EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the mechanical voting process (marking ballots, use of voting booths, ballot insertion) and contains no statutory requirements for conflict-of-interest disclosure by commissioners or senior election staff. It does not address institutional accountability mechanisms.

This section establishes a statutory right to seek judicial review of specific election-authority decisions (those issued under articles G2, G4, and I4 in provincial elections) before a defined appellate body (the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State). It codifies both standing (against the specified decisions) and venue (the Council of State's administrative division), satisfying the core structural requirement of COI.2.

“Tegen een beschikking op grond van de artikelen G 2 , G 4 of I 4 die wordt genomen in het kader van de verkiezing van de leden van provinciale staten, kan uitsluitend beroep worden ingesteld bij de Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Kieswet (Electoral Law) Article A 3 establishes the Kiesraad's (Electoral Council) mandate and core functions in statute rather than in the Dutch Constitution. The section provides statutory grounding for the commission's existence and tasks, satisfying the statutory requirement (score 1), but does not demonstrate constitutional-level grounding (which would score 2). The criterion asks specifically whether the mandate is set in the constitution; this section sets it in statute alone.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section vests appointment and dismissal of central polling board members exclusively in the executive branch (burgemeester en wethouders—mayor and aldermen). No statutory role for the legislature or judiciary in appointment is specified, meaning a single branch (executive) unilaterally controls composition. This fails the multi-branch requirement.

The statute provides fixed four-year terms with limited renewability (max two reappointments), satisfying term definition and length. However, it lacks staggered appointment cycles—all three commissioners could theoretically turn over simultaneously—and crucially provides no statutory grounds for removal, leaving termination entirely to ministerial discretion. The single-branch (executive) appointment structure means term protection operates without structural counterbalance.

“De leden worden door Onze Minister benoemd voor ten hoogste vier jaar. Herbenoeming kan twee maal en telkens voor ten hoogste vier jaar plaatsvinden.”

The section states that the Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen (Framework Act on Independent Administrative Bodies) applies to the Kiesraad with specified exceptions, but does not itself establish political-balance requirements. The provision is a cross-reference rather than a substantive structural rule. To evaluate COMM.4, one would need to examine the Kaderwet itself and the excepted articles to determine whether statutory political-balance protections exist; this section alone does not provide that content.

“De Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen is van toepassing op de Kiesraad, met uitzondering van de artikelen 12 , 21 en 22 .”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article A 9 addresses the appointment and qualification of persons executing election tasks under the Kiesraad, including age requirements, disqualifications, and competency standards. It contains no provision establishing an independent funding line, budget structure, or statutory protection against mid-cycle reallocation by the executive. The section deals exclusively with personnel staffing, not budget autonomy or financial structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article A 9 addresses the appointment and qualifications of persons designated by the Electoral Council (Kiesraad) to execute election tasks, and compensation rules that may be established by ministerial regulation. It contains no language establishing or governing multi-year budget cycles, budget allocation, or protection from annual political renegotiation of election-administration funds. The section is procedural and personnel-focused, not budgetary.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines terms in the Wfpp (political party funding law), including 'Nederlandse gever' (Dutch donor), which is relevant to CAMPAIGN finance regulation, not election ADMINISTRATION funding. FUND.3 asks whether foreign-source funding of the election AUTHORITY itself is prohibited by statute. This section contains no prohibition on foreign funding of election administrators, election commissions, or election administration vendors—it only defines key terms for political party finance disclosure. The criterion is not satisfied.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute provides no civil-service protection, merit-based employment rules, or career staff safeguards for election administration personnel. All central polling board members and alternates are appointed and dismissed at will by the mayor and aldermen—a purely political appointment mechanism with no statutory protection against politicization or removal for cause. The structure vests appointment authority solely in the executive branch with no counterbalance from career employment rules.

The statute requires that poll workers (stembureau members) must complete training and demonstrate sufficient knowledge and skills in the electoral process before appointment. Article E4(4) further mandates that the government may establish detailed rules about training content and testing by regulation, creating a statutory framework for mandatory training requirements.

“na het volgen van een training, naar het oordeel van burgemeester en wethouders over voldoende kennis en vaardigheden beschikt op het terrein van het verkiezingsproces”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article J 24 regulates voter identity verification and admission to polling stations. It contains no statutory language establishing whistleblower protections for election staff reporting irregularities. The section is procedurally focused on voter authentication requirements, not staff accountability mechanisms or protections for employees disclosing misconduct.

The section codifies a certification process requiring the Kiesraad to have ballot-counting software specifications tested by an expert and independent body, with public disclosure of both the specification and test results. It further delegates detailed implementation rules to statutory regulation (algemene maatregel van bestuur), establishing statutory oversight of software reliability, security, and design. This satisfies the structural requirement that certification criteria and evaluators be grounded in law rather than administrative discretion.

“De Kiesraad laat de specificatie toetsen door een deskundige en onafhankelijke instantie, en maakt de specificatie en de uitkomst van de toets op een algemeen toegankelijke wijze elektronisch openbaar.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.