EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The section mandates that voters place a marked paper ballot (hlasovací lístek) into an official envelope, with voting accomplished by hand-marking (circling ordinal numbers of candidates). This establishes a legal requirement for a hand-marked paper ballot, which constitutes a voter-verifiable paper trail. “Volič vloží do úřední obálky 1 hlasovací lístek. Na hlasovacím lístku, který vkládá do úřední obálky, může zakroužkováním pořadového čísla nejvýše u 4 kandidátů uvedených na témže hlasovacím lístku vyznačit, kterému z kandidátů dává přednost.” | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the announcement and publication of election results on official bulletin boards by the registration office. It does not establish any legal right for citizens to re-tally votes from precinct-level data, nor does it create a mechanism for accessing detailed voting data necessary for independent verification. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
Custody Hardware
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 55 of the Czech Municipal Elections Act (Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb.) addresses the creation and termination of municipal council member mandates. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding hardware, tamper-evident seals, tamper-responsive systems, or any technical election security standards. The section is entirely about the legal status of elected positions and resignation procedures. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the termination of alternate councilor positions in Czech local elections and addresses resignation procedures. It contains no provisions regarding chain-of-custody documentation, ballot security, equipment handling, or public availability of custody records. The section is entirely unrelated to the custody_hardware dimension. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses civil remedies for election invalidity (grounds for challenging election results in court) and establishes the procedure and standing for such challenges. It contains no provisions regarding criminal penalties for unauthorized device access or equipment tampering. The section is entirely focused on judicial review of elections, not criminal law or equipment security. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
Post Election Audit
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the procedural rules for meetings of the College of the Office (Kolegia Úřadu), including matters of scheduling, voting, and decision-making authority. It does not address post-election audits or election audit requirements whatsoever. The section is entirely administrative in nature and unrelated to the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the vote counting procedures performed by district election commissions, including the division and summing of ballots and preferential votes. It does not address audit methods, risk-limiting audits, hand recounts, or any post-election verification procedures. The section is about initial vote tabulation, not post-election auditing. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 42 addresses the content and format of election result records (zápis) prepared by polling station commissions, including vote tallies and procedural notes. It does not address observer access to audits, audit procedures, or who may observe election-related activities. The criterion concerns post-election audit observation rights for parties, media, and citizens, which is not the subject of this section. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the announcement and publication of presidential election results by the State Election Commission, not post-election audits or their binding force. It describes procedural requirements for declaring election outcomes after the first round but contains no provisions regarding audit procedures, audit results, or the legal bindingness of audit findings. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the content and format of voting protocols and records maintained by district election commissions. It does not address observer access rights, procedures, or transparency mechanisms. The criterion requires information about whether party and civil-society observers are granted procedural access to elections, which is not covered by this section on vote-counting documentation. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voting rights and eligibility requirements for municipal elections in Czechia. It contains no provisions regarding international observer access, admission procedures, or default authorization for OSCE/EU/IFES observers. The section is entirely unrelated to the transparency and observation dimension. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 49 establishes what information the State Electoral Commission must record in its official minutes (the election result report), but it does not address publication timelines or precinct-level result dissemination. The section requires the State Statistical Office to submit results and the Electoral Commission to approve and sign the report, but imposes no legally mandated timeframe for public publication within 24 hours or any other specific period. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-14 |
Voter Access
0.0% · 0/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 0/10.0% | The section mandates secret voting (tajným hlasováním) as a constitutional principle but does not establish enforceable mechanisms, procedures, or legal remedies to guarantee or enforce voter–ballot unlinkability. It states the principle without addressing implementation, audit procedures, or enforcement. “tajným hlasováním” | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the content and procedure for election commissions to record voting results and outcomes (times, voter counts, valid votes, complaints, etc.). It does not address accessibility standards for polling places, nor does it establish requirements for accommodating voters with vision, motor, or language disabilities. | § view source 2026-06-14 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the content and procedures for documenting voting results at polling stations (okrskové volební komise), including recording voter turnout and vote counts. It does not address polling-place density, minimum numbers of polling stations, or any floor requirements related to polling place availability per voter or geographic area. | § view source 2026-06-14 |