, which is a technical governance matter outside the scope of this penal provision. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 50 addresses the procedural mechanics of delivering nomination papers to a returning officer—specifically when, where, and by whom such delivery must occur. It contains no provisions regarding the publication, signing, or pre-election disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules. The section is entirely procedural and administrative in nature and does not engage with the software verifiability or election definition publication criterion. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | The section establishes rights for candidates to appoint agents at key election stages (polling, counting, ballot issuance). However, it does not extend these rights to general civil-society observers or independent monitors—only to candidate-appointed agents. This limits procedural access to narrow partisan representatives rather than providing full transparency rights to broader stakeholder classes. “A candidate or his election agent may appoint agents to be present on the candidate's behalf— ( a ) at the issue of ballot papers to postal voters, ( b ) in polling stations, ( c ) at the opening of the postal ballot boxes, and ( d ) at the counting of the votes.” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 126 requires the returning officer to declare the result of the poll upon completion of counting, but contains no requirement regarding precinct-level results publication, no specification of publication timelines, and no reference to the 24-hour threshold. The section addresses declaration of overall election results, not granular precinct-level data release within defined timeframes. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section amends electoral finance and campaign expense reporting requirements under the Electoral Reform Act 2022. It addresses penalties for non-disclosure of election expenses and donations to the Standards in Public Office Commission. It does not concern vote-format standards, device protocols, or vendor independence in voting systems. | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | The section permits the Commission to engage persons to assist with monitoring and explicitly allows contracting 'for such period as the Commission considers appropriate,' which grants the Commission discretion in contract duration but does not impose a cap or prevent indefinite renewal. This addresses contract duration but does not mandate limits preventing perpetual lock-in. “enter into a contract with any person on such terms and conditions and for such period as the Commission considers appropriate” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-03 |
Voter Access
57.1% · 4/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | Section 161 creates a legal obligation on persons present at various stages of voting (ballot issuance, voting, counting) to maintain ballot secrecy. This requirement directly supports voter-ballot unlinkability by ensuring that those with access to voting materials are legally bound to preserve the secret nature of ballots, making it enforceable through breach of statutory duty. “shall maintain and aid in maintaining the secrecy of the ballot” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 3/560.0% | Section 103 establishes procedures to accommodate blind, physically incapacitated, and illiterate electors, addressing vision, motor, and language accessibility needs. However, it does not mandate standardized accessibility infrastructure at every polling place; instead, it provides procedural accommodations (companion marking, presiding officer assistance, oral reading) triggered when an elector requests help. The statute addresses some accessibility dimensions but stops short of requiring comprehensive accessibility standards or infrastructure mandates. “Where a Dáil elector applying for a ballot paper satisfies the presiding officer that his sight is so impaired or that he is otherwise so physically incapacitated or that he is unable to read or write to such an extent that he is unable to vote without assistance, this section shall apply.” | § view source 2026-06-03 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 101 establishes the procedure for voting and ballot distribution at polling stations, but contains no provisions regarding the density, number, or geographic distribution of polling places. The criterion requires a legal floor on polling-place density per voters or area; this section addresses only how ballots are issued and cast once a voter is at a polling station. | § view source 2026-06-03 |