The gaps, explained so anyone can understand
Each card is a real, documented weakness in how elections are run today — in plain language, with a cited source, and live data showing how common it is across the 97 jurisdictions we've analyzed.
Software you can't check
Can anyone verify the code that counts the votes?
Software you're not allowed to check
The machine that counts the votes follows secret instructions. If no one outside the company is allowed to read those instructions, no one can be sure the votes are counted fairly.
Learn how it works →No way to prove the code is the real code
Even if the voting software is published, that alone isn't enough. You also need to be able to rebuild it yourself and get the exact same program the machine runs. Without that, the published code might not match the secret version actually installed.
Learn how it works →Nothing locks the software before election day
Even if the voting software was checked weeks ago, in most places nothing forces the machine to prove — on election day — that it's still running that exact same checked version. So it could be quietly swapped at the last minute.
Learn how it works →Physical & network security
Can the machines be tampered with or reached over a network?
Machines that open with a screwdriver
A voting machine should be physically hard to open and obviously broken if someone tries. Where the rules don't require that, the case can be opened and the insides reached in minutes.
Learn how it works →Vote equipment that can reach the internet
Some vote-counting machines can quietly talk to the internet. Anything connected to the internet can be reached by a stranger far away — so the machines that count votes should be unplugged from every network.
Learn how it works →Chain-of-custody nobody can see
Voting equipment should have a clear, public record of who touched it and when. When those custody records aren't open, someone can get unauthorized access — and it can go unnoticed for a long time.
Learn how it works →Checking the result (audits)
Is the count actually checked against the paper?
Nobody is required to check the count
After machines count the votes, someone should check a batch of the real paper ballots by hand to confirm the machine got it right. If the law doesn't require that check, a wrong count can slip through unnoticed.
Learn how it works →Weak audits that can miss a flipped result
Even when the law requires a check of the paper ballots, a weak method — like always recounting a tiny fixed percentage — can easily miss a wrong result in a close race. A smarter method checks however many ballots it takes to be sure.
Learn how it works →No extra check when the race is close
A razor-thin race is exactly when you'd want an automatic extra check. But in many places there's no rule that triggers a recount or audit just because the margin is tiny — so the closest, most error-prone results can be certified with no second look.
Learn how it works →Audits behind closed doors
An audit is supposed to build public trust — but that only works if the public can actually watch it. When an audit happens behind closed doors, you're just being asked to trust a different process you also can't see.
Learn how it works →Audits that don't actually change the result
An audit is supposed to catch a wrong count. But in many places the audit is 'informational' only — even if it finds the machines got it wrong, it can't overturn the result that was already certified.
Learn how it works →Proof anyone can see
Can the public verify the outcome for themselves?
You can't prove your own vote counted
Today, even if you trust the result, you personally have no way to confirm that your own ballot was actually counted. The technology to let every voter check that — without revealing how they voted — exists, but almost no law allows or requires it.
Learn how it works →When there's no paper to recount
If the only record of your vote lives inside the computer, there's nothing independent to recount when something looks wrong. A paper record you can see and check is what makes a real recount or audit even possible.
Learn how it works →Who builds the machines
Is the whole system controlled by one vendor in the dark?
Watching & reporting
Can observers watch, and are results published fast and openly?
International observers turned away at will
Independent international observers are one of the world's main checks that an election was run fairly. When officials can bar them — or even threaten them — at will, that outside check simply disappears.
Learn how it works →Slow results leave a window for doubt
When results come out slowly and without precinct-level detail, the gap between 'polls closed' and 'we know who won' fills up with rumor and false claims. Fast, transparent, precinct-by-precinct reporting shrinks that window.
Learn how it works →Protecting the voter
Is the ballot secret, accessible, and reachable?
A ballot that isn't truly secret
If someone can find out how you voted, they can buy your vote or pressure you into it. A secret ballot isn't just privacy — it's what makes vote-buying and coercion impossible to enforce.
Learn how it works →Voting that shuts people out
If a polling place or a voting machine isn't accessible, voters with disabilities can be effectively shut out — unable to vote privately and independently, or unable to even get in the door. They're not formally denied; they're just blocked.
Learn how it works →Too few places to vote
If there aren't enough polling places for the people who live in an area, the result is long lines and long travel — which quietly stops some people from voting, without anyone ever being formally turned away.
Learn how it works →Every gap here has an answer.
TrustVoting is built so each of these weaknesses can be closed — and proven closed.
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