EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 7-10-103 addresses candidate filing requirements for nonpartisan offices, including filing fees, petition procedures, and ballot access rules. It does not enumerate the parties with standing to contest an election. The section does reference election contest procedures in subdivision (c)(1)(C)(ii), which states that 'The sufficiency of a petition filed under this section may be challenged in the same manner as provided by law for election contests under § 7-5-801 et seq.' However, this section itself contains no enumeration of standing parties for election contests. To satisfy CONT.EDRI.1, the criterion requires that the statute explicitly enumerate which parties (candidates, parties, qualified voters, AG, etc.) have standing to bring an election contest. This section is limited to candidate filing mechanics and does not address contest standing.

Section 7-5-804(a) specifies that election contests are tried by 'the circuit judge' in open court, establishing which court level (circuit court) has jurisdiction. However, the statute does not specify WHICH circuit court has jurisdiction when multiple circuits exist, nor does it address venue rules for determining the proper venue among potentially multiple circuits. The section clarifies the trial court level and procedure but leaves unresolved the geographic venue allocation that is necessary for complete jurisdictional specification. A fully compliant statute would include explicit venue rules (e.g., 'in the circuit court of the county where the election was held' or similar territorial specification). The current text satisfies the court LEVEL requirement but not the complete jurisdictional specification needed for unambiguous dispute resolution.

“The election contest shall be tried by the circuit judge in open court without a jury.”

The statute specifies a clear 15-day deadline for House election contests measured from certification of election returns by the county board. However, for Senate contests, the statute explicitly defers to chamber internal rules ('in accordance with the rules and procedures for election contests as established by that chamber under its governing rules'), providing no statutory deadline. For eligibility contests, the deadline is indefinite ('at any time after the election'). This creates a bifurcated framework: one chamber has a codified deadline while the other does not, and eligibility contests lack temporal specification. A fully satisfying answer would require deadlines specified by statute for all categories of contests and both chambers.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 7-5-702 addresses ballot preservation, chain of custody, and the procedural conditions under which ballots may be opened or destroyed. It establishes that ballots may be used as evidence in election contests and directs tribunals to control access. However, it contains no codified standard of proof for election contests and no statutory evidentiary rules governing how ballot evidence or other evidence must be evaluated, weighted, or admitted. The section explicitly delegates evidentiary authority to 'some competent tribunal'—deferring to common law or case-by-case judicial discretion rather than codifying standards. It does not specify burden of proof (preponderance, clear and convincing, etc.), admissibility criteria, or substantive rules for evaluating contested election claims. This is a ballot-custody statute, not an election-contest procedure or evidence statute.

Section 7-5-319(c) provides detailed statutory procedures for recounts that specify: (1) who counts (the county board of election commissioners); (2) how (paper ballots recounted in the manner prescribed for initial count, or alternative methods if malfunction detected; electronic devices subject to manual verification); and (3) what evidence is generated and preserved (certified results tapes, notification of affected candidates, sealing and storage of ballots). The statute codifies mandatory procedures at subsection (c)(2) with specific enumerated requirements (A)-(E) rather than delegating these details to regulation or administrative directive. This satisfies the criterion's requirement that recount procedures be defined in statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

Ark. Code § 7-5-319(f)–(g) provides a clear statutory allocation of recount costs. The candidate requesting the recount bears the initial cost, paid in advance to the county board of election commissioners. However, subsection (f)(2) establishes a refund mechanism: if the recount alters the outcome of the election, costs are refunded to the petitioning candidate. Subsection (g) further codifies a cost cap—the lesser of 25¢ per vote cast in affected precincts or $2,500 countywide—based on actual costs incurred. This structure satisfies the criterion by specifying both who pays (the candidate) and under what outcome costs are allocated (refund if outcome changes), with statutory limits on the amount chargeable.

Section 7-5-319(d) explicitly codifies the legal effect of a recount finding. It establishes that when a recount produces results differing from the original certification, the recount results are mandatory and binding—they 'shall be included in the canvass' as the official vote for the affected precinct. This creates a clear, statutorily-mandated amendment of the election results. The provision is unambiguous and leaves no discretion with election officials regarding whether to adopt the recount findings. This satisfies the criterion for codified recount-finding effect.

Ark. Code § 7-5-703 explicitly sets a statutory certification deadline: the Secretary of State must cast up and arrange votes within 30 days after the time allowed for county board returns (or sooner if returns are complete). The Governor then 'immediately thereafter' issues a proclamation declaring the winner and grants an official certificate under the state seal. The certification mechanism and timeline are codified in statute, not left to administrative discretion. The use of mandatory language ('shall') and a fixed 30-day window satisfies the requirement that the certification deadline be set by statute rather than discretionary action.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 7-5-805 establishes procedures for contesting state legislative offices (Senate and House of Representatives), but it contains no mechanism to stay certification of election results while a recount or contest is pending. The statute addresses complaint filing deadlines, responsive pleading timelines, and commission procedures for reviewing evidence and making recommendations to the respective chambers. However, there is no statutory provision that suspends, delays, or stays the certification process during the pendency of these contests. The timing provisions focus on when complaints must be filed (15 days after county certification for House contests) and when recommendations must be submitted to the legislature (5 days before General Assembly convenes for House contests), but these do not constitute a stay of certification itself. The statute delegates final authority to the Senate's governing rules (for Senate contests) and to the House of Representatives as a body (for House contests), but does not codify a pre-certification stay mechanism.