EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

The statute delegates standing requirements to Article 3 of Chapter 120 rather than enumerating them directly in § 163-182.13A. While the section explicitly incorporates Article 3 of Chapter 120's standing rules by reference, the criterion requires enumeration within the statute itself or its explicitly cross-referenced provisions. The section does not independently specify which parties (candidates, parties, voters, etc.) possess standing; instead, it states that existing standing rules from Chapter 120 Article 3 'shall apply.' This indirect incorporation satisfies the functional goal of providing codified standing rules but technically does not enumerate standing within this section. The statute does clearly define 'contest' at the end and establishes that notice of intent must be filed 'as if it were a contested election for the House of Representatives as prescribed in Article 3 of Chapter 120,' which provides procedural clarity but still relies on external reference rather than internal enumeration.

“Except as provided by this section, the provisions of Article 3 of Chapter 120 shall apply to contested elections under this section and shall govern standing, notice of intent to contest, answers, service of process, evidence, the petition, procedures, grounds, and relief except as provided in this section.”

The statute explicitly specifies the forum and jurisdiction for election contests for Council of State offices. Contests are filed with the Principal Clerk of the House of Representatives; initially heard by a select committee of 5 Senators and 5 Representatives with defined appointment procedures; and finally determined by the General Assembly in joint session. The statute further specifies that 'The decision of the General Assembly in determining the contest of the election pursuant to this section may not be reviewed by the General Court of Justice,' effectively vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the legislative branch. The venue, filing location, initial hearing body, and final decision-maker are all clearly codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-96 addresses the definition and creation of new political parties, including petition requirements, signatures, filing deadlines with the State Board of Elections, and verification procedures. It does not contain any provisions related to election contest filing deadlines, procedures for challenging election results, or timelines for contesting election outcomes. This section is procedurally focused on party formation, not dispute resolution. The criterion requires specification of a deadline for filing an election contest (measured from certification or another defined event). This statute does not address that topic at all.

The statute provides procedural rules for how challenged ballots are handled during a contested election, including that the board of elections shall consider each challenged ballot and may take 'such further evidence as it deems necessary' with subpoena power. However, the section does not codify a specific standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence) nor does it establish detailed admissibility rules for evidence. The phrase 'such further evidence as it deems necessary' delegates evidentiary discretion to the board rather than establishing statutory evidentiary standards. The statute sets a procedural framework but lacks the codified evidentiary rules needed to satisfy the full criterion.

“the board of elections shall then convene and consider each challenged ballot and rule as to which ballots shall be counted. In such consideration, the board may take such further evidence as it deems necessary, and shall have the power of subpoena.”

The statute codifies a recount trigger (tie votes in primary elections for certain offices) and designates the responsible body (county board of elections). However, the section provides minimal procedural detail on the mechanics of the recount itself—it does not specify who physically counts ballots, what equipment or methodology is used, what evidentiary standards apply (e.g., handling of provisional or disputed ballots), chain of custody protocols, or observer rights. The statute establishes the existence and triggering condition for recount but leaves the operational 'how' to administrative implementation. This is a partial satisfaction: the statute codifies the trigger and responsible actor but not the detailed procedural steps necessary to conduct a recount fairly and consistently.

“In the event of a tie for the highest number of votes in a first primary between two candidates for party nomination for a single county, or single-county legislative district office, the board of elections of the county in which the two candidates were voted for shall conduct a recount and declare the results. If the recount shows a tie vote, a second primary shall be held on the date prescribed in subsection (e) of this section between”

The statute enumerates specific numerical margin thresholds that trigger mandatory recount rights. For county-jurisdiction ballot items, the trigger is a margin of no more than 1% of total votes cast (or 1% of votes cast for the two candidates in multiseat contests). For state-jurisdiction nonstatewide items, the trigger is also 1%. For state-jurisdiction statewide items, the trigger is 0.5% or 10,000 votes, whichever is less. These thresholds are clearly codified and mechanically defined, making recount triggers enumerated rather than discretionary. The statute also permits discretionary recounts when necessary to complete the canvass, but the mandatory triggers are the focus of enumeration here.

The statute addresses cost allocation for one specific scenario: hand-to-eye recounts of the entire jurisdiction ordered by the State Board of Elections are free to the candidate. However, the section does not comprehensively codify cost allocation for the full spectrum of petition-based recounts. It is silent on: (1) costs for the initial recount (before hand-to-eye stages); (2) costs for the first hand-to-eye sample recount (3% of precincts); (3) whether candidates or counties bear costs under different outcomes; (4) cost consequences if a recount reverses or fails to reverse results (except for the full statewide hand-to-eye recount). The statute delegates remaining recount rules to the State Board of Elections via G.S. 163-182.7(d), meaning critical cost allocation details are not codified in statute but reserved for administrative rule-making. For EDRI purposes, which requires procedural clarity through statutory codification, this partial and administratively-delegated approach falls short of the criterion.

“There shall be no cost to the candidate for that recount in the entire jurisdiction.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-182.10 codifies the legal effect of recount findings by explicitly stating that the county board 'may order' vote recounts and that such findings result in mandatory actions including correction of vote totals and declaration of new results. The statute specifies the conclusions that trigger recount authority and the binding consequences: corrected vote totals 'as stated' in official returns and 'new results declared.' This creates a clear statutory rule linking recount findings to mandatory amendment of official election results, not merely advisory effect. The provision is procedurally codified with specific triggering language ('substantial evidence to believe that a violation of the election law or other irregularity or misconduct did occur') and binding remedial effect (mandatory correction and declaration of new results).

“If the county board makes this conclusion, it may order any of the following as appropriate: That the vote total as stated in the precinct return or result of the canvass be corrected and new results declared. That votes be recounted.”

The statute explicitly codifies certification deadlines with specific temporal triggers. For county-level ballots, certification occurs six days after canvass completion absent a pending protest (§ 163-182.15(a)(1)); with a protest, it issues five days after dismissal/denial unless appealed, or ten days after State Board's final decision, or five days after Superior Court's final order (§ 163-182.15(a)(2)(A)-(C)). For state-level ballots, the same six-day default applies (§ 163-182.15(b)(1)), with ten days post-State Board decision on protest, or five days post-Superior Court final order (§ 163-182.15(b)(2)(A)-(B)). These are statutory rules, not discretionary administrative determinations. The deadlines are absolute unless the statute itself provides for a stay by Superior Court of Wake County (per § 163-182.14 reference). This satisfies the criterion that the timing of official results is set by statute rather than discretion.

The statute explicitly provides a statutory stay mechanism for pending disputes. It codifies: (1) the triggering condition (an aggrieved party appeals to Superior Court within 10 days of service), (2) the timing (stay must be obtained within 10 days after date of service), (3) the procedural vehicle (application to Superior Court of Wake County), and (4) the substantive standard for issuance (petitioner must show appeal has been filed, aggrieved party status, and likelihood of prevail). The statute further clarifies that certification shall not issue unless such a stay is obtained. For General Assembly and executive office contests, analogous protection is provided through the Article 3 Chapter 120 process. This is a clear, codified statutory mechanism that prevents automatic certification and allows disputes to be resolved pending appellate review.

“After the decision by the State Board of Elections has been served on the parties, the certification of nomination or election or the results of the referendum shall issue pursuant to G.S. 163-182.15 unless an appealing party obtains a stay of the certification from the Superior Court of Wake County within 10 days after the date of service. The court shall not issue a stay of certification unless the petitioner shows the court that the petitioner has appealed the decision of the State Board of Elections, that the petitioner is an aggrieved party, and that the petitioner is likely to prevail in the appeal.”