ECIElection Campaign-Finance Index

Section 25 establishes a statutory prohibition on campaign expenditure by relevant persons (entities registered as both party and third party), but the actual limits themselves are delegated to Schedule 10 to PPERA (for controlled expenditure) and Schedule 9 to PPERA (for campaign expenditure), which are incorporated by reference rather than enumerated in this section. While the framework is statutory, the specific numerical limits are not transparent within this provision.

“no campaign expenditure may be incurred during that period by or on behalf of the person”

Section 94B(3) codifies statutory rules for independent expenditure by third parties, establishing when third-party spending must be disregarded from contribution limits and setting out explicit conditions (A, B, C) that must be met. The section provides clear enumeration of which expenditures count toward third-party limits and under what circumstances they are excluded, grounding independent-expenditure regulation directly in statute rather than administrative discretion.

“In determining for the purposes of section 94(3)(a) whether a limit is exceeded by a third party during a regulated period, controlled expenditure incurred by or on behalf of the third party is to be disregarded if— a conditions A and B are met in relation to the expenditure, and b condition C is met.”

No matching sections in corpus.

Section 62(4) explicitly defines in statute the primary disclosure threshold of £11,180, with subsection (6A) setting a subsequent threshold of £2,230. These thresholds are enumerated exhaustively and apply to the treasurer's duty to record donations in quarterly reports. The provision establishes clear, binding statutory procedure for when disclosure is required, with no delegation to regulation or administrative discretion.

“a if it is a donation of more than £11,180 , or b if, when it is added to any other relevant benefit or benefits , the aggregate amount of the benefits is more than £11,180”

Section 63(1) enumerates the filing schedule with specific temporal intervals: weekly reports beginning on the first day of the general election period, continuing for each successive seven-day period, and concluding with a final sub-week period. The statute explicitly defines 'general election period' and 'reporting period', establishing a clear, codified schedule. Schedule 6 is referenced for detailed reporting content, indicating the statutory framework is comprehensive.

“the treasurer of a registered party shall, in the case of any general election period, prepare a report under this section in respect of each of the following periods— a the period of seven days beginning with the first day of the general election period; b each succeeding period of seven days falling within the general election period; and c any final period of less than seven days falling within that period”

The section mandates disclosure of donor full names for Irish citizens and other entity types (companies, unions, societies, etc.), satisfying the name requirement. However, the statute does not require disclosure of occupation or employer information for any donor category—only name, address (for entities), and documentary verification. This covers the name component but omits the occupation/employer elements specified in DISC.3.

“In the case of a donation by an Irish citizen the report must also— a give the donor's full name”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Schedule 1, paragraph 11A addresses the qualifications and disqualifications for staff appointments to the Electoral Commission itself, not campaign-finance disclosure requirements or public access to filings. It contains no procedural rules governing public accessibility of campaign-finance filings, online publication timelines, or disclosure procedures.

Section 159 codifies one penalty (election void/office vacated) for corrupt and illegal practices, establishing statutory grounding for enforcement consequences. However, the section does not specify monetary civil penalties or criminal grades (fines, imprisonment); it references corrupt and illegal practices defined elsewhere in the Act but does not itself enumerate a full penalty schedule. The section defines procedural consequences (voiding, incapacity periods) rather than financial or criminal penalties.

“If a candidate who had been elected is reported by an election court personally guilty or guilty by his agents of any corrupt or illegal practice his election shall be void”

The section establishes statutory protection for Electoral Commission independence by disqualifying its members and staff from serving simultaneously in Parliament (House of Commons), creating a structural separation that insulates the enforcement body from direct political control and in-cycle legislative pressure. This mechanism protects the Commission's institutional independence through statutory codification.

“in Part II (bodies of which all members are disqualified), insert at the appropriate place— The Electoral Commission. ; and b in Part III (other disqualifying offices), insert at the appropriate places— Deputy Electoral Commissioners. , Assistant Electoral Commissioners. , and Member of the staff of the Electoral Commission.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 143 addresses only witness expenses in election petition trials—a procedural matter for dispute resolution about election outcomes, not campaign-finance violations. It contains no provision creating or authorizing private rights of action for breaches of campaign-finance rules (contributions, spending, disclosure, foreign-source prohibitions, etc.). The section is about cost-shifting in existing litigation, not substantive enforcement of finance rules.

The section prohibits transactions involving non-authorised participants (defined by reference to 'permissible donor' in s.54(2)), which encompasses the foreign-source concept. However, this excerpt does not itself define 'permissible donor' or explicitly state which foreign sources are prohibited—those definitions lie in s.54(2), not in s.71H. The prohibition is statutorily grounded but the operative definitional element is cross-referenced rather than self-contained, making the procedural clarity partial rather than complete.

“A registered party must not— a be a party to a regulated transaction to which any of the other parties is not an authorised participant; b derive a benefit in consequence of a connected transaction if any of the parties to that transaction is not an authorised participant.”

The section delegates to the Secretary of State by order the power to specify circumstances in which non-permissible donors may be treated as authorised participants, addressing indirectly some pass-through scenarios. However, the statutory text itself does not enumerate specific indirect foreign-source channels (e.g., foreign-controlled entities, corporate-ownership tracing) or define the procedure for identifying foreign beneficiaries through domestic intermediaries; the delegation to administrative order means key procedural detail is not grounded in statute.

“The Secretary of State may, by order, specify circumstances or any description of circumstances in which a person who is not a permissible donor is to be treated as an authorised participant.”

Section 71H establishes a statutory prohibition on parties transacting with non-authorised participants (non-permissible donors), which incorporates foreign-source restrictions by reference to section 54(2)'s definition of permissible donors. However, the section does not explicitly mandate verification procedures, methods of confirmation, or what evidence parties must obtain to demonstrate compliance; it creates the substantive rule but delegates verification methodology to administrative guidance or common practice rather than statutory enumeration.

“A registered party must not— a be a party to a regulated transaction to which any of the other parties is not an authorised participant; b derive a benefit in consequence of a connected transaction if any of the parties to that transaction is not an authorised participant.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the disqualification criteria and appointment termination conditions for staff of the Electoral Commission itself, not campaign-finance record retention by campaign committees. It contains no requirements for campaign committees to retain donor lists, expenditure records, or bank statements.