EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 69 of the BWO regulates the procedural mechanics of ballot counting and vote tallying at the polling place level. It contains no provisions requiring commissioners, election officials, or Beisitzer (poll observers/assistants) to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party affiliations, or candidate connections. The section addresses only the chain of custody, verification, and counting of ballots under the supervision of the Wahlvorsteher (presiding officer), not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements.

§ 18(4a) BWahlG codifies the right to judicial review of Federal Electoral Commission decisions that prevent parties/groups from submitting nominations. The statute explicitly defines standing (parties or associations affected), timeline (four days after announcement), and venue (Federal Constitutional Court). This provides clear, statutorily-grounded accountability for administrative determinations affecting ballot access.

“Gegen eine Feststellung nach Absatz 4, die sie an der Einreichung von Wahlvorschlägen hindert, kann eine Partei oder Vereinigung binnen vier Tagen nach Bekanntgabe Beschwerde zum Bundesverfassungsgericht erheben.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is found in the BWahlG (Federal Electoral Act), which is federal statute, not the German Constitution. While the electoral commission structure is statutorily grounded—satisfying the basic requirement for statutory law rather than pure executive discretion—the criterion explicitly asks whether the mandate is set in the CONSTITUTION rather than statute alone. § 9 BWahlG provides statutory scaffolding for election administration bodies, but does not anchor them in Germany's constitutional framework (the Grundgesetz). Therefore, the structural grounding is statutory (score 1) rather than constitutional (score 2).

§ 4(3) of the BWO establishes that judicial branch members (federal administrative court judges and state administrative court judges) are appointed to electoral commissions on the recommendation of court presidents—a multi-branch structural safeguard. Combined with § 4(2), which mandates that political parties proposed by statute be appropriately considered when selecting lay members (Beisitzer), the statute creates a framework where executive officials (Wahlleiter) cannot unilaterally control composition. Judges nominated by the judiciary and parties nominated through statutory process provide distinct sources of appointment authority independent of any single branch.

“Der Bundeswahlleiter beruft zwei Richter des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts, die Landeswahlleiter berufen je zwei Richter des Oberverwaltungsgerichts des Landes und jeweils einen Stellvertreter. Die Berufung erfolgt auf Vorschlag des Gerichtspräsidenten.”

The statute establishes a fixed term tied to the Bundestag's electoral period (Wahlperiode), satisfying the 'fixed length' element. However, the section provides no staggered removal cycles and, critically, no statutory grounds for removal—removal appears to rest entirely on the Bundestag's discretion between elections. This lacks the institutional insulation that term protection requires; commissioners serve at the pleasure of a single political branch.

“Der Wahlprüfungsausschuß wird vom Bundestag für die Dauer der Wahlperiode gewählt.”

Section § 4(2) BWO mandates statutory political balance by requiring that election commission members (Beisitzer) be selected in proportion to parties' performance in the most recent federal election and that party-nominated candidates be appointed. This is a clear statutorily-grounded party-balance requirement. Additionally, § 4(3) ensures independent judicial appointment of court members (judges from federal and state administrative courts) proposed by court presidents, providing structural multi-source appointment.

“Bei der Auswahl der Beisitzer der Wahlausschüsse sollen in der Regel die Parteien in der Reihenfolge der bei der letzten Bundestagswahl in dem jeweiligen Gebiet errungenen Zahlen der Zweitstimmen angemessen berücksichtigt und die von ihnen rechtzeitig vorgeschlagenen Wahlberechtigten berufen werden.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § BWO § 80 addresses the procedural notification of elected candidates by election officials and contains no provisions regarding budget allocation, funding lines, or fiscal independence. It is a purely operational/administrative rule governing post-election communication, not a budgetary statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 36 BWahlG addresses the procedural mechanics of absentee voting (mail-in ballots), including submission deadlines, sworn declarations, and postal delivery. It contains no provisions regarding election infrastructure budgets, budget cycles, or multi-year funding structures. The section is silent on the funding mechanism for election administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 46 of the BWahlG governs loss of Bundestag membership and addresses grounds for disqualification of elected representatives (invalidity, recount, loss of eligibility, voluntary resignation, party ban). It contains no provisions regarding funding of election authorities, election administration vendors, or any prohibition on foreign-source funding. This section is entirely unrelated to the institutional funding structure of election administration and therefore does not satisfy FUND.3.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 9 BWO addresses exemptions from voluntary honorary election service (Wahlehrenämter), not the institutional structure, appointment, or protection of career professional staff. It contains no provisions regarding civil-service status, merit-based employment protections, or professional staffing of the election authority. The criterion requires statutory protection of career staff; this section does not address staffing at all.

§6(5) mandates that municipal authorities must inform poll board members about their duties before the election, ensuring proper conduct of voting and result determination. However, the statute does not define specific content, duration, frequency, or quality standards for such training—it leaves implementation details to administrative discretion. The requirement is present but lacks the codified specificity needed to fully satisfy the criterion.

“Die Gemeindebehörde hat die Mitglieder des Wahlvorstandes vor der Wahl so über ihre Aufgaben zu unterrichten, dass ein ordnungsmäßiger Ablauf der Wahlhandlung sowie der Ermittlung und Feststellung des Wahlergebnisses gesichert ist.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute delegates certification authority to the Interior Ministry and mandates regulatory detail on approval criteria, procedures, testing protocols, and public testing (Erprobung). However, the delegation to executive regulation without Bundesrat consent, combined with absence of statutory specification of independent evaluators, timeline requirements, or formal public-comment procedures, leaves critical procedural safeguards to discretionary rulemaking rather than codified statute. The framework is partially codified but structurally vulnerable to unilateral executive control.

“Das Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat wird ermächtigt, durch Rechtsverordnung, die nicht der Zustimmung des Bundesrates bedarf, nähere Bestimmungen zu erlassen über 1. die Voraussetzungen für die amtliche Zulassung der Bauart von Wahlgeräten sowie für die Rücknahme und den Widerruf der Zulassung, 2. das Verfahren für die amtliche Zulassung der Bauart, 3. das Verfahren für die Prüfung eines Wahlgerätes auf die der amtlich zugelassenen Bauart entsprechende Ausführung, 4. die öffentliche Erprobung eines Wahlgerätes vor seiner Verwendung”

The statute grants the federal interior ministry authority to set conditions for official approval and withdrawal/revocation of certification via regulation, and contemplates periodic public testing. However, the text does not codify specific recertification triggers—such as material software/hardware updates, discovery of defects, or fixed temporal schedules. The delegation to regulation is standard German practice, but CERT.2 requires that triggers themselves be codified (in statute or regulation), not merely that rulemaking authority exist. The section provides structural authority for oversight but leaves the substantive trigger framework to discretionary regulatory definition.

“die Voraussetzungen für die amtliche Zulassung der Bauart von Wahlgeräten sowie für die Rücknahme und den Widerruf der Zulassung”

§ 35(3) expressly authorizes the Federal Ministry of Interior to establish by regulation the grounds (Voraussetzungen) and procedures for revocation (Rücknahme) and withdrawal (Widerruf) of official certification of voting machine designs. The statute explicitly delegates to regulation the framework for decertification, satisfying the requirement that grounds and procedure be defined in statute (or statutory delegation). The provision mandates that these rules be established and published, creating a statutory basis for decertification oversight.

“die Voraussetzungen für die amtliche Zulassung der Bauart von Wahlgeräten sowie für die Rücknahme und den Widerruf der Zulassung”