EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute concerns a school or water district board, not an election administration commission. It is completely inapplicable to election commissioners or election staff. Even if it were applicable, the section requires disclosure and board approval of financial interests only when a trustee is 'directly interested financially in any contract, work done or property purchased by the district'—a narrow category covering vendor conflicts but not party positions, candidate connections, or broader financial entanglements relevant to election integrity. The section does not apply to the election administration institutional framework.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section explicitly precludes judicial review of election contests involving the president, vice-president, or presidential electors, stating determinations are 'final and conclusive and is not subject to judicial review.' This directly contradicts COI.2, which requires codified judicial review of election-authority decisions. The section does not establish a statutory framework enabling such review; rather, it statutorily forecloses it.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section does not address the election commission's existence, mandate, or institutional structure at all. It contains only technical procedural requirements for judges to set voting machine counters to zero before voting. It is entirely disconnected from COMM.1, which concerns constitutional or statutory grounding of the commission itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 22-18-111 governs temporary appointment procedures for vacant elective offices (senator, state offices, legislature, county offices) when vacancies occur mid-term. It does not establish or describe the institutional structure, appointment process, or composition of any election commission. This section addresses successor-filling mechanisms, not commission governance. The criterion requires evaluation of commission appointment authority; this section contains no such content.

While the section specifies that appointed directors serve 'until the next regular election,' it does not establish fixed-length terms, staggered removal cycles, or statutory grounds for removal. The statute addresses only vacancy-filling procedures and interim tenure; it does not define the underlying term structure, removal protections, or cyclical renewal of director positions. Term protection requires statutorily-defined fixed terms with staggered cycles and removal-for-cause grounds—none of which appear in this section.

“An appointee to the office of director shall serve until the next regular election.”

The statute requires members to be of 'different political parties,' which provides explicit political balance on the canvassing board itself. However, the critical structural weakness is that both appointees are chosen solely by the county clerk—a single executive official—with no multi-branch appointment, confirmation requirement, supermajority threshold, or judicial involvement. This creates vulnerability to single-party control at the appointing level, even though the resulting board must be internally balanced. A dual-scholar test would likely split: left-leaning scholars might credit the internal balance requirement; right-leaning scholars would flag the lack of appointment safeguards (no confirmation, no independent appointment authority). The statute satisfies the balance *requirement* but not the institutional *insulation* that COMM.4 prioritizes.

“The county canvassing board is the county clerk and two (2) electors of different political parties resident in the county appointed by the county clerk.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs campaign finance contribution limits and prohibitions—disclosure and enforcement of political spending rules—not the election authority's operational budget. It contains no provision establishing an independent statutory line item for election administration funding or protecting election agency budgets from executive reallocation. This is a candidate/PAC regulation statute, not a structural provision for election authority funding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the composition, election, and qualifications of county central committees for political parties — it concerns intraparty organizational structure, not election administration funding or budgeting cycles. It contains no provisions establishing multi-year funding frameworks, budget authority, appropriations mechanisms, or protection from annual reallocation of election administration resources.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

Wyoming Statute § 22-8-113 mandates that training schools be conducted before each primary and general election with a statutory obligation for all judges of election and counting board members to attend at least one school. The statute specifies content (minimum curriculum prescribed by the secretary of state) and frequency (not later than four days before elections). These requirements are embedded directly in statute rather than administrative discretion.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section codifies a pre-election testing and certification procedure for voting machines, specifying the county clerk's role, the testing methodology, and documentation requirements. However, it does not establish codified criteria for equipment approval, does not designate independent evaluators or third-party certification bodies, does not require a public-comment period, and does not address vendor oversight or post-certification accountability mechanisms. This is a machine-preparation protocol, not a vendor-accountability certification process.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration procedures, verification, and provisional ballots—not vendor certification, decertification grounds, or procedures for revoking certification of election equipment or service providers. The criterion CERT.3 requires statutory definition of grounds and procedures for revoking vendor certification; this section contains no such content.