EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses termination and suspension procedures for county directors of elections, including grounds for discipline and due process protections. It contains no provision requiring commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section does mention recusal procedures for actual or apparent conflicts of interest but does not mandate public disclosure of those conflicts or financial interests.

The section explicitly codifies the right to seek judicial review of State Board of Elections decisions via administrative appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 150B (the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act). It defines standing (the assessed violator), timeline (30 days), and procedural mechanism (contested case petition). This provides clear statutory accountability for the Board's enforcement decisions.

“The notice of assessment shall be served by any means authorized under G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 4, and shall direct the violator either to pay the assessment or to contest the assessment within 30 days by filing a petition for a contested case under Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the ministerial duty of the election board chairman to issue certificates of election after municipal elections have been officially determined. It contains no language establishing the existence, composition, appointment mechanism, or core mandate of the election commission itself. The section presupposes a county board of elections (referenced in G.S. 163-182.5 and other statutes) but does not ground that institution in constitutional or statutory authority; it merely assigns one procedural task to the chairman.

The statute divides appointment authority between the State Board of Elections (four of five members) and the Governor (one member as chair). However, the State Board itself is not statutorily required to be multi-branch appointed in this chapter, and the Governor appoints only a single chair position. This creates a structural path to executive dominance: the Governor's office controls the board chair, and the State Board (whose composition is not specified here) appoints the majority. While political-party balance is mandated among the four State Board appointments, the absence of judicial or legislative branch appointment authority and the concentration of chair power in the Governor means no true multi-branch structural independence exists. The criterion requires appointment by multiple branches (legislature, judiciary, executive); this statute shows only state executive branch entities (Governor and State Board).

“Four members of county boards of elections shall be appointed by the State Board on the last Tuesday in June and every two years thereafter, and their terms of office shall continue for two years from the specified date of appointment and until their successors are appointed and qualified. One member of the county boards of elections shall be appointed by the Governor to be the chair of the county board on the last Tuesday in June and every two years thereafter”

The section establishes a fixed two-year term and a statutory ground for removal ('for cause'), which are positive structural elements. However, COMM.3 requires term protection for commissioners, and this provision addresses only the Executive Director (a staff official), not the State Board members themselves. The criterion is inapplicable to this staff position, making the section inadequate to satisfy COMM.3.

“for a term of two years with compensation to be determined by the Office of State Human Resources. The Executive Director shall serve beginning May 15 after the first meeting held after new appointments to the State Board are made, unless removed for cause”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 163-294.1 addresses procedures for candidate death, disqualification, and withdrawal in municipal and special district elections. It contains no provisions regarding the composition, appointment, or political balance of any election commission. The section does not establish or reference commission structure, term limits, multi-branch appointment, or any statutory safeguards against single-party capture.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs campaign finance reporting and treasurer account-keeping requirements for candidates and political committees. It contains no provisions regarding the election authority's budget, appropriations, funding mechanisms, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. FUND.1 requires statutory protection of the election administration agency's own operating budget as an independent line item; this section addresses only candidate and committee financial disclosure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural mechanics of filling candidate vacancies after nomination and before election—specifically which party committee appoints the replacement nominee. It contains no language regarding election infrastructure budgets, multi-year funding cycles, appropriations mechanisms, or any aspect of how election administration is financed. It is entirely unrelated to FUND.2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates contributions to candidates and political committees, not funding of the election authority or election administration. FUND.3 requires a statutory prohibition on foreign funding of the election administration agency itself (and its vendors). This statute addresses campaign finance restrictions on political actors, which is orthogonal to institutional independence of the election administration structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes criminal penalties for election-related misconduct and does not address the statutory framework protecting election staff as career professionals or civil-service employees. It criminalizes failure to perform duties by election officers and board members, but contains no language establishing merit-based hiring, job protection, or civil-service status for career election staff. STAFF.1 requires a statute affirmatively protecting professional employees from political removal; this section merely penalizes dereliction.

The statute mandates training for county elections directors and board members with explicit frequency schedules (odd-year, even-year primary, even-year general timelines). It also requires certification with examination standards and establishes authority for the State Board to promulgate rules for precinct official training. Content and frequency are statutorily defined, not left to administrative discretion.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute codifies that the State Board must certify voting systems and establishes specific standards (paper-ballot backup, federal compliance, vendor bonds, escrow access, etc.), satisfying the core requirement of statutory codification of certification criteria. However, the section explicitly delegates 'procedures' and key operational details ('as set by the State Board of Elections') to administrative rulemaking rather than statute, leaving evaluators, specific timelines, and public-comment procedures to regulatory discretion rather than statutory codification. This partial approach provides statutory guardrails but lacks complete codification of the certification process itself.

“Only voting systems that have been certified by the State Board of Elections in accordance with the procedures set forth by the State Board of Elections and subject to the standards set forth in this section and that have not been subsequently decertified shall be permitted for use in elections in this State.”

The section establishes initial certification requirements and gives the State Board power to decertify systems, but does not codify specific recertification triggers—such as mandatory recertification after material software updates, after discovered defects, or on a fixed schedule. The authority to decertify is discretionary, and there is no statutory language requiring recertification under defined circumstances. This leaves recertification timing entirely to State Board administrative procedure rather than statutory mandate.

This section establishes notification duties when decertification occurs elsewhere and requires disclosure of defects, but it does not define the grounds for the State Board of Elections to decertify a voting system within North Carolina or specify the procedure for doing so. The statute imposes vendor penalties for violations and violations themselves constitute grounds for civil penalties, but lacks a statutory framework articulating when and how the State Board may revoke certification. The decertification procedure is left to administrative discretion rather than codified in statute.

“The vendor shall promptly notify the State Board of Elections and the county board of elections of any county using its voting system of any decertification of the same system in any state, of any defect in the same system known to have occurred anywhere, and of any relevant defect known to have occurred in similar systems.”