EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 8 of the Village Organization Law addresses composition, gender representation, and kinship recusal within village committees—it does not establish or reference any statutory requirement for commissioners or election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The kinship recusal rule is a limited conflict management tool, not a comprehensive financial disclosure regime.

The statute explicitly codifies the right to judicial review of election-commission decisions on voter-roll disputes, specifies standing (aggrieved complainants), defines timeline (5 days before election day for filing; judgment before election day), and establishes venue (人民法院, the people's court) with final authority. This satisfies the structural requirement for codified judicial accountability of administrative election decisions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural mechanics of voter-roll publication and dispute resolution by the 村民选举委员会 (village election committee), but does not establish the committee's existence, authority, or mandate in constitutional text. The PRC 村组织法 is statutory law; the section assumes the committee exists but provides no evidence of constitutional grounding. The criterion requires constitutional rather than statutory-only establishment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section vests control of election administration entirely in the people's congress standing committees (the legislative branch), with no role for judicial or executive branches in appointment or oversight. The text explicitly provides that election committees are 'under the leadership' (受...的领导) of standing committees alone, creating single-branch control rather than multi-branch appointment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines term length for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (a legislative body, not an election commission) and term limits for its leadership. It does not establish an independent election commission, define grounds for removal of election administrators, or create staggered commissioner cycles. The PRC does not have a statutorily independent, multi-branch election commission; election administration is controlled by the Communist Party apparatus. This section does not provide the institutional structure required by COMM.3.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains only general procedural principles (leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, democracy, and rule of law) and does not establish any electoral commission structure, appointment mechanism, or political-balance requirement for any institutional body. No commission composition rules are present.

The section mandates that election expenses be included in the fiscal budget and funded from the national treasury, providing statutory grounding for election funding. However, it does not establish (1) a separate, dedicated line item insulated from executive reallocation, (2) multi-year appropriation, (3) legislative oversight of mid-cycle transfers, or (4) any mechanism preventing executive freezing or diversion of funds. In the PRC institutional context, where executive authority (not parliament) controls treasury disbursement and budget implementation, this language provides no genuine independence from executive discretion.

“全 国 人 民 代 表 大 会 和 地 方 各 级 人 民 代 表 大 会 的 选 举 经 费，列 入 财 政 预 算，由 国 库 开 支。”

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a penal and accountability provision that sets out sanctions for election fraud and misconduct (bribery, violence, forgery, retaliation against whistleblowers) and applies disciplinary authority to state workers. It does not establish or protect a career professional staff structure for election authorities, nor does it provide civil-service merit protections for election staff. It addresses liability and punishment, not institutional staffing architecture.

The statute mandates training for village committee members and workers by government authorities, establishing a statutory obligation for training. However, the section does not define training content (beyond general goals of political quality, legal awareness, and policy competence) or frequency, leaving implementation details to administrative discretion rather than codifying specific requirements.

“乡、民 族 乡、镇 的 人 民 政 府 或 者 县 级 人 民 政 府 应 当 为 村 民 委 员 会 成 员 以 及 其 他 村 务 工 作 者 提 供 培 训，帮 助 其 提 升 政 治 素 质、法 治 意 识、政 策 水 平 和 服 务 能 力。”

This section criminally prohibits retaliation against persons who report or expose election violations, which addresses whistleblower protection substantively. However, it does not establish affirmative statutory protections for whistleblowers (immunity, anti-retaliation procedures, confidentiality safeguards, or remedies), nor does it create institutional accountability mechanisms to enforce whistleblower safety. It is purely penal in nature.

“对 于 控 告、检 举 选 举 中 违 法 行 为 的 人，或 者 对 于 提 出 要 求 罢 免 代 表 的 人 进 行 压 制、报 复 的。”

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.