EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute specifies that a district judge is the court of original jurisdiction for election contests. While the text does not explicitly state 'original jurisdiction,' it identifies the district judge as the judge 'conducting the hearing' for contested elections and grants that judge subpoena power and authority over witnesses and evidence—the hallmarks of original jurisdiction. The statute also specifies venue by requiring the petition be filed 'with the secretary of the election board with whom the candidate filed the candidate's declaration of candidacy,' which anchors jurisdiction to the election board that received the initial candidacy filing. This satisfies the criterion of specifying court jurisdiction for contests, even though additional detail about appellate procedures or exact venue rules may exist elsewhere in the code.

No matching sections in corpus.

Oklahoma § 26-8-118 addresses contest procedures and establishes that a district judge has authority to compel witnesses and evidence, which provides a procedural framework for evidence presentation. However, the statute does not codify (1) a specific standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt) for determining whether fraud or irregularities have occurred, nor (2) specific admissibility rules governing what types of evidence may or may not be presented. The statute delegates the evidentiary framework to judicial discretion rather than establishing it in statutory text. Under the dual-scholar test, this satisfies the threshold requirement of establishing a procedural mechanism for evidence introduction but falls short of full statutory codification of evidentiary standards and proof burdens. Score reflects presence of procedural rules (subpoena authority, witness compulsion) without codified substantive standards of proof or admissibility.

§ 26-8-114 codifies recount procedures in statute with specificity. The statute defines: (1) who counts (county election board for electronic devices; appointed counters for manual recounts, with qualifications tied to precinct inspector/judge/clerk standards); (2) how the process works (opening transfer cases by precinct, assigning ballots to devices or counter groups, county election board supervision); (3) evidentiary standards for ballot validity (county election board majority vote determines if ballot is valid and should be counted); (4) watcher rights and challenge procedures (written challenges made immediately to county election board, whose decision is final); and (5) compensation (counters paid on same basis as election workers). The procedures apply to both electronic and manual recounts. This is codified in statute, not delegated to regulation or administrative directive.

The statute enumerates specific recount triggers: (1) for candidate elections, a 10% margin threshold triggers an additional deposit requirement, and the statute establishes that any candidate whose name appeared on the ballot may petition for a recount; (2) for issue/question elections, specific margin thresholds are codified (150 votes or 1% depending on total votes cast), and recounts require a petition signed by eligible registered voters meeting specified numeric thresholds (150 voters or 1% of votes cast). These enumerated triggers provide clear statutory rules governing when recounts may be requested, satisfying the criterion's requirement that recount triggers be codified in statute.

The statute clearly allocates recount costs by outcome. It specifies that: (1) initial deposits cover actual expenses including identified categories (salaries, mileage, court reporter fees, etc.); (2) any deposit balance is returned to the contestant; (3) if the contestant is successful in changing the outcome, the full deposit is refunded and the county or state bears the expense; (4) if unsuccessful, the deposit is not refundable. This creates a bright-line cost-allocation rule tied to recount success, satisfying the procedural clarity requirement for RECT.3.

The statute codifies that the district court's judgment on ballot preservation is 'final and conclusive,' establishing a binding legal effect for that preliminary determination. It also specifies that if ballots are found properly preserved, the recount shall be conducted 'immediately thereafter.' However, the section does not explicitly codify the legal effect of the recount's actual ballot count findings—i.e., whether the recount results are binding on certification, whether they mandate amendment of official results, or what happens if the recount produces a different outcome than the original count. The statute addresses the procedural effect (the recount shall occur) but leaves the substantive consequence of the recount count itself to other statutory provisions or case law. This is a partial satisfaction: the finding-effect on ballot preservation is codified, but the finding-effect on the actual recount count is not.

The statute explicitly sets a specific, binding certification deadline: 5:00 p.m. Tuesday following the General Election. This is a clear statutory mandate, not subject to administrative discretion. The section also addresses the alternative scenario where a contest is filed, establishing that certification occurs 'either when the contest is determined or when it has been abandoned,' which provides a secondary but still statutory framework. The deadline is codified in statute and leaves no discretionary authority to the State Election Board or other officials to delay or extend the certification date absent a pending contest.

No matching sections in corpus.